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interchange between organizational conditions and knowledge
creation has been investigated through a case study method in 24
initiatives in three firms, namely Ericsson Telecommunication, KLM
Cargo, and Van Ommeren. The results of the study show that mana-
gement can have a strong influence on the progression of initiatives
by manipulating the organizational conditions and knowledge base.
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PREFACE 
Innovation is fascinating because it deals with the potential future in which we may live. 
For firms, this fascination with the future must, however, be balanced with the need to 
ensure profitability today. Initiatives to pursue new ideas, therefore, cannot be considered 
in isolation, but must be considered with respect to the other activities of the firm. This 
necessity to balance exploration and exploitation is fundamental to the survival of firms; an 
emphasis on merely one aspect would surely be doomed.  
Before I entered the field of strategic management this point was missed on me. 
Having studied Industrial Design Engineering at Delft University of Technology, I was 
active on the exploration side of the balance. The realm of the designer is represented in 
dogmas like “innovate or perish.” The designer’s goal is to invent better, nicer, more 
sophisticated products or services than are currently available. Naturally, these are to be 
designed in such a way that they are not just technologically but also economically viable. 
Market size, customer needs, product pricing, production and material costs, competitive 
positioning are all fundamental aspects considered in the design process. Why some firms 
still found it difficult to adopt innovations that were economically viable was therefore 
something that dumbfounded me as a designer. 
Having moved into the field of Strategic Management as a PhD candidate at the 
Rotterdam School of Management, the existing strategic management literature almost 
instantly answered the now seemingly naive questions that had boggled me as a designer. 
Firms have commitments. They need to exploit their explorations before cannibalizing on 
them. How firms are to manage this balance of exploration-exploitation became my 
primary concern. Two views in the literature stand out. The conditioning view looks at 
what organizational conditions firms use to control explorative processes. Although it 
offers much insight into the firm-initiative relationship, it was very detached from the inner 
workings of the explorative process that I had been involved in as a designer.  That aspect 
was captured by the knowledge-creating view. Yet, that view was succumbing to the same 
trap that I had fallen into as a designer. It failed to take into account that initiatives occur in 
firms, which must balance exploration-exploitation. Finding a resolution for this 
discrepancy is what led to the writing of this study on “Managing Initiatives.’ 
This study of firm renewal through initiatives benefited greatly from being 
embedded in the Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center at the Rotterdam School of 
Management. At the time this study was conducted, the center brought together various 
researchers, such as Henk Volberda, Frans van den Bosch, Charles Baden-Fuller, Tom 
Elring, Eva Meeusen-Henniger, Bert Flier, and Marjolijn Dijksterhuis, who were all 
concerned with how firms renew their strategy and whose involvement in the center has 
resulted in a stream of research publications.  Although these researchers concerned 
themselves with different aspects of the renewal process, this study benefited greatly from 
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the cross-fertilization enabled by the center. As such, I am grateful to the members of the 
center for their ideas and support. More specifically, I am particularly indebted to the 
center’s chair, Henk Volberda, for having laid much of the foundation for this study. He 
ensured cooperation of the firms investigated, organized and was involved in the 
investigation of these firms and their initiatives, and provided the Farsys expert system 
(Volberda, 1998) that was used in this study for the measurement of organizational forms. 
Tom Elfring and he also laid much of the groundwork for this study in terms of the 
methodology used for collecting the initiative data. 
During the research project a team of academic supervisors without whose 
expertise this endeavor could not have been completed surrounded me. Henk Volberda of 
the Rotterdam School of Management went out of his way to review my manuscripts, even 
on short-term notice. He divulged much of his expertise on strategic management as 
described in his 1998 book ‘Building the Flexible Firm,’ which formed the basis for 
measuring the conditions of the three firms investigated. My other supervisor, Charles 
Baden-Fuller of City University Business School in London offered many critical and 
creative contributions that have moved this study beyond its initial focus. I am greatly 
indebted to these two academic scholars for having guided me from start to finish. During 
the initial trajectory of my research Tom Elfring, before he left to become a full professor 
at the Free University of Amsterdam, also offered much guidance that helped shape this 
study. Henk Volberda and he organized and were heavily involved in the research at Van 
Ommeren Tank Storage, KLM Cargo, and Ericsson ETM and I am very thankful to them 
for use of their data. 
I was also lucky to benefit from the cooperation and interest of the three 
companies described in this study: KLM Cargo, Van Ommeren Tank Storage (now 
Pakhoed), and Ericsson Telecommunications.  Many people within these companies 
graciously offered their valuable time to cooperate in the larger studies of the Renewal 
Center that this particular study draws upon. Their enthusiasm and support for the research 
carried out through the Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center enabled this study. Since my 
dealings were with Ericsson in particular, I would very much like to thank Joop van Troost 
and Tom Paffen for their support at Ericsson Telecommunications. Within each of the 
previously mentioned companies many interviews were conducted by research assistants. I 
am therefore very thankful to Ronald Boers, Mark Oskam, Carlo Jochems, and Bert Flier. 
Amongst my colleagues from Erasmus University there were many that 
contributed in one form or another to the culmination of this project.  I am very grateful to 
Gerardo Patriotta for the discussions on the framework of this study. In terms of a 
perspective on academia in general and my place in such, I owe much to Eric Gedajlovic 
and K.C. O’Shaughnessy. Simona Latimer-Spedale, Patrick Reinmöller, fellow AIOs 
Raymond van Wijk, Marjolijn Dijksterhuis, Bert Flier, Bas de Leeuw, Tom Mom, and 
Justin Jansen, as well as Marten Stienstra and Asmat Ikram, all made my time at Erasmus 
University a memorable experience.  The support provided by Carolien Heintjes, Bep 
Klop, Birgitte Breemerkamp, Sandra Everts, Will Geurtsen, and Ingrid Oron was also 
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much appreciated. I am also grateful to ERIM in the person of Wilfred Mijnhardt for 
having taken care of the publication of this study. Last but not least, I thank the 
department, which was chaired by Frans van den Bosch and Henk Volberda, for its 
enduring support and commitment to this project.  
  
Finally, I am very grateful to my wife Rita for having supported me throughout this 
trajectory. Not only did she put up with the many evenings, weekends, and vacations spent 
on this study, she also pushed me to go on. Moreover, during this trajectory she gave birth 
to our son Dan, whose arrival only made me more determined to bring this process to a 
closure. Being a parent myself now, I realize how much of my own parents energy in my 
upbringing made completion of this study possible. I thank all those who stood behind me. 
   
Martin Wielemaker 
May 17, 2003 
Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: 
Research on Initiatives 
In this thesis we discuss how initiatives impact strategic renewal in large firms. The 
chapter starts by clarifying the necessity of strategic renewal. Initiatives are then identified 
as an important source for such renewal. We show that differing findings from previous 
studies make it unclear how large firms deal with, and ought to deal with, initiatives. The 
chapter presents the research aim and accompanying questions that guided the study. 
Previous research on the subject is categorized in two perspectives: the ‘conditioning’ 
view and the ‘knowledge-creating’ view. A co-evolutionary view is proposed that 
integrates the two differing views and enables an answer to the research questions. The 
three companies investigated are then briefly introduced as well as the methodology that 
was used in the empirical research. Finally, we end the chapter with an outline of the 
book. 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INITIATIVES 
For firms, the discovery and exploitation of opportunities, constitutes an essential, if not 
crucial, mechanism for survival. Because these firms’ competitive advantages (Porter, 
1980) and idiosyncratic resources (Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984) erode over time, they 
must continuously be renewed (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1990). Such strategic renewal 
starts with the discovery of opportunities. It is the pursuit of the latter by the men and 
women of the organization that takes them to full fruition. Their initiatives are thus a 
source of strategic renewal and form the object of our interest.  
Although the field of strategic management did not deny the need for opportunity 
discovery, superior performance - particularly in large firms - was initially primarily 
related to a sustainable competitive advantage. The positioning school sought such 
advantage in a superior positioning in the market (Porter, 1980). Certain markets were 
considered more profitable than others. Once positioned in a lucrative market, sustaining 
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that advantage was a question of deterring competitors from entry1. The resource-based 
view of the firm (Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Rumelt, 1984; 
Selznick, 1957; Wernerfelt, 1984), instead, considered sustainable competitive advantage 
to be located in non-imitable idiosyncratic resources within the firm. As such, both views 
saw little need for the exploration of opportunities that might eventually yield new 
competitive advantages, but instead focused on sustaining existing ones. 
Yet, the field of strategic management quickly realized that competitive 
advantage, be it in an external market or in the unique resources of a firm, was not 
sustainable forever (Jacobsen, 1992). The dynamic capabilities approach (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1990) pointed to the necessity for firms to renew their competencies. Strategy 
scholars from the different schools agreed that nothing was sustainable in the long term. 
Rumelt stated, “the task of general management is to adjust and renew [..] resources and 
relationships as time, competition, and change erode their value (Rumelt, 1984:558).” A 
quest to reveal the source that would lead to a continuous renewal of competitive 
advantage was on. Not surprisingly, Porter (1991) called for research into the dynamic 
processes that create new competitive advantage. And with the idea prevalent amongst 
many (i.e. Prahalad and Hamel, 1994)2 that firms were operating in hypercompetitive 
environments (D'Aveni, 1994), the need to understand these sources of strategic renewal 
became all the more important.  
The discovery of ideas and opportunities thus lies at the heart of strategic 
management and is why Rumelt (1984: 558) says, “we need new ideas that can create 
competitive advantage over and over again.” Yet, ideas by themselves are dead, stowed 
away on a shelf, resting to be forgotten unless someone decides to pursue them. Initiatives 
represent the pursuit of such ideas and opportunities within firms. They are important 
vehicles that enable strategic renewal (Burgelman, 1983b; Kanter, 1988). Notwithstanding 
that the causal relation between initiatives and strategic renewal is still an object of 
research, the existence of a general relation between the two is now reasonably well 
established (Morris and Sexton, 1996; Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999). Not 
surprisingly, McGrath, MacMillan, and Venkataraman (1995: 252) conclude that ‘a 
principle mechanism through which organizations develop new competitive advantages is 
through the pursuit of new initiatives.” The study of initiatives, therefore, lies at the heart 
of strategic management and merits our attention. 
                                                 
1 For which Porter offered three defense tactics (1985: 487): raising structural barriers, increasing expected 
retaliation, and lowering the inducement for attack. 
2 Prahalad and Hamel (1994) mention various forces that suggest the competitive environment is indeed 
dramatically altering: deregulation, structural changes in the industry, excess capacity in industries, mergers and 
acquisitions, environmental concerns, less protectionism, changing customer expectations, technological 
discontinuities, emerging trade blocks, and global competition. 
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Entrepreneurship 
The management field that deals specifically with the discovery and exploitation of 
opportunities is that of entrepreneurship. The field’s object of study is the entrepreneur 
who “pursues opportunities without regard to resources currently controlled (Stevenson 
and Jarillo, 1990).” The term ‘entrepreneurship’ then can refer either to (1) characteristics 
or traits of the entrepreneur, (2) the process or (3) the outcome of the entrepreneurial 
activities that the entrepreneur engages in (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). The first avenue - 
trait studies that try to answer who an entrepreneur is - has been shown to be unfruitful 
(Gartner, 1988). Of the other two, process and outcome, we are interested in 
entrepreneurship as a process, a common position in the management field (Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990)3. Entrepreneurship in this study is thus defined as “a process by which 
individuals – either on their own or inside organizations – pursue opportunities without 
regard to the resources they currently control (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990: 21). These 
opportunities have been specified as those that create future goods and services (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). The entrepreneur’s activities are entrepreneurial not just because 
they involve the pursuit of opportunities, but more importantly because they also involve 
some element of risk (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Miller, 1983) that stems from the 
aforementioned lack of resource control (Kirzner, 1973). This explains why the terms 
‘change’ and innovation,’ which are often used interchangeably with the term 
entrepreneurship (Brazeal and Herbert, 1999), differ from the latter; they do not 
necessarily entail any risk taking.  
The field of entrepreneurship has traditionally been divided in two: (1) the study 
of independent start-ups and (2) the study of entrepreneurial activity within existing firms. 
Whilst the first is of particular interest to economists, the latter is of particular interest for 
strategists and for this study, because it represents a source of competitive advantage for 
the incumbents. It should be noted that even though the activity occurs in firms, it can 
involve the crossing of organizational and industry boundaries. What matters, is that it is 
mainly pursued within the firm. According to Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) such 
entrepreneurial activity within firms can have wide-ranging effects: (1) the creation of a 
new business activity within the existing organization, (2) the complete transformation or 
renewal of the existing organization, and (3) the firm changing the rules of the industry. It 
might also result in a spin-off that grows into a separate firm (Elfring and Baven, 1996; 
Burgelman 1996).  
Within this field, that has alternatively been labeled intrapreneurship (Pinchot, 
1985), corporate venturing (Venkataraman, MacMillan, and McGrath, 1992), internal 
corporate venturing (Burgelman, 1983a), or corporate entrepreneurship (Guth and 
Ginsberg, 1990), the initiative constitutes our unit of interest. Because entrepreneurship in 
the management field is regarded as a process (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990) and initiatives 
                                                 
3 Economists are particularly interested in the economic impact of the outcome, i.e. the results (Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990)  
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are considered a specific form of entrepreneurship (Birkinshaw, 1997), it follows that an 
initiative is also seen as a process. An initiative has therefore been defined as “essentially 
an entrepreneurial process, beginning with the identification of an opportunity and 
culminating in the commitment of resources to that opportunity (Birkinshaw, 1997).” The 
initiative construct is narrower than an internal corporate venture (Burgelman, 1983a), 
because the latter also includes “the ongoing management of the resultant business activity 
(Birkinshaw, 1997: 207).” This latter activity is of less interest when one seeks to 
understand sources of strategic renewal. Not surprisingly, a recent strand of 
entrepreneurship research has centered on initiatives (Birkinshaw, 1997; Kanzanjian and 
Rao, 1999; McGrath, MacMillan, and Venkataraman, 1995; Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 
1999; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), seeking to answer, “how do initiatives occur and what 
facilitates them?” 
The question of how to deal with initiatives is particularly relevant for large firms, 
the subject of this study. Because of their size large firms are often sluggish and in need of 
new initiative. Yet, owing to economies of scale that same size lets them excel at 
exploiting their existing competencies. Putting energy in the exploration of new initiatives 
would counteract that exploitative capability. Evidently, this is much less a problem for 
smaller firms. Thus, especially large firms face the paradox of exploitation versus 
exploration (March, 1991; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Volberda and Baden-Fuller, 2003). 
Initiatives clearly embody this dilemma of change and stability that large firms must 
resolve to survive. How then should large firms deal with initiatives? 
Initiatives 
With initiatives being at the center stage of much research, both in strategic management 
and entrepreneurship, it is necessary to define them appropriately. As stated before, 
Birkinshaw defined an initiative as “essentially an entrepreneurial process, beginning with 
the identification of an opportunity and culminating in the commitment of resources to that 
opportunity (Birkinshaw, 1997).” He alternatively defines the end-point of the process as 
an explicit or implicit approval, or a rejection. For a definition of an initiative to be self-
explanatory we need to integrate the description of entrepreneurship (Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), as previously discussed, into the definition 
of an initiative (Birkinshaw, 1997). This leads to a definition of an initiative as “a process 
by which individuals inside organizations identify and pursue an opportunity to create 
future goods and services without regard to the resources they currently control, 
culminating in the approval of that opportunity.”  
 The initiative, i.e. the process, exists separate from the firm, i.e. it is “a discrete 
[…] undertaking (Birkinshaw, 1997).” It has a life of its own and it can thus part or spin 
out from the firm and evolve into a separate firm (Elfring and Baven, 1996; Burgelman, 
1996). This is not to say that the two have are not intertwined. On the contrary, there is a 
large interdependency between the two, because of the resources such as the people, 
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knowledge, and capital that they both share; this is the reason why their relationship has 
been described as part-whole relationship (Van de Ven, 1986). Yet, notwithstanding these 
dependencies, at its core the initiative is separate from the firm. 
 The identified opportunity represents a new knowledge base in the firm, namely a 
new combination of prior and other knowledge. This is particularly highlighted in the 
knowledge-creating view of initiatives, to which we shall turn later. Although ideas form 
the starting point for opportunities (Timmons, 1990), they are not necessarily the same. An 
opportunity is an idea that “has the qualities of being attractive, durable, and timely and is 
anchored in a product or service which creates or adds value for its buyer or end user 
(Timmons, 1994: 80).” In other words, an opportunity is an idea with business potential. 
Not all ideas therefore represent opportunities. However, because in this study we only 
consider ideas that are opportunities, we will use the two terms interchangeably. 
  
Figure 1.1: The Initiative Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study differentiates between product (goods) and process (service) 
opportunities (Tushman and Nadler, 1986), because such a difference has been known to 
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practice. Although other distinctions might have much theoretical value -such as between 
radical and incremental opportunities (Henderson and Clark, 1990), or between 
autonomous and induced opportunities (Burgelman, 1983a), or between the locus of 
opportunity (Birkinshaw, 1997)-, they are difficult to distinguish in practice (Lovas and 
Ghoshal, 2000) and were thus set aside in this investigation.  
Once identified, the development and approval of this opportunity, i.e. the 
knowledge base, is pursued. This study characterizes the pursuit both as as a knowledge-
creation and a resource (capital and assets) acquisition endeavor. The resources are 
considered necessary for the development of the knowledge base, i.e. the opportunity, 
because the initiators had handled ‘without regard for resources under their control.’ As the 
knowledge base develops, it moves from an idea, to a concept, to detailed action. This 
development occurs over time and can be characterized as moving through three phases 
termed linking, interpreting, and integrating phase. This study will alternatively use the 
terms variation, selection, and retention for these phases. Although it is acknowledged that 
these terms are not necessarily identical, they are considered to overlap to a large extent. 
The study also recognizes that initiatives do not need to proceed sequentially through these 
three phases, but can iterate back and forth (Van de Ven, 1992). Yet, although loops may 
exist, this sequential depiction serves to convey the general aggregate progression of the 
initiative. 
The approval refers to some form of sufficient legitimation (Van de Ven, 1986), 
either in the form of resource commitment or approval of further knowledge-creation. The 
commitment of resources alone does not necessarily constitute the end of the process, 
because these may very well be obtained outside the firm. We side with Birkinshaw's 
(1997) standpoint that the approval marks the end of the initiative process either by an 
explicit or implicit approval, or by a rejection. As is standard practice in initiative research, 
we limit the dependent variable to something called the outcome. As said earlier, proving 
the causal relationship with strategic renewal is not the object of this study. The outcome is 
measured by asking the participants of an initiative what they consider the outcome of the 
initiative to be4. 
Being located inside an organization, the definition implies that the process is 
influenced by various organizational conditions that determine the trajectory the initiative 
follows (Van de Ven, 1986). These conditions are differentiated in organizational form, 
administrative and incentive systems, and managerial roles. The question is, "how do they 
influence the trajectories of initiatives?" Hence, the interest is in the causality of these 
elements that are also considered to impact each other (Miller, 1986). Besides 
                                                 
4 A similar approach was chosen by Birkinshaw who measured three kinds of outcomes: (1) average new 
investment in subsidiary as a result of approval, (2) average new sales for subsidiary within two years, (3) 
subjective long term outcomes as stated by respondents. I do not use the first two because initiatives with high 
average investment and sales are not necessarily successful. The third option, asking the participants, is more 
appropriate because they can judge the status of the initiative when it has not yet reached the implementation 
stage. As opposed to Birkinshaw I measure the short-term outcome, because the outcome must relate to the 
initiative rather than to consecutive stages. 
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organizational conditions, namely those that depend on the firm, external ones 
(Birkinshaw, 1997), those that depend on the market, also exist. Yet, although initiatives 
can use the market in pursuing their course, this study does not consider such market 
conditions but only the organizational conditions as provided for by the firm5. In essence 
then, the focus is on how firms, particularly large ones, influence initiative trajectories.  
RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS 
Lamentably, the entrepreneurship literature fails to provide answers on how large firms 
should deal with initiatives, because it shows conflicting findings, lack of definitions, and 
unclarity about the organizational context that facilitates initiatives (i.e. Guth and 
Ginsberg, 1990; Brazeal and Herbert, 1999; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
The ongoing discussion amongst strategists, as described by Volberda (1998: 
112), about the roles of management levels in the renewal process (Barnard, 1938; 
Selznick, 1957), serves as an illustration of this fragmentation. He points out how 
originally the renewal process was perceived as a top-down deliberate process in which 
top-management took care of exploration, and front-line of exploitation (Chandler, 1962; 
Schumpeter, 1934; Selznick, 1957). Then a bottom-up emergent perspective, based on a 
more evolutionary approach, took foothold (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Bower, 1970; 
Burgelman, 1983a; Kanter, 1988). The idea was that in large companies top-management 
could not possibly oversee all opportunities. If top-management, instead, were to use the 
front-liners, who are in close contact with sources of information critical to innovative 
outcomes, they would have an immense pond to select initiatives from. This bottom-up 
perspective consists of two streams. In “the reactive […] bottom-up perspective (Volberda, 
1998:113)” the role of top management is that of a judge or a retroactive legitimizer 
(Burgelman, 1983b) of lower level initiatives. In “the proactive […] bottom-up perspective 
(Volberda, 1998: 113)” the role of top-management also involves purpose creation and 
challenging the status quo (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). Clearly, the different views that 
claim very different roles for the various levels illustrate the disagreement in the field. 
This thesis posits that part of the confusion, insofar as it concerns the initiative 
phenomenon, is due to the existence of two perspectives on initiatives that have barely 
been synthesized. One such a perspective is the conditioning perspective, which takes the 
position that it is the organizational conditions that determine the trajectory of initiatives. It 
is based on most of the intrapreneurship literature (e.g. Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a). 
It has been accused of only looking at the organizational context or conditions that drive 
the selection of initiatives, failing to account for their creation. The other perspective, the 
knowledge creating view, neglects the impact of organizational conditions on the 
development of initiatives. Instead, it focuses on the unfolding of the internal processes of 
                                                 
5 This too is the same as was done by Birkinshaw (1997). 
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the initiative. It assumes that other knowledge is linked to, that ideas emerge as a result of 
this knowledge brokerage and that they are then developed through integrating specialist 
knowledge. It is based on the innovation literature (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Hargadon, 1998b). It, in turn, fails to recognize that knowledge-creation is carried out in an 
organizational context that must deal with knowledge-exploitation. 
 
Figure 1.2: Two perspectives on initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Both perspectives focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon, the 
initiative (see figure 1.2), and therefore represent one-sided views of the initiative 
phenomenon (Kanzanjian and Rao, 1999; Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999). What is 
called for is a synthesis of both, as organizational conditions not only impact the contextual 
development of an initiative, but also its content-wise development. Although there are 
recent studies that attempt to bridge the divide, they are either causal (Kanzanjian and Rao, 
1999; Zahra Nielsen and Bogner, 1999), or conceptual (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999; 
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999) in nature. Studies that synthesize the conditioning and 
knowledge-creating perspectives are lacking. In light of the existing confusion in the field, 
this study therefore aims to understand the impact that firms exert on the generation and 
development of initiatives by synthesizing the conditioning and knowledge creating 
perspectives.  
In line with this research aim, four research questions were formulated: 
(1) How do initiatives emerge and develop in firms? 
(2) What is the influence of the organizational conditions on the trajectory of 
initiatives? 
(3) What is the influence of the knowledge base on the trajectory of initiatives? 
(4) Is there value in combining the two perspectives? 
Conditioning 
view
Knowledge creating
view
Initiative
Phenomenon 
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Contribution of the study 
This study sought an answer to the above questions by using a co-evolutionary perspective. 
A co-evolutionary6 approach (Kieser, 1989; Baum and Singh, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 
1999) is appropriate as it deals with issues of time, path dependency, multilevelness, and 
interdependency. Existing initiative studies that have been considered to be 
microcoevolutionary7 in nature, such as those on intraorganizational ecology (Burgelman, 
1991) or on intracorporate domains (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996), show difficulty in 
explaining the genesis of initiatives (Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1999; Shane, 2000), because they treat the firm and initiative as two separate 
entities, making it difficult for one to originate out of the other. Because this study looks at 
the co-evolution of knowledge and organizational conditions, rather than taking a bipolar 
view of the initiative versus the firm as the previously mentioned studies, it can explain 
how initiatives originate out of the firm. This approach is similar to, for example, Helfat 
and Raubitschek (2000) who looked at the co-evolution of knowledge, capabilities, and 
products. Yet whilst their study did not look at the initiative-firm relationship, this study 
uses a co-evolutionary perspective to shed light specifically on that relation. By doing so, 
this study manages to cross the divide between the conditioning and the knowledge-
creating perspectives and thus reduces some fragmentation in the field (see figure 1.3).   
 
Figure 1.3: Approaches to Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study’s contribution lies (1) in revealing the existence of two views on the initiative 
phenomenon, (2) in showing how the conditioning view attributes successful initiative 
trajectories to the direct impact of organizational conditions and how the knowledge-
creating view attributes it to the initiative knowledge base, (3) in demonstrating how a co-
evolutionary view synthesizes both views, and (4) in clarifying how organizational 
                                                 
6 Co-evolution is defined as “the joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects 
(Lewin and Volberda, 1999: 526).”   
7 In this study a micro-co-evolutionary approach is used, because it takes place within the firm (McKelvey, 1997). 
As opposed to macro-coevolution, which would be about firms and their environments, micro-coevolution has 
been specified as the “coevolution of intrafirm resources, dynamic capabilities, and competencies in an intrafirm 
competitive context (Lewin and Volberda, 1999: 526).” Because this study investigates the dual interactions 
between initiatives and the firm within an organizational context it is microcoevolutionary in nature. 
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conditions and the knowledge base must match and co-evolve to produce successful 
initiative trajectories. The study offers managers guidelines on how managers, by changing 
the organizational conditions and knowledge settings, can steer this co-evolutionary 
process, thus creating successful initiative trajectories.    
RESEARCH METHOD 
As for the methodology followed in the investigation a multiple-case study was carried out 
within three firms (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Yin, 1989). The three firms were selected on the 
basis of the following criteria: (1) had a presence in the Netherlands for reasons of access, 
(2) sales revenues of over 100 million guilders, and (3) participated in a global industry. 
These criteria were purposely chosen to enable cross-case analysis (Yin, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the criteria were not narrowed down too much, e.g. different industries rather 
than a single industry were chosen, to avoid sacrificing generalizability too much. On the 
basis of these criteria we chose the following three firms: Ericsson, Van Ommeren, and 
KLM Cargo.  
All the three firms investigated (Wielemaker, Volberda, Elfring, and Baden-
Fuller, 2003; Wielemaker, Elfring, and Volberda, 2000), Ericsson, KLM, and Van 
Ommeren, are active in a global industry. Ericsson ETM is a subsidiary of Ericsson 
Sweden, active in Telecommunications. In the period of investigating Ericsson ETM, the 
telecommunications market in the Netherlands was being liberalized allowing entry of over 
more than five new operators besides the former monopolist. The entry of these new 
operators altered the way Ericsson operated to such extent that it even changed its 
organizational structure. KLM Cargo was also undergoing a transformation during our 
investigation from straightforward airfreight to integrated logistics. As for Van Ommeren, 
they had just undergone a transformation and were seeking entrepreneurial revival within 
their firm.  
Each firm was investigated in two ways. First, the firm was investigated as a 
whole in order to measure the context in which the initiatives took place (Wielemaker, 
M.W., Elfring, T., and H.W. Volberda, 2000). This was done using Volberda’s (1992, 
1996, 1998) Flexibility Audit and Redesign method, which consisted of an automated 
survey and the use of document analysis (see appendix B). Secondly, a multiple-project 
study within each firm was carried out, basically for the purpose of gaining insight 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Numagami, 1998; Yin, 1989), and for developing the co-evolutionary 
model. Such a multiple-project study consisted of between 6 and 9 initiatives per firm and 
was carried out in a similar fashion to Dougherty and Hardy (1996), who through 
interviews investigated 40 new product development projects in 15 firms, and Birkinshaw 
(1997), who through interviews and questionnaires investigated 39 initiatives in six firms. 
In the three firms of this study 24 initiatives were analyzed in total. Some of the initiatives 
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were suggested for investigation by top-management, others were encountered and 
selected along the way. The initiative process, “a sequence of events or activities that 
describes how [an initiative is pursued] over time (Van de Ven, 1992:170),” was analyzed 
in a similar manner as described by Pettigrew (1992), namely by interviewing key people 
that were of influence to the initiative. Because certain people were involved in more than 
one initiative, on average about three people per initiative were interviewed. In this way, 
the trajectories of renewal of these initiatives were described. In a manner similar to 
Pettigrew, documentary and archive data, as well as observational and ethnographic 
material were also used in order to achieve triangulation.  
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Figure 1.3: Outline of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the outline of the study. After having described the conditioning view in 
chapter 2 and the knowledge-creating view in chapter 3, we integrate these two viewpoints 
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in chapter 4 by using a co-evolutionary perspective. Then in chapter 5 we move on to a 
description of the methodology used in our empirical work. In the empirical chapters 6, 7, 
and 8 the focus is on the initiative trajectories within a single firm, first Van Ommeren, 
then Ericsson, and finally KLM Cargo. In chapter 9 we cross compare the general 
initiative-trajectory patterns of the three firms, by using a conditioning, knowledge-
creating, and co-evolutionary lens. Finally, chapter 10 discusses the main conclusions and 
implications of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Conditioning View: 
Theory on Context 
In this chapter we discuss the ‘conditioning’ approach to initiatives. Firms are represented 
as a corporate context for the selection of initiatives into the firm. Organizational 
conditions - consisting of the organizational form, administrative and incentive systems, 
and managerial roles - are considered to influence the trajectories of initiatives. These 
conditions can be controlling or supportive in nature. The initiative itself moves through 
three phases that represent increasing levels of absorption by the firm: variation, 
selection, and retention. Two sub-views are discussed that depict different relations 
between the firm and the initiative, namely firms as constraining and as facilitating 
organizational environments. The first is the most prevalent and considers the firm and 
initiative to pursue, particularly in the initial phases, different means, namely exploitation 
versus exploration. Because each needs a different set of conditions this creates a conflict 
that can only imperfectly be resolved. The second sub-view acts as though the firm and 
initiatives only pursue explorative activities; this is the reason why the firm’s conditions 
are perfectly catering to the initiative. Although this pictures an ideal situation, it limits its 
practical usage. The chapter therefore concludes that the conditioning view mainly 
considers firms and initiatives to be in conflict. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITIONS  
One could say that in the initiative literature two streams exist: one that looks particularly 
at the content-wise development and one that looks particularly at the context. Most of the 
strategic management literature that looks at initiatives, i.e. the corporate entrepreneurship 
or intrapreneurship literature, (i.e. Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a; Pinchott, 1985; 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; McGrath, 1995; Birkinshaw, 1997) tends to take a managerial 
perspective (Venkataraman, Macmillan, and McGrath, 1992) and therefore focuses on 
creating an appropriate environment for initiatives. The firm is considered to provide 
organizational conditions that will influence the development of the initiative. Although 
this conditioning view pays some attention to the content-wise development of the 
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initiative, it does so only sparingly and instead focuses on the context: the organizational 
conditions. These function as levers for manipulating initiative trajectories.  Revisiting the 
initiative definition with a conditioning view lens it could be redefined as “a process 
subject to organizational conditions by which individuals inside organizations identify and 
pursue an opportunity to create future goods and services without regard to the resources 
they currently control, culminating in the approval of that opportunity.” 
The conditioning view does not completely neglect the content-wise development of the 
initiative, as is evident from Burgelman’s (1983a) discussion of the technical and need 
linking activities in the initial phase. He points out that product development remains 
important throughput the rest of the process. Yet, just as most authors from the 
intrapreneurship literature (i.e. Fast, 1979), the conditioning view does not go much further 
than mentioning the need for interdepartmental linkages and ongoing product 
development.  How such linkages create new knowledge and how product development 
processes lead to the content-wise improvement of an idea remain in large part a mystery. 
The opportunity in the above mentioned definition is therefore basically treated as a stable 
particle, i.e. a Ping-Pong ball, that does not transform into some other shape but only 
bounces back and forth between various levels. Although authors have pointed to aspects 
of learning (Cyert and March, 1963; Burgelman, 1983; Birkinshaw, 1997) this has served 
more as a side remark and has not been treated in a systematic and thorough manner 
(Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999). Overall, the conditioning view tends to focus on the 
context at the expense of the content-wise development. 
Idea content is, nevertheless, used as a means for categorizing ideas. One such a 
categorization classifies ideas as incremental (Quinn, 1987) or radical: “on the one hand, a 
step-by-step, gradual evolution; on the other hand, a breakthrough, an innovating decision. 
The first... is a series of adaptations … The second is an … innovating action” (Aharoni, 
1966). Firms are considered to treat incremental and radical ideas differently. Decisions 
are more easily made on the familiar than the strange. Incremental ideas are therefore dealt 
with through routine decision-making, whereas radical ideas demand non-routine decision-
making (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Burgelman, 1983c). However, in practice the 
distinction between the two types of ideas is complicated. Firstly, many authors merely 
state that something is radically new, but fail to specify the frame of reference (Stopford 
and Baden-Fuller, 1994)8. Secondly, there is confusion about the time reference. Are 
certain ideas radical with respect to the firm’s existing strategy or with respect to the firms 
intended strategy? Thirdly, there is no sharp distinction between the two kinds of ideas. 
This is why other categorizations exist as well. Henderson and Clark (1990), for example, 
introduced an intermediate form: architectural ideas. In practice, it is hard to objectively 
make the distinction between radical and incremental ideas. Aharoni (1966: 197) therefore 
concludes, “it would be very fallacious … to carry this dichotomy … too far.” 
 Notwithstanding some regard for the ideas themselves, the conditioning view is 
really about the context in which they develop. Such context of the initiative is much larger 
                                                 
8 Whether this is with respect to the firm or the industry. 
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than the organization alone. One could also consider the environmental context outside of 
the firm (Ruttan and Hayami, 1983). When initiatives are studied in MNCs, for example, 
there is often specific consideration of the local environment of the subsidiary (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989). Similarly, certain regions, i.e. clusters, have been studied because they are 
excellent providers of resources (Saxenian, 1990). Although most of the intrapreneurial 
literature does take the environmental context into consideration, its main focus is, 
nevertheless, on the firm as the context for the initiative. Or, as Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1993: 108) say “the main role of managers lies in their role as shapers of an organization’s 
context (based on Barnard, 1938).” 
These organizational conditions have been categorized in different ways. For 
example, Bower talked about the structural context (1970), Burgelman discussed a 
strategic context (1983b) and Ghoshal and Bartlett added the notion of a behavioral context 
(1994). The latter, by the way, has alternatively been labeled culture or climate (Tushman, 
Newman, and Romanelli, 1986; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997). Next to these rather abstract 
categorizations of organizational conditions, authors have also used more operational 
categorizations such as (1) organizational form, (2) administrative and incentive systems, 
and (3) managerial roles. 
Organizational form 
Organizational form and structure have been related to the level of innovation, and by 
implication to the level of initiative behavior. Burns and Stalker (1961) claim that 
organizational forms can be presented along a continuum ranging from a mechanistic form 
to an organic form (Burns and Stalker, 1961). The mechanistic form is better suited for 
carrying out known tasks in a stable environment and has an efficiency focus; the organic 
form is better for carrying out new things in a changing environment and has an innovation 
focus (Burns and Stalker, 1961). As Burns and Stalker (1961:122) clarify, “the two forms 
represent a polarity, not a dichotomy; there are… intermediate stages between the 
extremities.” Volberda (1998), for example, provided a larger range of forms by providing 
four forms based on environment, management, structure, culture, and technology. These 
are the rigid form, the planned form, the flexible form, and the chaotic form. The rigid and 
to a lesser extent the planned form represent the more mechanistic forms. The chaotic and 
to a lesser extent the flexible form represent the more organic forms. Using Stevenson and 
Gumpert’s (1985) terminology one could say that the mechanistic form is suited for 
administrative tasks, whereas the organic one is suited for entrepreneurial tasks9. Firms, of 
course, have tried to carry out both administrative and entrepreneurial tasks and have thus 
sought to set up forms that were both mechanistic and organic in nature, such as the 
hypertext (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), balanced (Volberda, 1998), or ambidextrous 
                                                 
9 Galbraith (1973) related organizational forms to the level of uncertainty in the environment. More uncertain 
environments require more decentralization and entrepreneurial behaviors and thus more organic forms. 
THE CONDITIONING VIEW 
16 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) organizations. However, these forms find it difficult to 
manage the paradox within a single unit, which is why they use techniques such as 
temporal and spatial separation10 (Van de Ven and Poole, 1988; Volberda, 1998) to 
manage change and stability. In essence then, they do not manage to resolve the paradox 
within a single unit at a single point in time. The distinction mechanistic-organic, even 
though it may know many in-between forms, is thus still very useful. 
Although structure is merely one aspect of organizational form, it is the most obvious and 
important one meriting specific attention. Organizational structures have been 
distinguished as U-, M-, X-, and N-forms. Originally firms were structured functionally 
with a powerful executive controlling functional departments: the U-form. Out of this form 
the multidivisional form (M-form) evolved in order to deal with growth through 
diversification, with decision-making delegated to the divisions (Chandler, 1962; 
Williamson, 1975), but still with a powerful executive in central command. The matrix 
(Galbraith, 1973) or X-form (Williamson, 1975) sought to bring back the influence of the 
functional areas by incorporating a matrix structure. However, the matrix structure in 
essence remains an M-form structure, because the matrix structure is not carried through at 
all levels, merely the middle level. The first three forms -or two forms if we consider the 
X-form as a variety of the M-form- all fall within a hierarchical structure. The network 
structure, or N-structure (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) departs from the hierarchy and is a 
new structure based on knowledge flows, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Placed 
along the mechanistic-organic polarity (see figure 2.1) the integrated U-form leans most 
towards the mechanistic form, the diversified M-form evidently more to the organic form, 
the matrix X-form even more so, and the N-form being the most organic. 
 
Figure 2.1: Organizational Forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative and incentive systems 
Through administrative and incentive systems (Block and Ornati, 1987) firms try in a 
direct way to steer employee behavior. Robert Simons (1994) categorizes such systems 
into four categories: diagnostic control systems, boundary systems, beliefs systems, and 
                                                 
10 Spatial separation involves differentiating change and stability in different units. Temporal separation involves 
differentiating exploration and exploitation over time. 
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interactive control systems. These can be categorized into three categories of control 
systems: those aimed at intended strategy, at induced, and at autonomous strategy 
(Burgelman, 1983a).  
To ensure effective implementation of intended strategy, management sets up 
critical performance variables that are used “to motivate, monitor, and reward achievement 
of specified goals” (Simons, 1994: 7). Such diagnostic control systems require 
performance standards, measurable outputs, and the ability to correct deviations (Simons, 
1994). Standard operating procedures (Cyert and March, 1963) specify the process by 
which outputs are to be achieved. Such standardization is “designed to minimize individual 
creativity and resultant error” (Simons, 1994: 62). Diagnostic control systems leave more 
room for creativity, as they do not specify the process, but rather the results –the critical 
performance variables.  
To ensure implementation of induced strategy (Burgelman, 1983a), boundary and 
beliefs systems are used to specify the kinds of opportunities that are sought after and state 
what is out of bounds. “The beliefs system is a positive system that motivates the search 
for opportunities in a certain direction; the other is a negative system that constrains the 
search (Simons, 1994: 33).” The beliefs system consists of the core values of the firm 
communicated through for example mission statements (Simons, 1994). The boundary 
system “delineate[s] the acceptable domain of activity for organizational participants” 
(Simons, 1994: 39). They therefore provide a frame within which creativity and freedom of 
action can occur in the organization. However, deviant behavior is not tolerated by the 
boundary system and results in punishment. 
 Autonomous strategic behavior (Burgelman, 1983a) seeks the fulfillment of other 
performance variables than specified by the diagnostic control system; it neglects the 
beliefs systems, and defies the boundary system. The previous control systems will 
therefore terminate such behavior, even if it were in the interest of the firm. Because 
management realizes that a certain level of autonomous behavior is in the interest of the 
firm, it tolerates it somewhat. Although Simons proposes a control system, called the 
interactive control system, for dealing with such activity, it would be better not to use to 
the word ‘control system’ for such because there is in reality an absence of a control 
system for dealing with this. Simons' definition of such a system reads: “formal 
information systems managers use to involve themselves regularly and personally in the 
decision activities of subordinates” (Simons, 1994: 95). He says: “[they] guide the 
experimentation and learning that are necessary for new autonomous strategic initiatives to 
emerge and be tested in the organization” (107). However, control is, generally speaking, 
not used in the way Simons uses it, and Simons contradicts himself somewhat when he 
states that in interactive control systems “senior managers determine where participants 
should focus attention”. The last is typical of induced strategy rather than of autonomous 
behavior. Instead, for autonomous behavior to prosper the administrative and incentive 
systems could be characterized as providing a supportive climate, one that seeks to support 
rather than to control specific behavior (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). 
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Managerial roles 
In part because there is still much discretion left by the administrative and incentive 
systems, initiatives pass through the decision-making process in firms. This decision-
making in large firms is distributed across various hierarchical levels that play certain roles 
in decision-making  (Selznick, 1957). Originally the owner-manager was considered to 
take on the entrepreneurial role. The rest of the organization, the administration, could 
exert discretion in filling in the entrepreneur’s directives, although within the limitations of 
standard operating procedures that functioned as general guidelines (Cyert and March, 
1963). However, the administration’s role was more than mere implementation. As 
Parsons (1960: 65) explains, “[upper levels] do not, in the nature of the case, simply tell 
people at the next level down ‘what to do.” Rather, lower levels were considered to 
“exercise types of competence and shoulder responsibilities that cannot be regarded as 
simply delegated by their superiors. This again is because the functions at each level are 
qualitatively different; those at the second level are not simply ‘lower level order’ 
spellings-out of ‘top’ level functions” (Parsons, 1960: 66). This new role of the 
administration in which they had more discretion resulted in them being called managers. 
Besides the managers, another ‘species’ was found to exist within the firm: the technical 
people (Parsons, 1960). These operated at the bottom of the hierarchy. With the 
recognition of this third group, a hierarchy had been born consisting of three levels: top-
management (the former entrepreneur), middle management (the managers), and the 
bottom or front-line (those with the technical and operational expertise).  
Naturally, firms can actually consist of more than three levels. Bower (1970), for 
example, found five formal hierarchical levels in the enterprises he studied: corporate, 
group, division, area, and product group. But when we look at the roles he attributes to 
these levels, he distinguishes only the three levels discussed previously. The extra levels he 
found seemed to exist primarily for reasons of span of control, rather than for additional 
role differentiation. The grouping of levels into the three levels top, middle, and front-line 
has become general practice amongst those studying initiatives (i.e. Cauwenberg and Cool, 
1982, Burgelman, 1983a; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). The existence of the levels is 
considered to stem for the different roles they perform in the firm. 
Cyert and March’s influential book, the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963), 
recognized this multilevel character of decision-making, but did not fully acknowledge its 
implications for the decision-making process. In their view decision-making was merely a 
multilevel coalition activity. They “avoided a discussion of what influence tiers of 
individuals have upon decision-making” (Carter, 1971: 413). According to Carter “the 
requirement that decisions pass through many organizational levels itself influence[s] the 
outcome” (Carter, 1971: 428). It were Vaughn Blankenship and Miles (1968) who clearly 
demonstrated that different levels have different roles in the decision-making process. For 
each level they showed differences in choice, influence, autonomy, reliance, and initiation.  
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Figure 2.2: Roles in the Initiative Process. 
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 The specific roles attributed to these hierarchical levels depend very much on 
one’s view of the direction of decision-making processes, i.e. the direction of strategy 
formulation and implementation. The first view of strategy making is a top-down one11, in 
which the top sets the direction and the bottom fills it in (see figure 2.2). Chandler (1962) 
described the roles accordingly as the top being the entrepreneur, the middle the 
administration, and the bottom the implementer. However soon it was realized that 
“planning and creative thinking [could no longer] be made the exclusive responsibility of a 
chosen view within a business organization (Hunt, 1966: 89).” Hence, there was a 
delegation of decision-making and idea generation down the hierarchy. The lower levels 
can therefore “present ‘needs’, which constitute specifications, to the management” 
(Parsons, 1960: 63). Or as Hunt puts it: “the rare quality of high capacity may thus be 
                                                 
11 In other words, intended and induced (Burgelman, 1983a). 
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concentrated where it is really needed [ed. at the top]; judgments of lesser importance can 
be made at lower levels.” This qualitative distinction between ideas at different levels 
formed the basis for standard operating procedures (Cyert and March, 1963): general 
guidelines for decision-making at lower levels (Simon, 1945). This shift in emphasis can 
be presented as a shift from intended to induced strategy (Burgelman, 1983a). Yet despite 
the increased contribution of the lower levels, in essence the initiative process remained 
top-down with roles in accordance with Chandler’s original pattern. 
The second view of strategy making is bottom-up12, quite the opposite of the 
previous, and describes a very different set of managerial roles. Extending the previous 
trend of all levels being able to make decisions, this opened up the possibility for “the 
decision process mov[ing] upwards” (Hunt, 1966: 86). As Hunt explains: “the upper levels 
in a decision-making process accept estimated findings from lower levels, not only because 
they must, but also because great advantage is gained in the process by using the judgment 
of people at levels where they have the capacity to exercise this judgment.” Some even felt 
that was the way it should proceed: “[t]hings have to go from the bottom up, not from the 
top down; that’s what a decentralized business is supposed to do” (Berg, 1965: 80). 
Vaughn, Blankenship, and Miles found that top managers indeed to a large extent relied 
“on their subordinates for … initiation (70 percent)… and to bring problems to their 
attention and to offer ideas and recommendations (1968: 114, 115).” This was articulated 
most clearly by Bower who claimed that “planning is bottom-up; there is no division 
planning staff that prepares a plan that the sub-units must then meet” (Bower, 1970, p. 
resides in managers at lower levels of the organization closer to the markets. If that is so, 
then the same lower level managers are best equipped to determine the quality of the 
forecasts built into an investment project request for funds” (Bower, 1970: 21). In such a 
bottom-up process managerial roles seem the reverse of the top-down one. Now it is the 
bottom that is the entrepreneur or initiator, the middle more an advisor, promoter, or 
gatekeeper for the bottom, and the top an approver of ideas and action (Schon, 1963). This 
authorization can be in advance, a judge (Bower, 1970), or after the fact, a retroactive 
legitimizer (Burgelman, 1983a).  
 The third view is really a combination of the previous, namely a coexistence of 
top-down and bottom-up processes. Burgelman (1983b) pointed out that firms displayed 
both top-down strategic processes, which he coined induced, and bottom-up ones, which 
he called autonomous. Although they did not go as far as Burgelman, Van Cauwenberg 
and Cool (1982), had just before pointed out something similar, by showing that top 
management could both set guidelines for those below them, yet also initiate intervention 
themselves. Burgelman (1983a) made it very explicit that there could be both processes. 
This implied that levels could reflect multiple roles, depending on whether the process was 
top-down or bottom-up. Top managers could be both initiators (top-down) and authorizers 
(bottom-up), middle managers both administrators (top-down) and advisors or gatekeepers 
                                                 
12 In other words, autonomous strategy. 
44.). The explanation was that: “the information necessary to make planning decisions 
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(bottom-up), and the bottom could be both implementers (top-down) and initiators 
(bottom-up). 
The above debate on the direction of the initiative process has put the middle 
manager in a peculiar spot. On the one hand the debate has gradually taken away their role 
of initiating ideas, whilst on the other hand it has accentuated their pivotal role as an 
performance (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Although the top-down view accentuated the 
initiating role of top management, it also accepted the notion of lower levels, such as the 
middle level, contributing to the initiation of ideas, albeit at a different qualitative level. A 
study by Vaughn Blankenship, and Miles (1968), for example, found that the middle level 
(41%) carried out most personal initiation of all the three levels. However, with Bower’s 
(1970) bottom-up description a top-down versus bottom-up battle ensued as to where idea 
generation was initiated. Burgelman’s (1983a) intended and autonomous concept merely 
emphasized the initiation roles of the top and bottom levels, and thus unintentionally de-
emphasized the initiation capabilities of middle management. Gradually the middle was 
robed of its creative potential. Yet, in spite of this, the middle level also gained a pivotal 
role, that of vertical integrator. Linking top and bottom, middle management was 
considered essential for passing on and interpreting information from top to bottom or the 
other way round. It is in this capacity that they perform their role of vertical information 
broker or organizational champions for certain ventures. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) 
enlarged their role to include horizontal information brokering. Middle management was 
was also in the position to intermediate between different areas within the firm.  
Controlling versus supportive conditions 
Table 2.1: Controlling versus Supportive conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational
form
Administrative
& Incentive
systems
Managerial Roles
Mechanistic 
hierarchy 
Steer behavior  
diagnostic control, boundary 
and beliefs systems 
Top-down 
Supportive  
Organic 
network 
Stimulate behavior  
discipline, stretch,  
trust and support 
Bottom-up 
Controlling  
intermediary between the top and bottom levels, with their involvement leading to better firm 
considered not just to intermediate between top and bottom, but because of its contacts 
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The aforementioned organizational conditions (organizational form, administrative and 
incentive systems, and managerial roles) can in theory independently from each other exert 
their influence as supportive or controlling in nature (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). A 
mechanistic form is controlling in nature; an organic form is supportive. Administrative 
and incentive systems that try to steer behavior through diagnostic control, boundary and 
beliefs systems are controlling in nature; those that try and stimulate intrapreneurial 
behavior through an entrepreneurial climate are supportive in nature. Managerial roles that 
reflect a top-down decision-making process are controlling in nature; those that reflect 
bottom-up process are supportive in nature. Theoretically, firms can thus possess 
organizational conditions that are mixed in nature, i.e. a controlling form, with supportive 
systems, but controlling roles. 
PHASES OF SELECTION 
Besides considering the organizational conditions, the conditioning view also takes into 
account the phases of development of the initiative itself. Notwithstanding that these 
phases can be related to the content-wise development of initiatives, they are much more a 
description of the extent to which the environment, in this case the corporate context, has 
accepted the initiative. In other words, each phase describes a level of initiative-absorption 
by the firm13. This is most evident in the intra-organizational ecology view of initiatives 
(Campbell, 1969; Burgelman, 1991, Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996), which based on 
population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) describes three phases: (1) variation, (2) 
selection, and (3) retention (Campbell, 1969).  
Although other descriptions of the phases have been proposed (i.e. Dutton, 1988), 
as well as various exceptions to the rational representation of the process, in essence most 
descriptions of the initiative process are very much in line with the above-described intra-
organizational view. For example, Burgelman (1983a) initially used two phases: definition 
and impetus. Aharoni (1966) talked about initiation and decision phases. Yet, their 
discussions of the phases are very much in line with the three-phase intra-organizational 
ecology model, suggesting a large overlap. The process also does not need to proceed as 
rationally as one might infer from the three-phase model. There does not have to be a 
weighing of alternatives at all; a proposal could be judged on its own merits (Aharoni, 
1966). Moreover, as stated in the opening chapter, it is generally recognized that initiatives 
do not necessarily need to proceed sequentially through these three phases, but can iterate 
back and forth (Van de Ven, 1992). In addition, there is sometimes no clear point-in-time 
where ‘the’ decision is made. Rather decision-making can be viewed as a process, 
consisting of many sub-decisions. Nevertheless, notwithstanding all these amendments and 
                                                 
13 Note that the initiative is as such a separate and distinct entity. 
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remarks, the three phases remain distinctive and useful in describing the different 
processes involved.  
Variation 
The first phase of the initiative process – variation - is that where opportunities are 
recognized and acted on, this is the reason why it has also been termed the identification 
(Mintzberg et al, 1976) or definition phase (Burgelman, 1983a). From the point of view of 
the firm, the initial phase is characterized by the creation of variety within the firm, i.e. as 
many different initiatives as possible. The presence of a variety of initiatives will ensure 
that amongst the initiatives are those with the appropriate set of genes to survive in the 
corporate and environmental context. The focus in the conditioning view is thus not so 
much on the creative process within a single initiative, but rather on the emergence of a 
pool of initiatives from which certain ones will survive, i.e. the notion of letting “a 
thousand flowers bloom (Kanter, 1988).”  
Given the usefulness of a pool of initiatives, the intrapreneurship literature has 
sought to answer questions that would provide clues on how to stimulate the initiation and 
pursuit of initiatives. One such a question was whether initiatives were problem or 
opportunity driven. Cyert and March (1963) stressed problemistic search as the driver. 
Although they acknowledged the existence of opportunity-driven behavior, which they 
called slack innovation, they downplayed its importance: “slack innovation will tend to be 
difficult to justify in the short run and remotely related to any major organizational 
problem” (1963: 189). Yet, many authors (a/o. Aharoni, 1966; Carter, 1971; Mintzberg et 
al, 1976) felt that Cyert and March underestimated and underrepresented the role of 
opportunity-driven behavior and that such behavior could be very irrational. Aharoni 
(1966) offers the example of a firm choosing to invest in a certain country for no other 
reason than that the investor’s wife originated there. He remarks: “A decision-making 
process does not begin with the definition of a ‘given’ problem. It begins with the 
recognition that an issue exists and awaits definition  (1966: 53).” Yet the debate subdued 
with the recognition that both problems and opportunities can drive initiatives. Mintzberg 
et al. (1976), for example, placed the two stimuli, problem and opportunity, along a 
continuum indicating that the two are extremes, but that a mixture of both can stimulate 
initiatives as well. 
“At one extreme are opportunity decisions, those initiated on a purely voluntary basis, to 
improve an already secure situation, such as the introduction of a new product to enlarge an 
already secure market share. At the other extreme are crisis decisions, where organizations 
respond to immediate pressures. Here a severe situation demands immediate action, for 
instance, seeking a merger to stave off bankruptcy. Thus, opportunity and crisis decisions may 
be considered to form two ends of the continuum.” (Mintzberg et al., 1976: 251). 
 
Another question was whether certain people were more entrepreneurial than 
others? The intention was to obtain clues on which people to select into the organization. 
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Indeed it was thought that entrepreneurship “can be treated as a psychological 
predisposition of individuals to take a chance in the hope of gain, and in particular, to 
commit effort and resources to speculative activity (Penrose, 1959: 33).” This remark by 
Penrose underlines a common thought about entrepreneurs that certain people are more 
prone to display entrepreneurial behavior than others (Brockhaus and Horowitz, 1986; 
Naffzinger, 1995). The findings, nevertheless, remain inconclusive (Aldrich and Zimmer, 
1986; Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1993). Hence, even though personality characteristics are 
considered important, they do not form part of accepted entrepreneurial theory yet.  
Another question centered on the motivation of initiators. Why do they pursue 
ideas, display personal initiative (Frese, Kring, Soose and Zempel, 1996), take charge 
(Morrison and Phelps, 1999), or express voice  (Hirschmann, 1970; Withey and Cooper, 
1989)? The intention here was to obtain clues on how the organization could influence that 
motivation (Scott and Bruce, 1994; Frese et al, 1996; Morrison and Phelps, 1999). Various 
factors have been found: top management openness, self-efficacy, felt- responsibility, and 
expert power. Morisson and Phelps (1999) found that top management openness, “the 
degree to which top management is believed to encourage and support suggestions and 
change initiatives from below (406),” was an important factor in employee’s decision to 
take action.  They also found self-efficacy, “an employee’s estimate of his or her capacity 
to perform (Gist and Mitchell, 1992)” to be important in the decision to take initiative. 
Moreover, felt-responsibility, “an individual’s belief that he or she is personally obligated 
to bring about constructive change (407),” was also found to be an important factor for 
taking charge (Frese et al, 1996; Morisson and Phelps, 1999). And last but not least, 
“employees with a high level of expert power should feel confident that they can bring 
about change more successfully (Morisson and Phelps, 1999: 407).” This stream of 
research is still ongoing and refining itself. Apart from top management openness, i.e. 
providing an innovative culture, the firm can also impact the self-efficacy, felt-
responsibility, and expert power of employees by increasing their level of autonomy. Frese 
et al (1996) have shown that such autonomy relates to higher levels of initiative.  
Selection 
In the selection phase the initiative is selected into the firm. In order to be selected in, the 
intrapreneurship literature tends to view initiatives as competing with each other as well as 
with other priorities in the firm. For example, as Aharoni (1966) explains “an 
organization’s executives might not explore a profitable opportunity for investment 
because they were too busy with other affairs at the time the opportunity presented itself. 
The same executives would have vigorously invested this opportunity at other, less hectic 
times.” Or as he puts it differently:  
“In a world of uncertainty the decision to invest is also a commitment: the organization 
commits its funds and management resources to a certain line of action. But there is always the 
possibility that in the near future a better opportunity will present itself, and the organization 
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will turn it down because it has already committed resources…Commitments constitute an 
evolving set of constraints” (Aharoni, 1966: 138). 
 
Selection can occur through a mixture of ‘invisible hand’ as well as “visible 
hand” mechanisms (Chandler, 1977). On the one hand, initiatives are legitimized through 
natural selection by the market: the ‘invisible hand’ mechanism. On the other hand, 
initiatives are proactively pursued by executives: the ‘visible hand’ mechanism. As 
Aharoni (1966; 270-271) says: “Certainly, some leaders d[o] give the organization a new 
direction without any overt stimulus from the environment. Leadership is left with some 
choice, and great leaders have been able to change the path of their organizations.” In most 
cases, selection occurs through a mixture of both mechanisms. As such, the firm itself is 
considered an internal selection market (Burgelman, 1983b; McGrath, 1995) within which 
there is a struggle to convince those with the discretionary power to exert choice or 
leadership (Selznick, 1957). As Venkataraman et al (1992:502) explain, “in a sense the 
market is simulated within a firm whenever each venture initiative competes with other 
initiatives within the firm for a fixed or varying pool of resources.” 
This notion of executive choice went against the behavioral theory. The latter 
claimed group consensus, together with standard operating procedures, would resolve 
selection issues (Cyert and March, 1963). This notion of a group consensus came under 
criticism from those studying investment decisions. “Cyert and March imply that all active 
members of the coalition have similar power. By doing so they implicitly deny the 
possibility of any innovation, leadership or coercive power and depict the organization as a 
coalition of mediocre people (Aharoni, 1966: 169).” Or as Carter (1971, 421) explains, 
“the final expectations of a coalition seemed to be the result of sequential bargaining at 
various levels in the organization rather than the result of any group consensus.” 
The existence of choice (Child, 1972) in the selection process therefore opened the 
door to politics and power play at various tiers in the hierarchy. It occurs at various levels 
in the organization because “as more and more decisions of consequence are made at lower 
levels of the organization through interdepartmental groups, problems of leadership arise 
(Galbraith, 1973: 18).” If all initiatives cannot be carried out, someone has to choose. 
Consequently, those with the power to exert choice will then do so. Research in decision-
making has shown that such choice stems not solely from objective principles, but also 
from judgments that are entirely personal (Carter and Williams, 1958) and that it is open to 
political influence. As Aharoni (1966: 215) states: “True, no American businessman worth 
his salt would admit to being influenced by prejudice, by social pressures, or by his wife. 
Decision making in complex organizations is a very long social process, not solely an 
intellectual exercise.”  
Because the initiative selection process is open to influencing those with the power 
to exert choices, the initiative tries to bargain and power play its way through.  This is 
difficult as “many proposals [are] rejected because the proposers lack the ability to 
persuade top management that the project [is] worthy of consideration (Aharoni, 1966: 
88).” Initiators therefore bring powerful players on board that have the authority and power 
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to influence the necessary decision-makers. Success in influencing is therefore dependent, 
as Bower explains, on “the willingness of a general manager at the division president's 
level, or one level below, to commit himself to sponsor a project in the counsel of division 
officers and before the division general manager” (1970, p. 68). These individuals, called 
champions, are considered essential to the selection process (Schon, 1963; Maidique, 
1980; Galbraith 1982; Kanter, 1982; Burgelman, 1983a; Van de Ven, 1986; 
Venkataraman, MacMillan, and McGrath, 1992). 
Retention 
The selection phase is not the end of the initiative process as approval often occurs in 
increments and is often dependent on the extent to which a project has proven its worth. 
Aharoni explains that “in some cases [official approval] is granted after all contracts have 
been signed (1966: 123).” Moreover, as Venkataraman et al (1992:512) point out, “for 
successful retention of ventures within the firm, some collective social acceptability is 
critical.” As such, initiatives often still need to be implemented to gain further legitimacy 
and approval in order to be retained in the firm and not spin-off or die out. The major 
concern in this phase, as pointed out by Burgelman (1983b), often concerns the difficulty 
of integrating the initiative into the fabric of the firm. This phase is what Kanter (1982) 
calls ‘moving into action,’ which she claims consists of handling interference or 
opposition, maintaining momentum and continuity, implementing secondary redesign and 
changes, and communicating externally to the various stakeholders in the project. 
CONDITIONING VIEW  
Although the organizational conditions - form, systems, and roles - are in theory 
independent, most authors in the conditioning view do not really treat them as such, but 
consider them to be interdependent. In line with part whole (Van de Ven, 1986) and 
systems thinking (Senge, 1994) there is a strong tendency to align the three conditions to 
ensure that they all fit each other. Bartlett and Ghoshal clearly reflect this tendency to 
align, which they express as ‘a clear set of commonalities (1993: 24), in their discussion of 
the strategy-structure-systems doctrine, or their own structure-processes-roles version. 
Because of this alignment, the three types of organizational conditions consequently 
become either all supportive or all controlling in nature.  
 This leads to two views of firms, namely one in which the firm functions as (1) a 
constraining environment or as (2) a facilitating environment (Bouchikhi, 1993). Although 
most authors agree that (3) initiatives can change or influence the environment, it is 
something that is generally taken for granted and therefore given limited consideration. 
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Figure 2.3: The conditioning view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms as constraining environments 
In the constraining view, all conditions are considered controlling in nature. The reason 
they stay controlling during all the three phases is because they have not been set up for 
initiatives in particular, but for the firm as a whole. Because the firm as a whole is not 
going through any particular phases there is no reason to change the conditions over time. 
In fact the firm is though to be in a constant exploitative mode, this is the reason why all 
organizational conditions are controlling, i.e. they consist of a mechanistic form, 
administrative and incentive systems that try to steer behavior, and managerial roles that 
are top-down in nature. These characteristics are considered appropriate for exploitative 
activities (March, 1991; Lewin et al, 1997; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). 
In the constraining view the initiatives and the firm are considered to be at odds 
(Block, 1982; Kanter, 1985; Sykes and Block, 1989) because they pursue different means. 
The initiative needs a set of organizational conditions that are different from that provided 
by the firm. The firm tries to implement intended behavior and control what’s going on, 
whereas the initiative seeks freedom to act (Sathe, 1985). The firm seeks implementation, 
the initiative creativity. The firm, through its organizational conditions enforces existing 
practices (Cyert and March, 1963; Hlavacek and Thompson, 1973; Nelson and Winter 
1982). Initiatives are dealt with through these existing organizational conditions that 
remain the same throughout the development of the initiative, instead of through new ones 
for specific phases (McGrath, 1995). The firm’s reward system is known for not 
rewarding, sometimes even punishing (Quelch, Farris and Olver, 1987) extra role behavior. 
Initiatives are met with resistance because it “impinges on the status quo” (Hanan, 
1969:44), or because they create problems for managers, requiring leadership or the 
neglect of administrative issues (Burgelman, 1983c). All in all, “the [firm] has come to 
appear to many innovators as a hostile environment to change” (Hanan, 1969:44) and to 
creativity (Burgelman, 1983c; Dougherty, 1990; Meyer, 1982). As such, the firm through 
its controlling organizational conditions is regarded as a constraining environment for 
initiatives. 
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 Whether this conflict between initiatives and the firm is undesirable remains 
inconclusive. There are those who say that conflict leads to higher effectiveness of the firm 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961) and that it ensures an appropriate balance between innovation 
and implementation. This is why Schon (1963: 82) states that the firm “must be ambivalent 
about radical technical innovation. It must both seek it out and resist it.” Burgelman 
(1983c) even fears that encouraging entrepreneurship could lead to misguided 
opportunism. Notwithstanding these positive notions about conflict, the overall feeling is 
that the firm smothers initiatives before they have had the chance to prove their worth. 
According to Venkataraman, MacMillan and McGrath (1992) the critical question is 
therefore “how to ensure the survival of an idea and venture within the hostile firm until a 
market test can provide the true criteria for retention or divestment.” 
To ensure survival of initiatives in this constraining environment three basic 
venues have been put forward: (1) loosen the strictness of the controlling conditions by 
making them more supportive, (2) set up separate conditions for initiatives, (3) battle and 
change the controlling conditions through the use of champions. These tactics allow for the 
conditions to vary over the three phases. As it is known that idea generation, i.e. the 
variation phase, is particularly aided by supportive conditions (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1993), we see that such supportive conditions are particularly sought after in the initial 
phases (see figure 2.3). Although these tactics do not require that all conditions – form, 
systems, and roles – be configured equally, i.e. one could have supportive roles in a 
controlling structure, we do see that they try to achieve alignment between all these 
conditions (Burgelman, 1983a).  
 
Loosening strictness of controlling conditions 
Firms can decrease their constraining influence on initiatives by loosening the controlling 
nature of the organizational conditions. However, because these organizational conditions 
have been set up to steer the general activities of the firm, rather than only initiatives, there 
is a limit to the extent to which they can be adapted to cater to initiatives.  
The organizational form can be made less controlling by moving from the 
functional and divisional forms to the more organic matrix form. In order to facilitate 
initiative behavior the firm also can display a larger tolerance for informal organization. 
Schon goes as far as to say that “the buffering function of the official screening offices 
virtually forces such a network into existence” (1963: 84). However, according to 
Galbraith the matrix form was purposely set up exactly to formalize these informal 
processes: “These informal processes are necessary as well as inevitable, but their use can 
be substantially improved by designing them into the formal organization. At the very least 
organizations can be designed so as not to prevent these processes from arising 
spontaneously (1973: 47).” Nevertheless, because the firm’s main purpose remains the 
implementation of ongoing non-initiative activities, the form in essence remains 
hierarchical and thus constraining in nature. 
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The administrative and incentive systems can be made less controlling by 
allowing for more slack in the organization (a/o Cyert and March, 1963; Galbraith, 1973; 
Kanter, 1983). The presence of slack (Cyert and March, 1963) reduces the exposure of 
initiatives to the controlling administrative and incentive systems and in effect creates 
more autonomy for the venture. This has led to its institutionalization by some firms in the 
form of distributed slack (Cyert and March, 1963). Distributed slack consists of letting 
lower levels keep a share of their profit, of deliberately providing broad and vague job 
descriptions, of providing less stringent target measures, of formalizing slack time in 
employee jobs etc. Although the availability of slack can be detrimental because of the 
lack of discipline (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), the use of slack remains an essential 
facilitator for initiatives as is nicely explained by a former president of IBM:  
“But how much do we want to know? How much can we even ask without dulling initiative, 
without killing imagination? Let me give you an example. The disk memory unit, the heart of 
today’s random access computer, is not the logical outcome of a decision made by IBM 
management. It was developed in one of our laboratories as a bootleg project. It was developed 
over the stern warning from management that the project had to be dropped because of budget 
difficulties.  A handful of men ignored the warning. They broke the rules. They risked their 
jobs to work on a project they believed in. Could this have been done if the company’s control 
system had been more precise? I doubt it. Luckily for us, our control was imperfect and a great 
development was the result… There is bound to be businesses that destroy themselves through 
excessive control’ (Watson, 1962: 23). 
 
As for the managerial roles, firms can signal and tolerate more openness to bottom-
up processes and couple this with greater decentralization. This will allow managers to 
take on more supportive roles on behalf of the initiative. The decentralization grants them 
more discretion in decision-making to perform these supportive roles. It also reduces the 
necessity of decision-making moving up the echelons (Galbraith, 1973). Yet, in essence 
the core roles of the managers remain focused at implementing ongoing non-initiative 
activities of the firm. As such, their steering top-down roles are their first priority and 
overshadow any initiative roles, reducing the latter to second priority. 
 The loosening of the controlling conditions only works to facilitate initiatives to a 
limited extent, because the firm’s main task is still to implement efficiently its ongoing 
activities rather than to cater solely to initiatives. Although the organizational form can be 
loosened to a matrix form, in essence it remains a hierarchy set up for implementation 
activities. Similarly, although the controlling nature of the administrative and incentive 
systems can be loosened through the tolerance for slack, in essence they remain in place. 
And last but not least, although there is an openness to bottom-up processes and attached 
roles, first priority remains top-down implementation of general firm activities. Hence, 
softening the controlling nature of the organizational conditions will only work to a certain 
extent, because the conditions at their core remain controlling. The firm therefore remains 
constraining to initiative behavior. 
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Separate conditions for initiatives 
Instead of trying to adjust the organizational conditions to the needs of initiatives, firms 
and initiatives have also set up separate forms, separate administrative and incentive 
systems, and separate managerial roles specifically for initiatives. Drucker (1974: 799) 
explains: “The search for innovation needs to be organized separate and outside of the 
ongoing managerial business. Innovative organizations realize that one cannot 
simultaneously create the new and take care of what one already has.” A similar logic was 
already used to ensure appropriate conditions for different departments within a firm. Hall 
(1962), for example, found that research and development departments were more organic 
in nature, whereas the production departments were organized more mechanistically.  
The organizational form of the firm is often of a hierarchical nature, whereas the 
initiative is often in need of a more team-like structure to promote innovation, speed, and 
flexibility. Not surprisingly, firms have set up special initiative structures that are distinct 
from the organizational one, a technique called spatial separation (Baden-Fuller and 
Volberda, 2001; Volberda, 1998), such as teams14, skunk and garage works (Kanter, 1988), 
innovation cells, and new venture divisions (Burgelman, 1983a). Not only does this create 
a more appropriate structure, it also allows initiatives to bypass the controlling 
organizational conditions. The venture, within its boundaries, it is not bothered by a 
conflict with the firm, and can thus blossom. Burgelman (1983a) took this a step further by 
suggesting that certain ventures are deliberately hidden from the corporate context in order 
to first prove themselves worthwhile before trying to gain approval.  
Yet, although these separate structures have been show to aid in the development 
of initiatives, the set-up of these separate structures, their integration into the firm, and 
their continuity is problematic (MacMillan, 1985; Burgelman, 1983a). Much of the 
literature acts as though these structures are set up almost automatically. But as Kanter 
(1988) pointed out, someone first needs to authorize the set up of such a structure, meaning 
that the initiative is still subject to organizational conditions at the outset15. As for their 
integration back into the firm, this will need to occur sooner or later, subjecting the venture 
to – inappropriate - organizational conditions once again. This integration process has been 
shown to be quite problematic (Burgelman, 1983a). Although separate ventures are thus 
perhaps well suited for the development of an idea, they do not eliminate the firm-initiative 
                                                 
14 There are basically three ways for forming such a team according to Hanan (1969): an intracorporate team, 
intercorporate team, and supracorporate team. An intracorporate team consists of a unit set up within the firm. It 
is known by such names as a skunkwork, garage work, team, or venture team. The intercorporate team consists of 
members from the company and of members from one or more other firms. The supracorporate team “operates in 
semi-autonomous independence from its corporate sponsor” (Hanan, 1969: 48) and “reports only to their 
sponsor’s president or to one of his general managers.” 
15 A related issue is which level would be appropriate for deciding on the set up of the separate structure. 
Speaking about divisional versus corporate interests Berg says (1965: 89): “to place [this decision] lower in the 
organization is seen by higher levels as resulting in inefficiency and waste, either because the goals at lower 
levels are different or because the lower levels cannot see the ‘big picture’ and the better opportunities for the 
corporation to spend money elsewhere. At the same time, moving [this decision] to higher levels is seen by the 
lower levels as resulting in inefficiency and waste because the higher levels cannot know enough about our 
problems”. 
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conflict and the resulting bargaining process. The availability of high levels of autonomy 
and resources in these separate ventures is also known to actually cause their failure 
(Garud and Van de Ven, 1992) because there was not enough of a challenge to perform. 
Moreover, when the firm enters a resource scarcity situation, these separate ventures, 
representing allocated slack, are the first to disappear owing to their visibility (Sykes and 
Block, 1989). 
 Firms have, often on an ad-hoc basis, within the organization created separate 
decision-making bodies for initiatives in the form of screening, steering, or review 
committees and boards, because the administrative and incentive systems of the 
organization are often not fine-tuned to the needs of initiatives. These screening 
committees are supposed to apply a separate set of administrative and incentive systems to 
the initiative. However, they are often perceived “as a wall, rather than as a screen” 
(Schon, 1963: 79). If separate structures were set up for the initiative, then that is 
sometimes accompanied by a unique set of administrative and incentive systems that are 
initiative specific. Although one might assume that the initiative benefits from such a 
unique set of administrative and incentive systems, Block and Ornati (1987) found that 
incentive systems set up for ventures did not improve performance. Chesbrough (2000) 
explains that venture incentives cannot be too much out of line with the rest of the firm in 
order to avoid feelings of unfairness. Moreover, as the initiative will be integrated back 
into the firm, sooner or later, it can only temporarily avoid being subject to the 
administrative and incentive systems of the firm. 
Firms have also created venues for extra-role behavior that benefit initiatives, 
because the every-day roles of people in the firm are not always appropriate for initiatives. 
One such a venue is through temporal separation (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; and 
Volberda, 1998), in which certain roles are allowed during a certain time period. Another 
is through spatial separation (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Volberda, 1998), in which the 
separate venture enables a different set of managerial roles than within the firm. Yet, in 
both cases these initiative roles must be re-integrated with the organizational roles, as soon 
as the initiative is integrated back into the firm.  
Separate initiative conditions can thus benefit initiatives because they bypass the 
controlling organizational conditions for a certain time. However, this is only a temporary 
solution, as the initiative eventually needs to realign itself with the firm at which point the 
conflict with the organization’s controlling conditions is back in the picture again. 
 
Use of champions 
A third method for creating appropriate conditions is by having powerful players battle 
their way through. Firms accept it as inevitable that their main priority is to provide 
controlling organizational conditions in order to carry out their everyday non-initiative 
activities and that this causes a conflict between initiatives and the firm. Given the 
possibility of bargaining in the decision-making process, the solution is sought in powerful 
players that can maneuver the idea through these controlling conditions.” These 
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individuals, called champions, are necessary to ensure appropriate conditions and are 
primarily focused at acquiring resources (Bower, 1970; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Burgelman, 1983a; Day, 1994), obtaining organizational support, and 
bending routines (Schon, 1963; Maidique, 1980; Galbraith 1982; Kanter, 1982; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Burgelman, 1983a; Van de Ven 1986; Venkataraman, MacMillan, and 
McGrath, 1992). The firm accepts this power struggle (Emerson, 1962; Thompson, 1967) 
as a form of natural selection for initiatives. As Schon explains:  
“Given the underground resistance to change described earlier, the new idea either finds a 
champion or dies. Essentially, the champion must be a man willing to put himself on the line 
for an idea of doubtful success. He is willing to fail. For a number of them the price of failure 
is professional suicide, and a few become martyrs of the championed ideas” (1963: 84). 
 
There are two types of champions: the product and the organizational champion. 
The product champion, mostly middle management, is concerned with promoting the 
merits of a technological solution (Galbraith, 1982; Hlavacek, 1974) and is alternatively 
called the idea generator, initiator, venture manager, or sponsor (Von Hippel, 1977; 
Galbraith, 1982; Burgelman, 1983a). The organizational champion, mostly top 
management, provides legitimacy and is alternatively called orchestrator (Galbraith, 1982) 
or (again) sponsor (Von Hippel, 1977). However, this distinction seems overdone as 
Galbraith contends that organizational champions “orchestrate… by funding innovating 
activities and creating incentives for middle managers to sponsor innovating ideas” (1982: 
11). In other words, both levels have a role to play in the political game, with the one level 
merely having more power than the other.  
Apart from manipulating the organizational conditions, champions are also able to 
deal with the resistance to change16 that new initiatives may encounter (Schon 1963: 
Hannan and Freeman 1977; Van de Ven 1986). Venkataraman, MacMillan, and McGrath 
(1992) mention various reasons for such resistance. The idea threatens the existing power 
and resource distribution. It can make knowledge and skills of powerful members obsolete. 
It may require large investments in, for example, training personnel. Levinthal and March 
(1993) also point out that managers with past successes often have political power, even in 
situations when it is no longer successful. Many of these managers are caught in 
'competence traps’ (Levitt and March, 1988). “Such individuals are often reluctant to 
abandon the way in which they perceive the features of the company and its business 
environment” (Venkataraman, MacMillan and McGrath, 1992). Truly powerful champions 
are thus necessary for crumbling fierce resistance.  
 
Under the constraining view, firms can only provide imperfect solutions for initiatives, 
because the organizations main purpose is exploitation, which requires controlling 
                                                 
16 Overcoming such resistance can in part be done by gaining legitimacy. This is more open to coalition activity 
(Cyert and March, 1963) as “horizontal systems complemented the vertical chain of authority as a means of 
building legitimacy and momentum for the initiative” (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
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conditions17. Initiatives, at least initially, focus on exploration, which requires supportive 
organizational conditions. Because of this conflict of purpose, the two cannot function 
perfectly under one system. Loosening the controlling nature of the organizational 
conditions only helps initiative behavior to a limited extent, because in essence the 
conditions remain controlling. Similarly, the creation of separate initiative conditions 
forms no perfect solution either as such merely temporarily circumvents the organizational 
ones; initiatives must still be brought back into the organizational system. Conflicts, fought 
with the aid of powerful individuals, champions, are thus inevitable and necessary to 
manipulate the corporate context in favor of the initiative.  
Yet, underlying the constraining view is the notion that initiatives will eventually 
become part of the ongoing activities of the firm for which the controlling conditions are 
set up. Initiatives are assumed to make the shift from exploration to exploitation, from 
variation to retention, from invention to implementation. In the latter instance, the 
controlling conditions of the firm will turn out to be helpful for the initiative. Therefore, 
the organizational form of the initiative must eventually switch from a team or network 
back to a hierarchical form, the administrative and incentive systems must switch from 
stimulating to steering behavior, and the managerial roles must switch from bottom-up 
Hence, initiatives require supportive conditions in the initial phase, but they require 
controlling conditions in the implementation phase.  
Firms as facilitating environments 
Very recently, a facilitating view of the corporate environment has been put forward 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). Whilst in the constraining view, organizational conditions in 
essence remained controlling (even though they were somewhat loosened to be more 
supportive), in the facilitating view all the firm’s conditions – form, systems, and roles - 
are supportive of initiative behavior. The organizational form is an N-form allowing for the 
setup of many flexible interorganizational linkages, the administrative and incentive 
systems provide a stimulating climate, and the managerial roles are bottom-up, providing 
support for initiatives. These characteristics are considered appropriate for explorative 
activities (March, 1991; Lewin et al, 1997; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994), such as idea 
generation. The firm’s purpose then is to serve the initiative. There is thus no conflict 
between the firm and the initiative.  
The facilitating view is the first attempt within the conditioning view to align 
organizational conditions with the knowledge development needs of the initiative. 
Knowledge sharing is facilitated by a very non-hierarchical N-form with the ability to 
easily form new organizational linkages that serve as knowledge linkages. Middle 
                                                 
17 Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994:103) summarize this sub-view as tending to “ focus more on control than support 
(Peters, 1992) and, accordingly, there is little reference to support as an element of context in the work of these 
authors [of this sub-view].” 
back to top-down ones, something Volberda calls a temporal oscillating mode (1998). 
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management’s role is to function as a horizontal broker, bringing together various experts 
throughout the firm. The administrative and incentive system is built around the concepts 
of discipline, stretch, trust and support (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). 
Yet, the facilitating view is problematic because it merely focuses on exploration, 
disregarding exploitation (Burgelman, 1983a; March, 1991; Volberda, 1998)18. First, it 
fails to acknowledge that firms may serve another purpose than merely to support 
initiatives. Firms must also carry out exploitative activities, which require controlling 
conditions, rather than the supportive ones they are providing according to the facilitating 
view. Second, it fails to realize that initiatives themselves move through various phases 
and will eventually shift from an explorative to an exploitative mode, requiring a shift from 
supportive to controlling conditions. Because no such need for a change over the phases is 
perceived, the conditions remain the same over the three phases, namely supportive (see 
figure 2.3). In essence, the facilitating view depicts a desirable state for the explorative 
phase of initiatives, in which they are facilitated by a ‘perfect’ supportive corporate 
environment. That these initiatives will need to be implemented and form part of an 
organization that can exploit them is left aside.  
Multidirectional impact between Initiatives and their organizational environments 
The initiative-firm relationship is of a multidirectional causality, an essential element of 
micro-coevolutionary processes (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) that we shall discuss later in 
more detail. Hence, although both previously discussed views - firms as constraining and 
facilitating environments – considered the impact of organizational conditions on 
initiatives, it is widely understood that initiatives may also impact firms and their 
organizational conditions. This was evident in the championing process, in which 
initiatives try to change certain organizational conditions of the firm. Burgelman (1983a) 
specifically points out this multidirectionality. He showed how ventures were induced by 
the firm’s strategic and structural context, whilst at the same time autonomous initiatives 
can change the structural and strategic context. Similarly, whilst domains determine much 
of the venture activity, successful ventures can result in new intracorporate domains 
(Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). This multidirectionality can move beyond the microlevel 
into the macro level, which Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) clarify when they show how 
initiatives can also change the rules of the industry to such an extent that they directly 
impact the corporate environment. That initiatives may impact firms and their conditions is 
thus widely recognized in the conditioning view, even though it is perhaps implicit.  
 
                                                 
18 March (1991: 71) says, “systems that engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find 
that they suffer the costs of experimentation without gaining much of its benefits.”  Burgelman (1983a) and 
Volberda (1998) talk about strategic neglect by managers resulting in a chaotic situation that hinders 
implementation of the venture. 
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The conditioning view leads us to various propositions. Within the firm, the organizational 
conditions – form, systems, and roles – will tend to align themselves in order to be 
effective (Senge, 1994; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993) and are, generally speaking, thus either 
all supportive or controlling in nature. Supportive conditions are considered appropriate for 
explorative activities, whilst controlling conditions are appropriate for exploitative 
activities, or as Polanyi (1966: 83) explains: “the structure of authority exercised over a 
society of explorers is different from that to which a dogmatic society submits.” Initiatives 
are an activity within the firm that evolve through the phases variation, selection, and 
retention, and as they do so they move from an explorative to an exploitative mode 
(Burgelman, 1983a). In other words, during the variation phase they are in an explorative 
mode, in the selection phase they are in a mixed mode of exploration and exploitation, and 
in the retention phase they are in an exploitative mode. Because controlling organizational 
conditions are appropriate for exploitation, which occurs in the retention phase of an 
initiative, it follows that: 
 
Proposition 1a: Firms that provide controlling, rather than supportive, 
organizational conditions in the retention phase of initiatives 
show better implementation of initiatives. 
 
Similarly, because supportive organizational conditions are appropriate for exploration, 
which occurs in the variation phase, it follows that: 
 
Proposition 1b: Firms that provide supportive, rather than controlling, 
organizational conditions in the variation phase of initiatives 
show better generation of initiatives. 
 
Initiatives need to move from the variation to the retention phase in order to complete a 
successful trajectory. The firm’s organizational conditions impact the initiative along the 
way. As explained above, in the initial variation phase of the initiative, the initiative 
requires the firm to provide supportive conditions, whilst in the final retention phase of the 
initiative, the initiative requires the firm to provide controlling conditions. This need for 
the firm to provide different conditions to the initiative during different phases seems at 
odd with the previously discussed views of firms as constraining and facilitating contexts 
which tend to assume that the firm’s conditions stay the same over time. However, 
certainly within the constraining view, the options available to counter the controlling 
conditions, such as championing and the set up of separate venture, make it clear that a 
different set of conditions can be applied to initiatives, and thus by extension different sets 
for different phases. Hence, it is very well possible for firms to provide conditions that 
differ across the various phases. In such a case, with the initiative moving from exploration 
in the initial to exploitation in the final phase, we would expect that firms that manage to 
provide initiatives with supportive conditions in the variation phase, a mixture of 
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supportive an controlling ones in the selection phase, and controlling ones in the retention 
phase would display successful trajectories. 
 
Proposition 1c: Firms that provide supportive organizational conditions in the 
variation phase of initiatives and controlling ones in the retention 
phase of initiatives show better overall generation and 
implementation of initiatives.  
 
The latter proposition clarifies the need for organizational conditions to evolve over time. 
The challenge for firms in the conditioning view is not that the entire set of conditions of 
the firm must change over time, but rather that there is an evolution in the type that 
operates on and applies to the initiative in each particular phase.  
CONCLUSION 
The conditioning view focuses on the corporate context of initiatives rather than their 
content-wise development. The organizational conditions that impact initiatives are its 
object of study. These are the organizational form, the administrative and incentive 
systems, and the managerial roles. The conditions provided by the firm are often not the 
ones the initiative needs, because both operate in a different mode. The firm seeks to 
exploit, whilst the initiative initially seeks to explore. The firm therefore represents a 
constraining environment whose controlling conditions can only moderately be made 
supportive for the initiative. To get initiatives through this system powerful individuals, 
called champions, are required that manipulate the firm’s decision-making process to the 
benefit of the initiative. 
 During its life span, the initiative is considered to move through three phases that 
represent different levels of increasing absorption by the firm: variation, selection, and 
retention. In the initial phase the initiative is in an explorative mode, whilst the firm in 
order to carry out its ongoing activities is in an exploitative mode. In the final phase, 
retention, the initiative is to be implemented in the firm. In that phase, both the firm and 
the initiative are in an exploitative mode. Conflict then is particularly present in the initial 
phases, when the initiative and the firm require different sets of conditions: the firm 
requires controlling conditions to exploit, whereas the initiative requires supportive 
conditions to explore. 
 There are two sub-views within the conditioning view. One considers the firm to 
provide a facilitating environment by providing supportive conditions. This sub-view’s 
value lies in pointing out the conditions that are needed to enable explorative activity. Yet, 
it fails to recognize that firms exist not just to serve initiatives, but also to carry out other 
ongoing tasks that require controlling conditions. Secondly, it fails to realize that initiatives 
 THEORY ON CONTEXT  
 37 
themselves move through various phases and must eventually be implemented requiring a 
switch from supportive to controlling conditions. Overall, it fails to recognize that 
initiatives must fit in the larger balance of exploitation versus exploration (March, 1991) 
and cannot be treated in isolation. Without this balance there is a danger for too much 
exploration that can lead to strategic neglect (Volberda, 1998) and chaos (Weick, 1979). 
Hence, although this sub-view has contributed to the conditioning view, the latter is still 
mainly framed in terms of the other sub-view, namely of firms as constraining 
environments. 
This most common sub-view considers firms to constitute constraining 
environments for initiatives. Certainly in the variation phase, firms and initiatives pursue 
different means, exploitation versus exploration, and they therefore require different 
conditions, namely controlling versus supportive ones. Because it is impossible to satisfy 
the two with a single set of conditions, firms can loosen the strictness of the conditions, 
create separate ones for initiatives (spatial separation), or allow powerful champions to 
battle through these conditions when conflict arises. The constraining sub-view also 
recognizes that initiatives move through different phases and will shift from an invention 
to an implementation focus (temporal separation). Hence, whilst the initiative initially 
requires supportive conditions, i.e. a facilitating environment, during its final 
implementation phase it will require controlling conditions, i.e. a constraining 
environment. 
 Overall, the conditioning view focuses on the context-wise development of 
initiatives. The organizational conditions function as levers for influencing the trajectories 
of initiatives. Because of the inherent conflict of purpose between initiatives and the firm 
the conditions cannot satisfy both parties and will always be imperfect. The approach is 
certainly not without its limits. Because it takes the firm as a starting point, it only 
describes what the firm provides instead of what the initiative requires. Moreover, it takes 
the generation of ideas for granted. Context rather than content is the focus of the 
approach. Also, the hierarchy is considered a given, whereas this need not be the case, as 
the facilitating sub-view had clarified. And last but not least, the initiative and the firm are 
considered enemies in battle, whilst they can also be considered to help each other as the 
discussion on multidirectionality had pointed out. Notwithstanding this, the firm realizes it 
must provide supportive conditions in the initial variation phase, and controlling ones in 
the retention phase, where the initiative is implemented. Although the content-wise 
development has been alluded to, in particular by the facilitating sub-view, the 
conditioning view in essence only considers the context. In the next chapter we will 
therefore discuss the knowledge creating view, which looks at the content-wise 
development of initiatives.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Knowledge-Creating View: 
Theory on Content 
As opposed to the previous chapter, in which the firm took center stage, the knowledge-
creation approach takes the initiative as a starting point and investigates how the firm can 
facilitate its initiation and development. The initiative process is seen as emanating from 
recombinations of disconnected knowledge domains. The firm’s knowledge base, which 
can vary in terms of its breadth and depth, serves as a platform from which the initiative 
creates its own knowledge base. This knowledge creation process occurs in three phases, 
linking, interpretation, and integrating, during which the initiative members couple 
themselves tighter to each other in order to integrate the specialist knowledge into detailed 
action. This causes the initiative to set up its own organizational form, administrative and 
incentive systems, and roles. Yet, the initiative occurs within the firm and therefore needs 
to synchronize itself with the organization context. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
how the firm can facilitate the knowledge creating process. 
INITIATIVES AS KNOWLEDGE RECOMBINATIONS 
Although there is no literature that specifically treats initiatives as knowledge-creating 
entities, such a perspective is drawn by the knowledge, learning, and creativity literatures.  
The knowledge literature, which sought to explain the existence of firms (Grant 
and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Grant, 1991, 1996a,b; Spender, 1996), comes closest to having 
identified initiatives as knowledge creating entities. This is evident from Spender’s (1996: 
47) description of firms as “enduring alliances between independent knowledge-creating 
entities, be they individuals, teams or organizations.” Focused on the dynamic 
development of knowledge it looks at issues such as innovation (i.e. Zahra, Nielsen, and 
Bogner, 1999), knowledge brokering (i.e. Hargadon, 1998a), knowledge transfer (i.e. 
Nonaka, 1991), and knowledge integration (i.e. Grant, 1996b). It regards new knowledge 
as a recombination of previous knowledge. There is some discussion whether the new 
knowledge should be called new (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) or a reconfiguration 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990) and whether the previous knowledge is applied in a different 
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context (Hargadon, 1998b) or merely recombined (Hedlund, 1994; Grant, 1996a,b; Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). Notwithstanding, its main point is that new ideas depend on 
assimilating knowledge outside the domain of the idea generator.  
The creativity19 literature, in turn, has specifically concentrated on the initial 
phases of the initiative process (Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin, 1993), analyzing the 
creative processes that cause sense making and the recombination of knowledge (i.e. 
Amabile, 1988, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin, 1993; Ford, 1996; Drazin, Glynn 
and Kanzanjian, 1999). It looks at the ways in which previously unrelated knowledge 
becomes related to some existing knowledge and sparks the generation of new ideas. 
Koestler (1964) termed this the ‘bisociative’ process; something De Bono (1970) termed 
‘lateral thinking.’ The creativity literature has proposed many techniques to stimulate this, 
such as brainstorming (Osborn, 1963), synectics (Gordon, 1961), and brainwriting 6-3-520. 
Its main contribution is that a new way of ‘seeing’ or ‘interpreting’ is required in order to 
see how new and previous knowledge can be recombined. 
The learning literature has sought to explain how the creation of knowledge at the 
individual and group levels leads to organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; 
Huber, 1991) as well as how this occurs in various phases (i.e. Drazin et al, 1999; Crossan, 
Lane, and White, 1999). There has been quite some debate whether knowledge is 
essentially individual (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996a,b)21 or organizational 
(i.e. Kogut and Zander, 1992; Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Gherardi, 1999).22 
Various authors have protested at this distinction. Tsoukas, for example, says, “individual 
knowledge is possible precisely because of the social practices within which individuals 
engage – the two are mutually defined (1996:14)”. Similarly, Kogut and Zander (1992: 
383) state, “Knowledge is held by individuals, but is also expressed in regularities by 
which members cooperate in a social community.” The learning literature’s main point 
then, is that knowledge creation is a process that moves through various phases and from 
the individual to the group and organizational levels (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999). 
 
                                                 
19 Creativity has been defined in various ways, but according to Amabile (1996) definitions can be grouped as (1) 
based on personality traits, (2) on characteristics of the creative process, and (3) as product definitions. Amabile 
concludes that with most research being measurement-driven product-definitions would seem most suitable, as 
the other two types have no measurable end product. However, if we take a product-based definition such as 
creativity being “the production of novel and useful ideas by an individual or small group of individuals working 
together” (Amabile, 1988: 126), there really is no difference with innovation. The personality trait definitions 
have the same problem: characteristics of creative people seem identical to those of innovative people. Only in 
the process definition do we see a clear distinction between innovation, the creation of something new, and 
creativity, a certain way of achieving that something new. 
20 The name Brainwriting 6-3-5 comes from having six people continuously writing three ideas within five 
minutes. 
21 Grant criticizes the literature on organizational knowledge, because “by defining rules, procedures, 
conventions, and norms as [organizational] knowledge [it] fails to direct attention to the mechanisms through 
which this ‘organizational knowledge’ is created through the interactions of individuals, and offers little guidance 
as to how managers can influence these processes (Grant, 1996b: 113).” 
22 They point to organizational memory, more specifically in codified form, as organizational knowledge that is 
not individual knowledge anymore: those individuals might have already left the firm. 
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Taken together these literatures depict a very different view of initiatives than the context-
focused conditioning view, discussed in the previous chapter. Instead, they focus on the 
content-wise development of the initiative, treating the initiative as a knowledge-creating 
entity. Revisiting the initiative definition with a knowledge-creating view lens it could be 
redefined as “a process by which individuals inside organizations identify and pursue an 
opportunity, i.e. a new knowledge base, to create future goods and services without regard 
to the resources they currently control, culminating in the approval of that opportunity.” 
Broad and deep knowledge 
Various classifications of knowledge exist, but two common ones are (1) tacit versus 
explicit and (2) broad versus deep knowledge.  
The first common distinction is between tacit and explicit knowledge (Polanyi, 
1962). Explicit knowledge enables the easy transfer of knowledge, whereas tacit 
knowledge represents a useful source of often-untapped knowledge that is not easily 
transferable. This resembles distinctions such as “knowing how and knowing about, [..], 
between subjective vs. objective knowledge, [..], personal vs. prepositional knowledge, and 
procedural vs. declarative knowledge (Grant, 1996b: 111). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
therefore proposed that one could create new knowledge by transforming tacit to explicit 
knowledge, a process they called externalization. Through conversion, i.e. explicating, 
tacit knowledge becomes transferable and the dilemma is solved.  
This view of knowledge creation has been critiqued for oversimplification. Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995) themselves also described three other conversions: socialization 
(tacit-tacit), combination (explicit-explicit), and internalization (explicit-tacit). Also, Alavi 
and Leidner (2001: 111) regard “the assumption that tacit knowledge is more valuable than 
explicit knowledge” as problematic because it “is tantamount to equating an inability to 
articulate with its worth.” Moreover, new knowledge and ideas are often a mixture of both 
tacit and explicit knowledge at the same time. In fact Tsoukas (1996: 14) points out that 
Polanyi’s (1975) tacit-explicit categorization has been misinterpreted by many strategists: 
“They should not be viewed as two separate types of knowledge. Contrary to what Nonaka and 
Takeuchi argue (1995:62-62) tacit knowledge can indeed be linguistically expressed if we 
focus our attention to it (Polanyi, 1975: 39-41; Moss, 1995: 62-62). And vice versa: explicit 
knowledge is always grounded on a tacit knowledge component (Polanyi, 1975: 41). [..] To 
split tacit from explicit knowledge is to miss the point – the two are inseparably related.” 
(Tsoukas, 1996: 14) 
 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the tacit-explicit distinction, there is still much 
inherent logic to the externalization argument. Certainly, it is not always easy to expliticize 
tacit knowledge by merely focusing on it as Tsoukas suggests, and therefore personal 
interaction remains necessary for its transfer. Nonaka and Takeuchi sum it up by saying, 
“creating new knowledge is also not simply a matter of learning from others or acquiring 
knowledge from the outside. Knowledge has to be built on its own, frequently requiring 
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intensive and laborious interaction among members of the organization. (1995: 10).” 
Although the distinction is not without its limitations, it does clarify that much knowledge 
is neither codified nor easy to access and that knowledge creation therefore often requires 
social interaction. 
 The second distinction is between deep and broad knowledge23 (Iansiti, 1993; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995). Deep knowledge refers to deep functional knowledge (Iansiti, 
1993; Leonard-Barton, 1995), and is alternatively labeled specialized (Demsetz, 1991), 
specialist (Grant, 1996b), or complex knowledge (Hansen, 1999). Broad knowledge refers 
to a knowledge base that is so wide-ranging that it manages to explore interfaces between 
different specialist areas (Iansiti, 1993; Leonard-Barton, 1995) and resembles to some 
extent the labels common (Demsetz, 1991), integrative (Grant, 1996b), or simple 
knowledge (Hansen, 1999). Yet Leonard-Barton’s broad knowledge differs in an important 
way from Demsetz’s common knowledge (1991): the first refers to the capacity to 
comprise different specialist areas whereas the second refers more to the capacity to 
understand one another, i.e. a common language. Obviously, some level of common 
understanding is required in order for broad knowledge to bring together specialist 
knowledge areas.  
 
Figure 3.1: Broad versus Deep knowledge (based on Leonard-Barton, 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leonard-Barton relates broad and deep knowledge to a T-shape. The cross in the 
T-shape represents broad knowledge. The vertical line of the T-shape, in turn, represents 
deep specialist knowledge. The broader the knowledge base, the more it can bring together 
disconnected knowledge areas. The broader the knowledge the more it enables distant 
search (Cyert and March, 1963), which is a search for different knowledge that has a 
higher chance to lead to more innovative ideas. The deeper the knowledge the more it can 
                                                 
23 Actually Iansiti and Leonard-Barton label them alternatively skills and knowledge. Since skills are one of the 
forms in which knowledge manifests itself (Hedlund, 1994), I have used the term knowledge for reasons of 
consistency in terminology. Both she and Iansiti also use the T-shape to refer to the presence of both kinds of 
knowledge within a single individual. In this case we use it for the firm. 
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refine knowledge within a specialist area. One can therefore claim that the generation of 
ideas requires broad knowledge, whereas their detailing requires deep knowledge (see 
figure 3.1). As such both types of knowledge are required for the creation of new 
knowledge.  
PHASES OF KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT 
The knowledge-creating process has been depicted as consisting of various phases. A well-
known representation is the previously discussed transformation process from tacit to 
explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), which has been critiqued as being 
overly simplistic (Tsoukas, 1996). Another representation is that of the information24 
processing view (Miller, 1972; Simon, 1973; Galbraith, 1973) of organizations as 
extracting, processing, and acting on information (Huber and Daft, 1987). In similar terms, 
Argyris and Schön discuss the learning process as consisting of acquiring, processing, 
storing, and applying (1978) knowledge. Both the information processing and learning 
representations have been criticized for being too stimulus-response oriented (Levitt and 
March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Weick, 1991) and for viewing humans as information 
processors instead of information creators (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Yet recently, these have been adapted to reflect more proactive representations of 
knowledge-creation involving sense making (Drazin et.al., 1999). Such a recent model by 
Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) depicts the knowledge-creating process as consisting of 
intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. With respect to the initiative 
process, the institutionalizing process comes after the approval of the initiative as it 
describes the transfer of already created knowledge to the rest of the organization. It is 
therefore laid aside in this thesis. Regarding the intuiting phase, this has also been termed 
the linking phase (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlund, 1994) because one first needs to 
link to other knowledge in order for intuiting to occur. We therefore describe the 
knowledge-creating view of initiatives as consisting of the three phases: (1) linking – 
which includes intuiting -, (2) interpreting, and (3) integrating (see figure 3.2). As stated in 
the opening chapter, it is generally recognized that initiatives do not necessarily need to 
proceed sequentially through these three phases, but can iterate back and forth (Van de 
Ven, 1992).  Yet, although loops may exist, this sequential depiction serves to convey the 
general aggregate progression of the initiative. 
Each phase also describes the involvement of players at different organizational 
levels. In the linking phase it is basically an individual who, often through social contacts, 
comes in to contact with other knowledge and intuits an opportunity or idea. In the next 
phase, a group of people become involved in interpreting the entire concept. In the 
                                                 
24 Because knowledge is built on information (Machlup, 1983). 
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integration phase the different knowledge areas are integrated into detailed action at the 
firm level. 
 
Figure 3.2: Knowledge-creating process (based on Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior knowledge 
Before one can even engage in a knowledge-creating endeavor, a certain amount of prior 
knowledge must be available to build on. Entrepreneurial discoveries are considered to 
stem from recombinations between prior knowledge and some other outside knowledge 
(Shane, 2000; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  This prior knowledge is both a prerequisite 
and a liability (Moorman and Miner, 1997) for knowledge creation. This existing 
knowledge and experience is stored in the individuals (Simon, 1955), the group (cf. 
Axelrod, 1976; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Barr. Stimpert, and Huff, 1992), and the 
organization (cf. Walsh and Ungson, 1991). The knowledge creation that occurs in 
initiatives is therefore dependent on the knowledge base of the initiative itself, but also on 
the knowledge base of the firm. 
The presence of a prior knowledge base has been shown to have positive effects 
on knowledge creation. Naturally one needs “domain relevant skills, which include factual 
knowledge, technical skills, and special talents in the domain in question” for the 
generation of an idea (Amabile, 1988). Similarly Weick (1993) has pointed to the 
recombination of prior knowledge -he talks of routines- to produce new ideas. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) found that prior knowledge increases a firm’s capacity to absorb new 
information.  
Yet, although the prior knowledge of the initiative and the firm in which it is 
embedded allow the recognition of certain opportunities, it inhibits the recognition of 
others (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane, 2000). Because prior knowledge forms the basis for 
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new knowledge, there is a high probability of path dependency and as Kogut and Zander 
explain, “firms [and individuals] learn in areas closely related to their existing experience 
(1992:392).” Such single-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) may be inappropriate 
(Walsh and Ungson, 1991) resulting in a deadly competence trap (Levitt and March, 1988; 
Levinthal and March, 1993), or core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Barnett et al, 1994).  
In line with the discussions on common language25, one could thus say that prior 
knowledge simultaneously allows for and limits the creation of future knowledge. If we 
take into account the broadness of the prior knowledge, then we can conclude that the 
broader the prior knowledge base, the larger the scope of the future knowledge direction.  
Linking 
The first phase of the knowledge-creating process, linking, starts with getting into contact 
with other knowledge and intuiting the existence of an opportunity.  Because other 
knowledge is required for knowledge recombination, one has to link up or get into contact 
with this new knowledge (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlund, 1994).  One way is by 
acquiring it in codified form, such as through the reading of specialist magazines or the use 
of databases. However, the latter have been critiqued heavily for their inability to stimulate 
idea generation. Hargadon explains: “they choke the process of analogic thinking 
[because] these systems are designed to help you find what you’re looking for, as long as 
you know what you’re looking for (1998b, 221).” And as Tsoukas explains: “nobody 
knows in advance what that knowledge is or need be. Firms […] cannot know what they 
need to know (1996: 22).” 
Another way to stimulate idea generation is by contacting other knowledge 
domains (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlund, 1994) through varying personal contacts (cf. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), because much untapped knowledge is tacit and personal, and 
“not yet codified or codifiable for transfer to others” (Kanter, 1988: 171). Some claim 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1986) that the importance of face-to-face meetings in acquiring 
knowledge stands without question. Because new ideas are often interdisciplinary in nature 
(Kanter, 1988) their generation requires crossing boundaries between different knowledge 
domains. Social interaction that spans such boundaries is available to firms in many 
different forms. Dyer and Singh point to alliance partners as “the most important source of 
new ideas and information (1998: 665).” Matusik and Hill (1998) suggest firms should use 
contingent work for upgrading their knowledge base. But apart from these somewhat 
formal arrangements, much value has particularly been attributed to social networks. 
                                                 
25 Prior knowledge has often been equated to common knowledge, because the second cannot exist without the 
first. Yet, only if the prior knowledge is strongly dispersed throughout the organization and stored in the 
organizational memory can we talk of common knowledge. In that case, many organizational members will think 
alike, causing homogeneity. In all other cases, prior knowledge can exists without it being common knowledge, 
causing heterogeneity. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) note, “while common knowledge [i.e. homogeneity] improves 
communication, commonality should not be carried so far that diversity across individuals [heterogeneity] is 
substantially diminished (134).” 
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Social networks are considered an important mechanism for achieving social 
interaction that spans across different knowledge domains (Kanter, 1988; Hargadon, 
1998a). For the field of biotechnology, for example, Liebeskind et al (1996) found social 
networks to be very important. Hargadon explains the value of such networks as (1998a) 
“firms [..] are capable of routinely innovating because they exploit their network position 
spanning multiple domains to recognize and transfer knowledge from where it is known to 
where it is not.” Firms try to facilitate the use of such social networks by nourishing 
mediators that manage such contacts, called brokers (Hargadon, 1998a), stars (Tushman, 
1979), or gatekeepers (Allen, 1977; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; Katz and Tushman, 
1983). This knowledge-brokering role has particularly been attributed to middle managers 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996b). 
Contact with other knowledge is in itself not enough for the generation of a new 
idea: Intuition is also required. Intuiting is “the recognition of a pattern and/or possibilities 
inherent in a personal stream of experience (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999: 525).” In 
order for knowledge to crystallize into valuable ideas it sometimes requires being shaken 
around, which can purposely be stimulated or can occur by chance, called “unexpected 
occurrences” by (Drucker, 1985: 68). What happens is that some other knowledge -for 
example an event, some information, or new knowledge- sheds a different light on the 
existing knowledge and out roles an insight. The capacity to make this happen is called 
creativity and is essential for innovative solutions (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994). 
Although contacting other knowledge is often a social activity, intuiting an 
opportunity is often an individual activity. Hence, when Leonard-Barton and Straus (1997: 
112) say that “in order to create new ideas and products, [..] managers [should] actively 
manage the process of bringing together a variety of people who think and act in 
potentially conflicting ways,” this should be read as providing the appropriate context for 
an individual to generate ideas. Idea generation is personal “in the sense of involving the 
personality of him who holds it, and also in the sense of being, as a rule, solitary (Polanyi, 
1966: 25).”  Crossan, Lane, and White (1999: 525) explain: “It is a uniquely individual 
process. It may happen within a group or organizational context, but the recognition of a 
pattern or possibility comes from within an individual.” Hence, in order for these 
individuals to recognize opportunities they must be provided with a context that provides 
new ways of ‘seeing.’  
Interpretation 
The next phase, “Interpreting has to do with refining and developing intuitive insights 
(Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999: 525).” Although the fragments of an idea are essentially 
already in one’s mind, the pieces still need to fit together. As Polanyi says,  “[t]he act of 
discovery […] starts with the solitary intimations […] of bits and pieces here and there 
which seem to offer clues to something hidden. They look like fragments of a yet 
incoherent whole (1966: 24).” To see how the bits and pieces fit together to become that 
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coherent whole, one needs an interpretative scheme, something Kanter calls ‘kaleidoscopic 
thinking’  (1986). Now creativity, which was probably also applied for gaining the insight 
in the first place, plays an even greater role in refining and explaining the concept. 
Metaphors, analogies, similes, associations, wishful thinking, estranging the familiar, and 
trying the counterintuitive are all techniques used to accomplish this (Nonaka, 1991). 
The conceptual utilization of knowledge, i.e. experimentation and personal 
interaction, has been found Moorman (1995) to aid this interpretation process. Initiators 
(Venkataraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye and Hudson, 1990) need to experiment to quickly 
figure out what works and what does not, as initiatives are a combinative process of 
interrelated advances and setbacks. So-called intelligent failures (Sitkin, 1992) can 
increase knowledge useful for other ideas. Lynn, Morone, and Paulson extended this to the 
notion that ideas might be pursued with the explicit recognition that they are likely to fail 
(1997). McGrath therefore proposes that firms should “evaluate the collective contribution 
of entrepreneurial initiatives to wealth creation than to assess each initiative on its own 
(1999: 14).”  
It is quite hard to explain and refine the insight without the contribution of various 
other people. Crossan, Lane, and White explain this by saying (1999: 525), “the proverbial 
person on a deserted island could have an intuitive insight and begin making sense of it 
through an internal conversation (i.e. talking to one’s self), but the interpretive process is 
likely to be much richer and more robust if the conversations and interactions are with 
others.” The interpretation phase is, therefore, essentially very much a group level activity 
and the reason why it has also been labeled sense making or issue selling (Woodman, 
Sawyer, and Griffin, 1993; Drazin, Glynn, and Kanzanjian, 1999; Daft and Weick, 1984). 
And thus as this sense-making process evolves, a group of people with an understanding of 
the idea starts to accumulate around it and pursue its implementation. 
Integration  
The integrating phase is aimed at detailing and implementing the concept, in other words 
securing “coherent, collective action (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999: 528).” People with 
specialist knowledge are brought into close contact, for example in teams, so that by 
integrating their specialisms they can detail the concept into an explicit plan. According to 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) they can achieve this without any actual transfer of 
knowledge occurring. In this regard, Grant (1996b: 377) offers the example of 
cardiovascular surgery, which is based on the integration – not transfer - of “the specialist 
knowledge of surgeons, anesthetist, radiologist, operating-room nurses and several types of 
technicians.”  
In the interpretation phase, the knowledge-creating process moves from the group to 
the firm level. The specialist knowledge that is needed is provided for by the firm, at least 
to a large extent, and is the reason why Demsetz (1991:171) describes firms as 
“repositories of specialized knowledge.” According to Grant (1996b) firms must be 
THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING VIEW 
48 
involved in integrating specialist knowledge because they deal with the application of 
specialist knowledge. The initiative must not only put to use the existing specialist 
knowledge available in the firm, it must also embed its own newly developed knowledge 
within this hierarchy of specialisms (Grant, 1996b). This involves formalizing the rules 
and procedures, and establishing the routines of the workgroup (Crossan, Lane, and White, 
1999) so that it matches those of the rest of the organization. 
Social Networks 
In the previous discussion of the knowledge-creation phases, social networks stood out as a 
prime driver of knowledge-creation; this is the reason why they merit further discussion. 
They are considered extremely important for acquiring other knowledge (Hargadon, 
1998a; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), because they provide access to other knowledge 
domains and because they are based on trust which is considered to facilitate knowledge 
sharing (Granovetter, 1985). Social networks contain knowledge that the future idea 
generator recombines with his own knowledge, leading to the birth of a new idea. 
Sometimes the new knowledge can “be an idea that exists in one domain, but becomes an 
innovation when it is introduced into a domain that had no previous knowledge of it” 
(Hargadon, 1998a: 19). Social networks can however also serve to interpret one’s own 
knowledge differently, as Kanter (1988: 175) explains, “contact with those who see the 
world differently is a logical prerequisite to seeing it differently ourselves.”  
Because people in the same social network tend to think and posses similar 
knowledge, knowledge generation is enhanced by knowledge flows between somewhat 
disconnected networks. People normally operate in a dominant social network of people 
with whom they often deal. By mapping these similar relationships – called structural 
equivalence (Burt, 1992) - social network researchers show the presence of slightly 
disconnected social networks.  
Ties between such disconnected social networks enable the flow of knowledge 
between them. Floyd and Wooldridge (1999) explain that one reason these contacts are 
important is because they can significantly affect an individuals belief system and 
“promote a mindset that deviates in important respects from the dominant culture and that 
perceives a different set of opportunities than most other organization members (Glade, 
1967).” Granovetter (1973), therefore points to ‘weak ties’, i.e. loosely coupled (Weick, 
1982) relations, the non-dominant social network people have, i.e. acquaintances, as 
important sources for knowledge flow. In a similar vein, according to DiMaggio (1992) 
and Burt (1992) it is the bridging of structural holes between social networks that 
constitutes the key to new ideas26.  
                                                 
26 For this reason, McEvily and Zaheer note that firms should ensure that their advice networks are non-
redundant, meaning that their “advisors are complete strangers to each other”, because ‘redundant ties are likely 
to produce information that is largely superfluous and unoriginal (1999: 1138).” 
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Although weak ties are considered beneficial for the generation of knowledge, the 
actual integration and recombination of specialist knowledge Grant (1996b) benefits from 
strong ties (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999; Hansen, 1999). Hansen explains, “weak ties may 
lead to search benefits in a social network but they may also cause problems in transferring 
complex forms of knowledge (1999:83).”  Strong ties, i.e. tightly-coupled (Weick, 1982) 
relations, are necessary for the actual transfer of knowledge across boundaries (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Szulanski, 1996) because such a transfer is 
considered difficult (Hansen, 1999). The project team members have “the opportunity to 
try, err, and seek instruction and feedback from the strongly tied source (Hansen, 1999).” 
 
Conclusion 
The previous literature on creativity, knowledge management, and social networks, 
provides a view of initiatives as attempts to recombine knowledge. The creativity literature 
clarifies, similar to social constructionists, that such recombination is often a new way of 
interpreting existing knowledge. Other knowledge is regarded as another perspective, 
another mode for interpreting, not just as a necessary ingredient. Knowledge management 
accentuates the use of other knowledge as a necessary ingredient. Often the other 
knowledge merely needs to be transferred to become a valuable idea. Both literatures point 
to the need to contact other knowledge, whether as an ingredient or as a perspective, and to 
the need for personal interaction in doing so because most valuable knowledge is tacit and 
difficult to transfer. This is where social network theory is valuable, as it considers 
knowledge to be tied to social networks. By reaching out to other social networks, through 
bridging weak ties or structural holes, other knowledge can be contacted. This will lead to 
knowledge flow and result in recombinations that generate new ideas. For the entire 
process to take place firms should allow for pockets of stimulating subcultures to ensure 
enough personal initiative to drive the knowledge recombination process.  
THE KNOWLEDGE CREATING VIEW 
The knowledge-creating view assumes that the initiative develops a knowledge base of its 
own during its life span as it moves from idea, to concept, to detailed action (see figure 
3.3). As the initiators construct the initiative’s knowledge base, they move from being 
loosely coupled - across various boundaries - to being tightly coupled to each other. This 
expresses itself in the formation and formalization of the initiative’s own organizational 
form, administration, and roles.  
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Figure 3.3: The knowledge-creating view  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge base 
With prior knowledge as a platform, other knowledge is linked to, interpreted, and 
integrated. The initiative’s knowledge base starts with the identification of an opportunity 
(Pinchott, 1985; Nonaka, 1994; Birkinshaw, 1997), often referred to as an idea. This can be 
the result of a problem driven search (Cyert and March, 1963), of a crisis (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976), of unexpected occurrences (Drucker, 1985), or of 
opportunistic and personal factors (Aharoni, 1966). Although ideas can come in many 
forms, such as radical, architectural, and incremental (Quinn, 1987; Henderson and Clark, 
1990), or as autonomous and induced (Burgelman, 1983a), or as internal, local, or global 
market initiatives (Birkinshaw, 1997), in this study we limit this to products (goods) and 
processes (services) for reasons of practicality. Processes are generally much more 
embedded within the firm and therefore to be subject to very different organizational 
conditions than products. The kind of knowledge that is embodied in the initiative clearly 
changes from the initial to the final phases. The initiative knowledge base, after having 
transformed the prior knowledge to an insight, continues transforming into a concept and 
finally detailed action. The difference over time in the knowledge base can best be 
described as a shift from broad to deep knowledge.  
Broad knowledge cuts across boundaries, because it connects different specialist 
knowledge areas, even though it might be at a superficial level. It is exactly this 
characteristic that enables the emergence of insights and ideas in the initial phase. The 
emergence of an initiative knowledge base is dependent on the firm’s knowledge base, 
because the initiative’s own knowledge base does not exist at the outset. It still needs to 
emerge in the initial linking phase. If the firm’s knowledge base is broad rather than 
narrow it will benefit the initiative in two ways. First, it offers a much larger range of prior 
knowledge areas as a platform for the initiative to draw upon. Second, the firm’s broad 
knowledge base, by extension, can be expected to have a much more diverse range of 
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knowledge ties, outside of its own existing knowledge base. Broader knowledge bases thus 
offer larger ranges of possible knowledge recombinations. What matters then is the 
knowledge base that the initiative can build on. This can be from the firm, but can also lie 
outside of the firm. This leads us to: 
 
Proposition 2a: Initiatives that can build on broad, rather than deep, knowledge 
bases in their linking phase show better generation. 
 
 Firms can also possess deep knowledge, i.e. areas of specialist knowledge. For the 
development of initiatives, which occurs in the final integration stage, it is already clear 
what specialist areas are to be combined. The broad knowledge that was used to establish 
the usefulness of the combinations is no longer needed now. Instead the knowledge of the 
different combinations must be integrated, requiring specialist knowledge at a very 
detailed level. Deep functional, rather than common knowledge is of the essence in order 
to carry out the detailing that is necessary in this final integration phase. This leads us to: 
 
Proposition 2b: Initiatives that can build on deep, rather than broad, knowledge 
areas in their integration phase show better implementation. 
 
Although deep and narrow are obviously not the same, in this study we will 
equate a deep knowledge base with a narrow one. This is because at the phase in the 
knowledge creation process at which deep knowledge must be integrated, it is clear which 
knowledge areas this concerns. At that point, new or other knowledge areas outside of the 
specialisms that are to be integrated have already been considered. The knowledge width 
has thus become narrow.  
Based on the above and in line with the argument that initiatives need to 
transform their ties from weak ones in the initial phase to strong ones in the final phase 
(Hansen, 1999), it follows that initiatives need to move from broad knowledge in the initial 
linking phase to deep knowledge in the final phase. Much of the product development 
literature expresses this rational as a move from divergent to convergent thinking. 
Wheelwright and Clark express this same rationale in their funnel model (1992). The logic 
is that as the idea, i.e. the knowledge base, develops, decisions and commitments will be 
made that limit the area in which future solutions, i.e. knowledge areas, can be found. 
Notwithstanding that new knowledge can be acquired during the initiative’s development, 
the aggregate and overall pattern is one of a convergence from a broad range of knowledge 
areas to a narrow one. Hence, successful initiatives display a transformation from broad to 
deep knowledge. This leads to: 
 
Proposition 2c: Initiatives that build on broad knowledge in the linking phase and 
deep knowledge in the integrating phase show better overall 
generation and implementation of initiatives. 
THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING VIEW 
52 
Initiative form 
As the initiative knowledge base moves from broad to deep knowledge, the initiative form 
must move from loose to tight coupling. The loose coupling of the various initiative 
members in the initial linking phase is necessary to access broad knowledge, i.e. to allow 
for the flexible formation of knowledge links between disconnected areas. As it becomes 
clear what deep knowledge areas are required, so too is it becoming clear which members 
must work closer together in order to manage the integration of the specialist knowledge 
areas. To enable this closer cooperation, they must be coupled tighter and tighter. An 
increasing level of structural formalization accompanies this move from loose to tight 
coupling of the initiative members. In the initial linking phase there is no initiative form 
yet (Kanter, 1988) because the initiative requires broad knowledge, which it can access 
from the firm and or from social networks. During the next interpretation and integration 
phases, as it becomes clear what specialisms are necessary, the initiative members from 
those areas must be brought into closer contact and we see the shift to a team and 
eventually a hierarchical unit (Grant, 1996b) form. 
The team form (c.f. Galbraith, 1973; Grant, 1996b), alternatively called task 
forces (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), temporary projects (Hedlund, 1994), or skunk works 
(Pinchot, 1985), represents a new combination of specialist knowledge areas. The existing 
hierarchy cannot handle such a combination of specialisms for the simple reason that it has 
not previously grouped them together. The specialisms are thus not tightly coupled but 
dispersed throughout the hierarchy. The team form brings these specialist areas together in 
a more tightly coupled setting allowing further interpretation and integration. As Grant 
(1996b: 118) explains “the essence of team based organization is the recognition that 
coordination is best achieved through direct involvement of individual specialists.” Some 
level of understanding of which specialist knowledge areas must fit together should thus 
already exist for a team to be formed; otherwise no rational would exist for the coupling of 
members representing certain knowledge specialisms. A team is therefore not an 
appropriate mechanism for generating an initial insight or idea, and is why it is not suitable 
for the linking phase (Kanter, 1988). 
 Further and more formal coupling in a hierarchical structure is required, once the 
concept has been refined and it is clear how the deep knowledge areas fit together, to 
integrate and implement the concept into detailed action (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999). 
In order to tightly couple these different areas of specialist knowledge (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Szulanski, 1996), a transformation of the 
team into a permanent unit within the hierarchy or a restructuring of the existing hierarchy 
is necessary (Van den Bosch, Volberda, and de Boer, 1999)27. This is the culmination what 
in Clark and Wheelwright’s terminology (1992) would be described as a transformation 
                                                 
27 They posited that the functional structure as opposed tot the divisional and matrix form, has “a high potential 
for efficiency, but a low potential for both scope and flexibility of knowledge absorption (Van den Bosch, 
Volberda, De Boer, 1999: 555).” This is adequate for “stable and homogenous environments (555),” which the 
initiative has come into by the time it enters the retention phase. 
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from a functional, to a lightweight, to a heavyweight, to a tiger team. In this regard, 
Hedlund describes, for example, how “Ericsson [..] reorganized to allow for more 
integration in technology [..] between its radio systems and digital telecommunications 
exchange systems. (1994: 83). Grant (1996b), when talking about the application of 
knowledge, therefore discusses the appropriateness of hierarchical forms for integrating 
specialist knowledge. The hierarchical structure binds the former team members together 
in a much tighter coupled and more formalized setting than was the case when they were 
coupled in a team form. This rational leads to: 
 
Assumption 2d: Initiatives move from an informal structure in the linking phase to 
a formal hierarchical structure in the integration phase. 
Initiative administration 
The move from the linking to integrating phase is also accompanied by the increasing use 
of formal procedures and routines (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999). This is to ensure 
effective behaviors for interpreting and integrating the various knowledge specialisms into 
detailed action. Because the linking phase lacks any initiative form, there is, of course, also 
very little need for any initiative administration. After all, this phase is more about chance 
encounters and opportunistic behavior than about planned activities. As such, an 
administration only starts to form once certain relations and coupling have started, i.e. in 
the interpretation phase. The tighter the coupling becomes, the more commitments are 
embodied in an administrative system that is necessary to control effective behaviors. The 
more the initiative is coupled into the hierarchy, particularly in the integrating phase, the 
more the administrative system will need to be brought in line with that of the rest of the 
hierarchy. This leads to: 
 
Assumption 2e: Initiatives move from the absence of any administration in the 
linking phase to the use of its own administration in the 
integration phase. 
Initiative roles 
From a knowledge-creating point of view the linking, interpreting, and integrating phases 
also require certain roles, namely that of knowledge specialists, brokers, creators, and 
managers. According to Grant (1996b) the basis of new knowledge lies in specialist 
knowledge, and firms as well as initiatives depend on the availability of people who have 
this specialist knowledge: the specialists. Because these specialists are often disconnected, 
brokers are necessary to bridge the divide and connect them. If connected, an act of insight 
is required by someone who creates the idea. Once an idea has been born, a manager, i.e. a 
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project leader, is necessary to manage the ongoing development of the initiative. The 
existence of specialist and creator roles is often taken for granted by the knowledge 
creation literature. Instead, most of the attention goes to the connection of different 
knowledge areas through brokering (i.e. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993).  
Brokers can aid in bridging the gaps or disconnections between knowledge 
networks, which are often embodied in different social networks. Burt (1999) describes 
these brokers as those “who are not people at the top of things so much as people at the 
edge of things (1).” Based on the relation of the broker to the specialists that engage in the 
knowledge flow, Gould and Fernandez (1989) have suggested the following broker roles: 
(1) coordinator: the broker belongs to the same group as the specialists, (2) itinerant 
broker: the specialists belong to the same group while the broker is an outsider, (3) 
gatekeeper: granting access to outsiders, (4) representative: establishes contact with an 
outsider on behalf of an insider, and (5) liaison: the broker and specialists all belong to 
different groups. There are different opinions about the appropriateness of these roles for 
knowledge creation. Kanter (1988) feels that only the coordinator role is appropriate 
because it is the specialists that will use the knowledge and they should therefore be the 
ones who should go out and scan for it. However, McEvily and Zaheer provide support for 
itinerant roles because brokers, as they say, need not form part of the firm, they can lie 
within the advice network of the firm (1999). Notwithstanding these differences about the 
appropriateness of specific broker roles, the importance of brokers in the knowledge 
creation process is now well accepted. Some firms have even institutionalized them28. 
Hargadon and Sutton (1997), for example, describe the use of rapid response teams at 
McKinsey, “which promise[…] to link –within 24 hours- any consultant facing a problem 
to others who might have useful knowledge (161).”  
The Firm and knowledge-creation 
Because the existing prior knowledge base of the firm forms the basis from which the 
initiative launches itself there is less of a distinction between the firm and the initiative in 
the knowledge-creating view than was the case with the conditioning view. The initiative 
is not seen as being absorbed into the firm, as was the case in the conditioning view, but as 
developing itself out of the firm’s knowledge base. Initially no initiative knowledge base 
exists; all that exists is that of the firm. Therefore, in the initial phases there is a strong 
overlap between the firm and the initiative. Yet as the initiative develops its own 
knowledge base, while simultaneously setting up its own form, administration, and roles, it 
becomes a distinct entity from the firm, thus reducing the amount of overlap with the firm. 
However, in the final integration phase new coupling with the firm becomes necessary 
because of the complementary knowledge (Chesbrough, 2000) provided by the firm, such 
                                                 
28 Companies can purposely choose to embed themselves in a specific regional [social] network, such as Silicon 
Valley (Saxenian, 1990), to ensure more contact with relevant knowledge networks. Some researchers (Lorenzoni 
and Liparini,1999) therefore consider the ties to social networks to be a distinctive organizational capability. 
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as marketing knowledge, which is necessary to implement the desired detailed action. The 
initiative, even though it is now a distinct entity, i.e. a unit, therefore becomes strongly 
intertwined with the hierarchy of the firm again (see figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4: The Firm and Knowledge-Creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The type of organizational form of the firm that is most conducive to the 
knowledge creating activity of the initiative differs between the initial and final phases. 
Idea generation in the initial phase, where disconnected areas of knowledge are linked, is 
aided by the presence of network characteristics in the firm, such as the cutting through 
hierarchical levels and the crossing of boundaries. Organizational forms that encompass 
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such network characteristics (Kanter and Eccles, 1992) are known as network or N-forms 
(Miles and Snow, 1992), adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1983), the holographic organization 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979), the hypertext organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), and 
the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986). In such forms the dominant logic is not “a top-down or 
bottom-up one, [but] rather [..] one of horizontal coordination (Hedlund, 1994: 84).” Firm 
boundaries are less relevant to network forms as the intention is to cut across them, and 
therefore inter-firm relations, such as joint ventures, consortium membership, and know-
how exchanges, are also attributed great relevance (Quinn, 1985; Hamel, 1991; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 1995). In the final integration phase, where the rollout of detailed action is to 
occur, hierarchical characteristics are necessary to ensure tying in the complementary 
knowledge of the firm to the initiative’s knowledge base. As Grant (1996b) has explained, 
such is best integrated through the use of the firm’s hierarchy. 
The type of administrative and incentive systems most conducive to knowledge 
creation in the initiative also differ between the first and final phases. In the initial linking 
phase, where the initiative has no administration of its own yet, the presence of an 
innovative subculture or climate (Myerson and Martin, 1987) is considered beneficial. 
Ghoshal and Bartlett consider this climate to be the reason why individuals, in some 
organizations but not in others, routinely do so much more for the good of the organization 
[...] than their personal economic or political rewards [..] justify (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1994:91).” This culture builds confidence, self-efficacy and bestows greater responsibility 
on its members: elements that were shown to relate to higher rates of innovation. In the 
final integration phase, where the initiative now has its own administration, it becomes 
crucial to ensure that the administrative and incentive systems of the initiative are not too 
much out of line with the firm. This is necessary because the two must now closely 
cooperate in order to implement the desired action, and any perception of unfairness in 
different administrative and incentive systems would jeopardize that. The kind of system 
required in this phase is one in which behavior must be controlled to ensure tight coupling 
of the initiative knowledge base and the firm’s complementary assets. 
Because the initiative starts out from the firm’s knowledge base, the knowledge-
creating roles occur within the firm’s hierarchy and are therefore invariably differentiated 
by hierarchical level. The specialist and knowledge creating roles are attributed to the 
bottom layer in the hierarchy (Grant, 1996b; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994). The brokering 
role is attributed to the middle managers (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996b; Hedlund, 1994) because they are at the heart of the 
horizontal information flows (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996, 1999). They are to be expected to have more overview and 
relevant contacts than the specialist front-liners, and as opposed to top management they 
are better in touch with the issues. Top management lacks a knowledge creating role, and 
is therefore attributed the role of creating an appropriate context for knowledge creation 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994). Once the initiative has become distinct from the firm, the 
roles are less strongly tied to the hierarchy and only two roles remain: the specialist and 
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manager roles. The broker role is less relevant because the reconfiguration of knowledge 
areas has already occurred. What matters now is that a manager, project leader, ensures the 
integration of the specialist knowledge areas into detailed action. 
CONCLUSION 
The knowledge approach considers initiatives as knowledge creating particles that grow 
from the knowledge base of the firm into distinct entities. It investigates how ideas are 
born, developed, and rolled out. It suggests this occurs by moving from broad to deep 
knowledge in three phases: linking, interpreting, and integrating. During this process the 
initiative, using the knowledge base of the firm as a platform, sets up a knowledge base of 
its own. Whilst doing so, it moves from loose to tight coupling which causes the set-up of 
its own organizational form, administrative and incentive systems, and roles. The role of 
the firm is then to provide a sufficiently broad and deep knowledge base from which the 
initiative can launch itself in the linking phase, as well as the complementarities that are 
needed to rollout the desired action in the integration phase.  
 The approach also has some disadvantages. First the approach is path dependent, 
as initiatives evolve –through recombination- in part out of the existing knowledge of the 
firm. This suggests that radical innovations are better off with a conditioning approach in 
which power combats the path dependent forces. Secondly, the approach focuses much 
attention on personal interaction, but when it comes to the coordination of complex tasks 
such is often not feasible as “articulation, systematization, written information, impersonal 
control, become necessary (Hedlund, 1994: 81). A hierarchical form seems better suited 
for coordinating such complex tasks. Furthermore, the firm’s culture may not be strong 
enough to prevent the firm from turning into chaos, when everyone is engaged in creative 
activities. The autonomous nature of the knowledge approach seems to call for more 
control. 
 The knowledge approach seems particularly suited for understanding the content-
wise creation of new knowledge through recombinations. It explains how firms can 
provide a broad and deep enough knowledge base for initiatives to emerge from. However, 
firms have other tasks than merely to aid initiatives; they must also exploit and manage 
their existing activities. Yet for handling this tension the knowledge approach offers little 
help, because it only deals with initiatives rather than takes the role of the firm into 
account. The conditioning view is also not very helpful because it neglects the content-
wise development of the initiative. Hence, what is needed is an approach that takes both 
the context- and content-wise development into consideration. This forms the topic of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Synthesizing Knowledge-Creating and 
Conditioning: 
A Co-evolutionary Framework for Initiatives 
The previous two chapters on the conditioning and knowledge-creating view showed that 
initiatives need to develop themselves both content and context-wise. The disregard of the 
conditioning view for the knowledge development of initiatives is inappropriate as 
organizational conditions impact the latter. So too, is the disregard of the knowledge-
creating view for the organizational embeddedness of initiatives because they operate in 
an environment that is also catering to other firm activities resulting in tensions. This 
chapter proposes a framework of initiatives that integrates both perspectives by 
recognizing that organizational conditions and knowledge creation must co-evolve for 
successful trajectories of change.   
CROSSING THE DIVIDE 
Although both the conditioning and knowledge creating view analyze the same 
phenomenon - the initiative - they differ significantly in their focus. The knowledge-
creating view focuses on how the initiative is developed content-wise, whereas the 
conditioning view explains how it develops context-wise. The knowledge-creating view 
deals more with the initial stages, where ideas are generated, whereas the conditioning 
view deals more with the final stages of the initiative, where they are implemented in the 
firm. They are therefore not just different perspectives (Allison, 1969); they also 
compliment each other, suggesting a synthesis.  
Various authors, from both views, have made attempts to cross the divide. Within 
the conditioning view, such attempts remain fairly limited with the notable exception of 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993: 32) who proposed organizational conditions that are “premised 
on knowledge and expertise rather than capital or scale.” They suggest that through 
decentralization middle managers become freed from their regular administrative activities 
allowing them to “create and support [...] horizontal linkages (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
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1993:32).” Although other authors within the conditioning view had also pointed to 
horizontal linkages and network forms they had done so from a flexibility rather than a 
knowledge point of view (Miles and Snow, 1986). Yet, when Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) 
point to knowledge, they do so in a static and not in a process manner. The organizational 
conditions are not related to the different stages of knowledge development and they fail to 
explain how these conditions relate to other, more exploitative, activities of the firm. 
Within the knowledge creating view we also see attempts to cross the divide, with 
recent research focusing on how knowledge or ideas tie in with the organization. Some 
offer a causal perspective in which knowledge-creation results in new firm capabilities 
(Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999). Others use a sense-
making or issue selling perspective (Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin, 1993; Glynn, 1996; 
Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999; Drazin, Glynn, and Kanzanjian, 1999) to explain how 
individual knowledge gradually becomes embedded in the organization. Although these 
contributions relate knowledge-creation to corporate entrepreneurship, and thus to 
initiatives, they do not explain how the knowledge-creating process is influenced by 
organizational conditions. Kanzanjian and Rao (1999) form a notable exception with their 
investigation of the influence of top management characteristics on the creation of 
capabilities. Nevertheless, the usefulness of their study for understanding initiatives is 
limited. Firstly, it does not analyze initiatives but capabilities. Secondly, it is set up as a 
statistical analysis of cross-sectional data at two points in time rather than as a process 
study. How the organizational conditions they researched impacted the generation of 
knowledge over time remains unraveled. Hence, notwithstanding previous attempts to 
cross the divide a synthesis of the conditioning and knowledge-creating perspectives is still 
required.  
A study that has somewhat crossed the divide is that of Van den Bosch, Volberda, 
and De Boer (1999). Whilst Cohen and Levinthal (1990) had previously pointed out that 
prior knowledge improved the absorptive capacity of firms, Van den Bosch et al (1999) 
showed how prior knowledge also impacts the organizational form. As such they have 
made a clear link between knowledge and the organizational condition of organizational 
form. However, they fail to account for the longitudinal nature of the knowledge creation 
process by focusing on the static concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990).  Moreover, they do not address how the organizational condition, i.e. the form, in 
turn influences the knowledge base formation. Therefore, notwithstanding previous 
contributions, studies that synthesize knowledge creation with organizational conditions 
are still needed. 
Three aspects aid the formation of such a synthesis between the conditioning and 
knowledge-creating view. Firstly, although each view stresses either the context or content, 
they do not strictly confine themselves to one of the two. The conditioning view, for 
example, has noted that separation benefits idea development but hinders its implementing 
(Burgelman, 1983b). The knowledge-creating view, for example, finds that network forms 
aid knowledge sharing. Moreover, the two views stress sequential segments of the 
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initiative process; knowledge-creating focuses on the idea generation segment and 
conditioning on the selection-retention segment, suggesting that both views represent 
consecutive phases. And thirdly, both discuss the same initiative phenomenon and 
therefore analyze similar elements such as the people involved.  
Co-evolutionary lens 
How then can the organizational conditions be related to the knowledge creation process of 
initiatives (Kanzanjian and Rao, 1999; Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1999)? Co-evolutionary studies (Kieser, 1989; Baum and Singh, 1994; Lewin 
and Volberda, 1999) would be particularly appropriate for answering this question as they 
deal with issues (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) of time, path dependency, multilevelness, and 
interdependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this study co-evolution, defined as “the 
joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects (Lewin 
and Volberda, 1999: 526),” is actually micro-coevolutionary because it considers the 
“coevolution of intrafirm resources, dynamic capabilities, and competencies in an intrafirm 
competitive context (Lewin and Volberda, 1999: 526).” Such micro-coevolutionary 
studies, as they take place within the firm (McKelvey, 1997), should be able to explain 
much about the genesis and development of initiatives within firms.  
 Although micro-coevolutionary studies on initiatives already exist within the 
field of intrapreneurship, such as those on intraorganizational ecology (Burgelman, 1991) 
or on shifting intraorganizational domains (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996), they show 
difficulty in explaining the genesis of initiatives (Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999; Floyd 
and Wooldridge, 1999; Shane, 2000). They focus on the co-evolution of the firm and the 
initiative once the initiative is already in existence; how the initiative came into existence 
is barely explained. In other words, they treat the mature initiative phase but not the 
embryonic initiative phase (see figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: Initiative phases 
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In the mature initiative phase a co-evolutionary view indeed enables an 
explanation of the relationship between the initiative and the firm (Burgelman, 1983a; 
Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). In the embryonic initiative phase no initiative yet exists 
that is distinct and separate from the firm, this is the reason why one cannot speak of co-
evolution but only of evolution, namely of the initiative out of the firm. A selection of the 
firm and the initiative as the two elements that co-evolve, make it by definition impossible 
to explain how one evolves out of the other: both elements must already be in existence in 
order to co-evolve. We suggest that this is why existing micro-coevolutionary views in the 
field of intrapreneurship have problems explaining the birth of initiatives. When the 
initiative's origins - at least partly - lay within the firm such a selection of elements makes 
explaining the genesis of initiatives difficult. 
In this chapter, we therefore propose a micro-coevolutionary model of initiative 
formation with a different set of elements, namely one in which knowledge and conditions 
co-evolve. The model explains how the initiative builds its own distinct knowledge base 
based on that of the firm. As such it maintains the firm and initiative as two levels of 
analysis, but no longer regards them as necessarily separate and distinct. Instead, they are 
initially viewed as inseparable, like Ying and Yang. By focusing on the co-evolution of 
knowledge and conditions rather than of the firm and initiatives, as many previous studies 
have done, we show how the evolution of an initiative gradually involves the separation of 
that initiative from the firm29. Such a model allows for a more balanced description of the 
evolution of initiatives across both the embryonic and mature initiative phase. 
The model builds on the work of others who have also tried to move away from 
the bipolar initiative versus firm view. Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner (1999), for example, 
regard intrapreneurship as a learning process culminating in new knowledge and 
competence. Floyd and Wooldridge (1999) have depicted the intrapreneurship process as a 
capability development process in which an idea evolves into an initiative, which leads to a 
new capability. Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) depict it as a co-evolution of knowledge, 
capabilities, and products. These studies all seek to move beyond the firm-initiative 
bipolarity. Our model follows their lead by looking at the co-evolution of knowledge and 
conditions, yet differs from these studies by maintaining a focus on the firm-initiative 
relationship. 
In this way, by looking at the interaction between knowledge creation and 
conditioning, this study is very much in line with Baum and Singh’s (1994) conception of 
a genotype versus phenotype interaction in the sense that knowledge creation represents 
the genotype, expressing itself as an initiative with a set of conditions, the phenotype. 
Based on Volberda and Lewin’s (2003) co-evolutionary engine of ‘managed selection,’ we 
can depict this as a co-evolutionary variation-vicarious selection-retention process (see 
                                                 
29 Later on the firm can, of course, select the initiative back into the firm. In that case the gradual separation is 
changed to an embedding in the firm again. 
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figure 4.2). In essence, at the genotype level variation in knowledge is created, not blindly 
but deliberately because prior knowledge guides the generation of ideas. These knowledge 
variations express themselves phenotypically in initiatives with certain sets of conditions. 
The initiatives have already undergone all sorts of pressures and are thus not subject to 
purely competitive selection, but rather selection that Lewin and Volberda (2003) term 
vicarious. In other words, selective pressures have already molded and weeded out 
initiatives before they arrive at a formal selection stage.  The initiative’s knowledge base is 
then retained through integration in the firm’s knowledge base. This adapted firm 
knowledge base (the genotype) expresses itself in the changed phenotype of the firm and 
its set of conditions. There are many interactions within this setting. Firm’s knowledge 
bases (genotype) obviously influence the formation of initiative knowledge bases 
(genotype); the firm’s conditions (phenotype) influence the selection of initiatives 
(phenotype) with their own set of conditions. It is with this co-evolutionary rational in 
mind that the framework is proposed in the section that follows. 
 
Figure 4.2: Knowledge base and conditions as geno-phenotype interaction 
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model looks at the interdependency between knowledge-creation and organizational 
conditions. The outcome, in terms of the initiative’s success in achieving its intention, is 
regarded as “a secondary issue (Birkinshaw, 1997: 209).” In this way the importance of 
consecutive stages such as further diffusion in the market, is acknowledged but regarded as 
less crucial with respect to the initiative.  
The model assumes the elements to be “multi-dimensional constellations of 
conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together (Meyer, Tsui, and 
Hinings, 1993: 1175). Revisiting the initiative definition with a co-evolutionary lens it 
could be redefined as “a process by individuals inside organizations in which 
organizational conditions and the identification and pursuit of an opportunity, i.e. a 
knowledge base, co-evolve to create future goods and services, without regard to the 
resources currently controlled, culminating in the approval of that opportunity.” 
 
Figure 4.3: An Integrative Framework of Initiatives 
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The phases 
Because at its core the initiative is a knowledge-creating process, the model bases its 
process dimension on the knowledge-creating phases: linking, interpreting, and integrating. 
Although these are representative of the knowledge-creating view, they are strongly related 
to the phases of the conditioning view: variation, selection, and retention. Although in 
theory the two descriptions of the phases could very well differ, we assume them to 
overlap to such an extent that it suffices to use one to label the phases. This is also based 
on our assumption, as discussed in chapter one, that the two views are looking at the same 
phenomenon, the initiative, although be it from a different angle. The phases of the 
conditioning view are more indicative of the initiative-firm relation, rather than of the 
development of the initiative. Because this population-ecology view of the firm is at its 
core dependent on this content-wise development of the initiative, it makes sense to use the 
knowledge-creating phases as the basis for the timeline in a co-evolutionary model. 
Therefore variation is equaled to the linking phase, selection to the interpretation phase, 
and retention to the integrating phase.  
The three phases combine the characteristics of the previously discussed views. 
Whilst the conditioning view regarded the search for resources and the knowledge-creating 
view the search for knowledge as the driver for the process, the co-evolutionary view 
regards both as drivers. This is because resources (capital and assets) are required to enable 
the setup of the appropriate conditions for knowledge creation. The linking stage is the 
stage in which the basic insight is formed, through linkage of prior knowledge with other 
relevant knowledge domains (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlund, 1994). During the 
interpreting stage sense is made of the newly formed knowledge (Crossan, Lane, and 
White, 1999) both at the initiative and firm level. It is in this stage that it often becomes 
clear what new conditions are necessary for the further development of the initiative and 
which require certain resources. This phase often involves a process of issue selling 
(Aharoni, 1966) and sometimes political manipulation (Burgelman, 1983b) in order to 
convince others. In the integrating phase specialist knowledge is integrated into detailed 
action (Demsetz, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996b) often in a tightly coupled 
setting. 
Knowledge base 
Knowledge is present both in the firm and the initiative. The firm represents a repository of 
specialist knowledge (Demsetz, 1991), which is integrated in the hierarchy (Grant, 1996b). 
Prior knowledge is available both in the initiative and the firm. Other knowledge that is 
linked to and combined with this prior knowledge can lie inside or outside the firm. The 
initiative represents a recombination of this specialist knowledge, albeit perhaps with the 
addition of some outside specialist knowledge. The broader the range of specialist 
knowledge areas in the firm, the larger the range within the firm and ties to other specialist 
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knowledge outside of the firm that is available to the initiative for recombinations. The 
more the firm contains deep knowledge, the more the initiative can rely on the firm for its 
availability. As such, the kind of knowledge that is available to the initiative is contingent 
on that which is present in the firm. 
 Because initiatives build on the prior knowledge of firms, variations in the 
knowledge base are not blind (Campbell, 1994) but to a certain extent deliberate (Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003). The stimuli for such ‘deliberate’ variation of the knowledge base can 
then be located internally, i.e. ideas within the firm, at the firm level, i.e. corporate 
strategy, or within the environment, i.e. clients30. Once emerged in the form of an idea, the 
knowledge base will develop itself further and further, moving from the idea into a concept 
and into detailed action. The kind of change in the knowledge base, i.e. whether it concerns 
an organizational/process versus product/service innovation, can be expected to make a 
large difference in the progress of the initiative, because such a difference has been known 
to lead to different findings (Abernathy and Utterback; 1975; Kimberly and Evaniski, 
1981). In particular, because organizational or process innovations deal with altering 
internal configurations of the firm, which is why they have been termed administrative 
innovations, tend to require top-down change patterns (Daft, 1978)31.  
Because an initiative is an ongoing process that does not stop at any particular 
point, it is of course not easy to pinpoint an exact end. According to the conditioning view 
the end is marked by the granting of resources (Birkinshaw, 1997). According to the 
knowledge-creating view the end is marked by a sufficient level of knowledge that is 
developed (meaning that the idea knows no major uncertainties anymore). Because formal 
approval is not always necessary - particularly when resources are acquired from outside 
the firm causing the firm to legitimize retroactively (Burgelman, 1983b) – we define the 
end in terms an explicit or implicit approval, or a rejection of a developed knowledge base.  
Organizational conditions 
Organizational conditions are also present both in the firm and the initiative. That the firm 
possesses organizational conditions comes at no surprise. Even without the existence of 
initiatives, an organizational form, an administrative and incentive system, and hierarchical 
roles are necessary to manage ongoing activities. Initiatives, however, can also build a set 
of their own organizational conditions during their life span. Particularly during the 
integration of specialist knowledge areas when initiative members must be tightly coupled, 
a set of conditions is needed that is distinct from the firm. The initiative can thus set up its 
own form, administration, and roles. Notwithstanding that the initiative can set up its own 
organizational conditions, it is often still largely dependent on the firm and will therefore 
to differing degrees remain under the influence of the organizational conditions of the firm. 
                                                 
30 Note that the absence of blind variation does not imply the existence of strategic intent. 
31 Daft (1978) actually talks of administrative changes, being organizational or process innovations, versus 
technological changes, being product or service changes. 
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Organizational form 
The organizational form changes from loose to tight coupling, namely from a network 
form with weak ties in the linking phase to one of strong ties in the integration phase, for 
reasons of knowledge sharing and resource acquisition. 
During the linking phase the initiative seeks new knowledge outside of its own 
domain (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). People having similar relationships –structural 
equivalence (Burt, 1982) – tend to think similarly and one can expect that they will also 
have shared any relevant knowledge. Therefore, not the dominant social network but 
disconnected social networks, one of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), form a source of new 
knowledge and thinking. People who provide such weak ties, called brokers (Burt, 1982; 
DiMaggio, 1992, Gould and Fernandez, 1989), as well as social settings that facilitate the 
formation of weak ties (Hargadon, 1998b) are therefore considered crucial in this linking 
stage.  
In the interpreting phase the initiative switches from seeking other knowledge to 
developing an understanding of how the various knowledge areas fit together. This 
interpretation process requires a more intimate sharing of knowledge for which stronger 
ties are more appropriate (Granovetter, 1973). Because the new idea was gained through 
weak ties, the entrepreneur will most probably need to cultivate certain relevant weak ties 
into stronger ones. Moreover, the initiative must also acquire resources for which it needs 
to manipulate decision-making. Central actors (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), called 
champions, become crucial for manipulating the decision-making process (Burgelman, 
1983a). These actors must be influenced, if not co-opted, requiring the cultivation of strong 
ties.  
Specialist knowledge is to be integrated in the integration phase for which the use 
of tightly coupled structures, such as teams or hierarchies32, has been deemed most 
appropriate (Grant, 1996b). Through the linkage and coupling behavior of the previous two 
phases, it has become clear who the members of the structure are to be; in most cases these 
are selected from the strong ties that contributed to the concept. As such, an initiative 
structure is the culmination of the increasingly growing stronger ties. The initiative 
continues to demand vast amounts of resources in order to carry out the detailing of the 
knowledge base. This increases the pressure on the strong ties to guard the resource 
consumption of the initiative, often through the installment of a steering committee.  
 
Administrative and incentive systems 
Administrative and incentive mechanisms range between those that steer the direction 
(Burgelman, 1983b; Simons, 1994) and those that create an appropriate climate or culture 
(Pettigrew, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; Schein, 1985; Quinn, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993).  
Those that steer the direction are based on strategic intent (Prahalad and Doz, 1987), 
                                                 
32 Teams are necessary if the hierarchy does not allow for the configuration of specialist knowledge areas in a 
tightly coupled setting. 
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whereas those based on culture are more based on creating a stimulating environment for 
knowledge generation and sharing (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). As the initiative moves 
from loose coupling to tight coupling, it increases the steering nature and control of the 
administrative system. 
In the linking stage the administrative and incentive mechanisms have only an 
indirect effect on the generation of ideas. Firstly, because idea generators are in general 
intrinsically motivated (Amabile, 1988). Moreover, idea generation is difficult to steer 
because of its chance and opportunistic nature (Drucker, 1985). The search for other 
knowledge is also a distant search and occurs through weak ties, thus lying outside the 
reach of the administrative system. Firms therefore try to guide idea generation in an 
indirect manner by nurturing an innovative climate or culture (Pettigrew, 1979; Ouchi, 
1981; Schein, 1985; Quinn, 1985; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). Many authors suggest that 
such a climate should be accompanied by “a clear vision for providing direction to 
knowledge creation activities (Hedlund, 1994),” alternatively called ‘strategic intent’ 
(Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000) or ‘beliefs system’ (Simons, 1994). 
However, the use of a vision, intent, or belief system has been questioned (Burgelman, 
1983b) because of the difficulty in steering initiatives. 
During the interpreting phase the administrative and incentive mechanisms 
function at a stronger level and in a more direct manner. This is because the initiative 
needs to ensure the coupling of the different specialist knowledge areas and because of the 
higher demands on the firm in terms of resources. As the initiative moves into the firm for 
knowledge and resources it is confronted by control systems (Simons, 1994) that are not 
particularly facilitating because they are intended for general activities of the firm. The 
‘beliefs system’ has now changed into a ‘boundary system’ (Simons, 1994) with according 
selection criteria. Because firms realize the constraining nature of their selection 
procedures they have also set up incentive structures, such as the giving of options to 
initiators, in order to motivate entrepreneurs.  
In the integrating phase the administrative and incentive mechanisms are even 
more steering in nature as the initiative becomes tightly coupled internally as well as with 
the rest of the firm in order to implement detailed action. In fact the initiative needs to be 
integrated with the hierarchy of the firm and therefore its administrative system must be in 
line with the rest of the firm. Moreover, the detailed action puts stronger requirements in 
terms of complementarities and resources on the administrative system. In this final phase 
the administrative system is primarily steering in nature as the initiative converts itself 
from an explorative to an exploitative activity. 
 
Roles 
Managerial roles follow the above shifts with roles shifting from motivational (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1993) to directional ones (Burgelman, 1983b). Motivational roles consist of top 
management as motivators (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993), middle managers as knowledge 
brokers (Hargadon, 1998b; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), and front-liners as knowledge 
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specialists and creators (Grant, 1996a). Directional roles assume that top management 
functions as the director, middle management as controllers, and front-liners as 
implementers. In this directional depiction bottom-up initiatives require champion roles to 
battle their way up (Schon, 1963; Maidique, 1980; Burgelman, 1983a), with front-liners as 
product champions (Schon, 1963) and middle management as organizational champions 
(Schon, 1963). In accordance with Burgelman (1983a), roles change over the stages of an 
initiative.  However, as opposed to Burgelman, we suggest that roles should not only focus 
on the resource allocation process but also be attuned to the knowledge-creating needs of 
the idea. Whereas Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) recognized this latter aspect they failed to 
relate roles to the phases as Burgelman (1983a) had done. For each phase we therefore 
offer a set of roles that take the knowledge and resource needs of an initiative into account. 
During the knowledge linking phase the front-line, because of its specialist 
knowledge, is considered to be the idea generator (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In 
accordance with an innovative climate, top management’s role is that of a motivator 
stimulating variation. The crucial horizontal broker role (Gould and Fernandez, 1989; 
Hargadon, 1998a,b) is reserved for middle management (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Floyd 
and Wooldridge, 1999). The question is whether all middle managers in general perform 
such a brokerage role or whether this is tied to certain individuals.  Owing to their daily 
tasks, one would expect certain people within strategic business development units or 
R&D departments to function as knowledge brokers as is suggested by Hargadon’s studies 
(Hargadon, 1998a,b) and studies pointing to product champions (Burgelman, 1983a). They 
cut across boundaries, both organizational and intrafirm ones, to a larger extent than 
middle managers that are tied to the hierarchy. Moreover, the fact that middle managers 
are often resource allocators (in the later stages) causes conflicts of interests with a 
brokerage role.  
During the interpreting phase tighter coupling of the knowledge areas is necessary 
requiring a project manager, also termed product champion (Schon, 1963), whilst the need 
for resources requires an organizational champion. The latter are often middle managers 
who perform the role of initiative sellers in the sense that they need to influence top 
management for the necessary resources. Because the necessary resources are allocated in 
accordance with the formal strategy, initiatives are either repositioned to correspond with 
the strategy or the strategy is reinterpreted to fit the initiative. Within this bargaining and 
manipulation process, top management performs the role of selector.  
In the integrating phase the roles shift again, because the initiative has to a certain 
extent been selected and now focuses on becoming detailed. Front-line, which consists of 
specialists meeting and putting together the bits and pieces, have become implementers. 
The middle manager has become a controller, ensuring that the team gets the task done. 
Top management has taken on the director role, by delegating the control task to middle 
management. Every time during the integrating stage that more resources are needed, the 
set of roles reverts back to that of the interpreting stage. In that sense the middle layer is 
subject to the largest role change: from horizontal broker, to champion, to controller. 
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Co-evolution 
The suggested co-evolutionary framework assumes that knowledge and organizational 
conditions are interdependent and should therefore not be treated separately. When one 
desires to use broad knowledge in order to link to a diverse range of disconnected 
specialist knowledge areas, it is essential that the organizational conditions are supportive, 
namely that they provide network characteristics, an innovative climate, and motivational 
roles. These conditions enable loose coupling and therefore the flexible access to a broad 
range of knowledge. When one wants to integrate specific areas of specialist knowledge, 
controlling conditions are necessary. In that situation there is no need to access a broad 
range of knowledge, as it is clear which specialist areas are relevant. What matters, is that 
within the narrow range of specialist knowledge areas the deep knowledge is integrated in 
a detailed manner. This calls for tight coupling both within the initiative as well as with the 
rest of the firm. Such requires controlling conditions, namely a hierarchical form, 
administrative and incentive systems with a strong steering focus, and directive roles. In 
summary, broad knowledge needs to be aligned with supportive conditions, whilst narrow 
knowledge needs to be aligned with controlling conditions. 
Not only must the knowledge and conditions match each other, they must also co-
evolve with each other over time, i.e. over the linking, interpreting, and integrating phases. 
Any change in the knowledge base must be paralleled with a change in the conditions; 
otherwise a mismatch between the knowledge and conditions would be the result33. 
Assume, for example, that the knowledge base changes in focus from broad to narrow 
knowledge, i.e. to integrating specific specialist knowledge areas. If the organizational 
conditions remained supportive instead of changing to the matching controlling set, there 
would be too little tight coupling to ensure effective and detailed integration. Similarly, if 
there is a necessity to switch from narrow to broad knowledge, in order to access a wide 
range of disconnected specialist areas, it is necessary that the conditions change from 
controlling to supportive. If not, then controlling conditions would inhibit the loose 
coupling necessary to access the wide range of knowledge. This leads to: 
 
Proposition 3a: Co-evolution of conditions and knowledge across the linking, 
interpreting, and integrating phases is necessary for successful 
initiative trajectories. 
 
Over time the initiative can shift its knowledge focus from broad to narrow or 
vice versa, and similarly from supportive to controlling conditions and vice versa. 
Naturally there can also be no change in these elements at all. We can depict these 
possibilities in a graph by plotting an area spanned by knowledge on the one side, ranging 
from narrow (low) to broad (high), conditions on the other side, ranging from controlling 
                                                 
33 For this to be truly evolutionary there must be, in biological terms,  a change in the population of conditions 
and knowledge bases, i.e in that of the firm. Otherwise, it is merely a single mutation rather than an evolution. 
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(low) to supportive (high), over the life span of the initiative (see figure 4.4). If we assume 
the trajectories to be linear we arrive at the four possibilities depicted in figure 4.4. 
Naturally, in reality much more complex trajectories are possible, but for the purpose of 
this discussion we will use this typology.   
The area spanned by the conditions and knowledge base over time can be small 
and large. If it is large, then for most of the time, the knowledge base was broad and the 
conditions were supportive, which is excellent for generating new knowledge 
combinations. The more an initiative can access broad knowledge under supportive 
conditions the more innovative it will be. In figure 4.4, one can thus expect the fourth 
quadrant to be the most innovative, in terms of its level of inventiveness.34  The first and 
second quadrant can be expected to be somewhat less innovative, and the third quadrant to 
be the least innovative of all. In summary, the larger the area spanned by the conditions 
and knowledge base over time, the more innovative the initiative. This leads us to: 
 
Proposition 3b: The more supportive the organizational conditions and the 
broader the knowledge base in the linking, interpreting, and 
integrating phase the more innovative the initiative. 
 
Although the initiative’s innovativeness is facilitated by broad knowledge and supportive 
conditions, its effective implementation requires narrow and controlling conditions. Hence, 
for a successful implementation of the initiative there must be a convergence from broad to 
deep knowledge and supportive to controlling conditions. The higher the convergence the 
narrower the knowledge base and more controlling the conditions are over time. Such 
tighter coupling facilitates effective and detailed integrating of knowledge, and is thus 
better for the implementation of the initiative. In figure 4.4 the third quadrant is best suited 
for implementation because it has the highest convergence, namely from the start of the 
initiative. The second quadrant also manages to achieve implementation, but less easily 
than the previous because it takes more time to converge. The first and fourth quadrants 
fail to achieve convergence, and will thus find it difficult to get their initiatives 
implemented. This leads us to: 
 
Proposition 3c: The more controlling the organizational conditions and the 
deeper the knowledge base in the linking, interpreting, and 
integrating phase the better the implementation of the initiative. 
 
The need for a large area to be spanned and the need for convergence are 
conflicting. Much convergence is perhaps good for implementation; it is not good for the 
generating innovative ideas. Broad knowledge and supportive conditions (equivalent to a 
large area in graph 4.4) are perhaps good for generating innovative ideas; they come at a 
                                                 
34 Recall form Chapter 2 that although innovation, i.e. innovativeness, can also include the notion of 
implementation, in this study we restrict its meaning to invention, i.e. inventiveness, only.   
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cost to implementation. Hence, an appropriate level of dampening of the co-evolutionary 
pattern is necessary. This dampening effect can either be a natural offspring of the process, 
such as through self-control, or that management has imposed, i.e. managerial control 
(McKelvey, 2002). 
 
Figure 4.4: Co-evolutionary Trajectories of Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four possibilities depicted in graph 4.4 show different degrees of such 
dampening: (a) no dampening, (b) natural dampening, (c) managerial dampening, (d) and 
extreme dampening. Of course the graph depicts strong simplifications of processes that 
are much more complex in nature. One could, for example, well imagine that the processes 
do not evolve in a linear fashion, as is shown in the graphs. Also, the lengths of the phases 
are most probably not exactly equal over time. Yet, notwithstanding that the processes are 
more complex than depicted, the simplification allows for a clarification of the basic 
patterns that underlie the obviously more complex reality. It shows that although co-
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evolution is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition; the dampening must be adequate as 
well. 
There is no dampening effect when there is divergence, as is the case in quadrant 
1. The knowledge spirals into broader and broader knowledge, whilst the conditions 
become more and more supportive (Volberda, 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). This 
situation, which we term ‘diverging into chaos,’ is not desirable because convergence is 
necessary in order to ensure implementation of the initiative. Such would require the 
presence of a dampening effect.  
Natural dampening effects occur when divergence patterns reach their limits. 
When the knowledge base is already broad and the conditions already supportive, as is the 
case in quadrant 4, then there is a natural dampening effect because the divergent pattern 
has reached its limit; it is difficult to find broader knowledge or more supportive 
conditions available. This situation, which we term ‘drifting in space,’ represents a 
maximization of proposition 3b, i.e. a situation of very good innovation. It is not desirable 
because it lacks the convergence necessary for achieving implementation.  
Managerial dampening occurs when convergence takes place without it reaching 
the extreme situations in which natural dampening occurs as described above. This 
and supportive to controlling conditions, as is the case in quadrant 2. The area shown in the 
graph reflects the funnel model of Wheelwright and Clark (1992); this is the reason why 
we label it ‘converging through the funnel.’ The reason why this is an ideal type trajectory 
is because it underscores the need for broad and supportive conditions in the initial linking 
phase in order to arrive at innovative ideas, whereas the narrow knowledge and supportive 
conditions are necessary in the integration phase in order to achieve implementation of the 
initiative. This situation offers a balance between innovation and implementation and is 
thus the most suitable to achieve a throughput of reasonably innovative ideas. 
Extreme dampening occurs when the managerial or natural dampening is so 
strong that the convergent pattern has reached its limit. In other words, during the entire 
life span of the initiative the knowledge base is narrow and the conditions controlling, as is 
the case in quadrant 3. This situation represents a maximization of proposition 3c and is 
thus very good for implementation because of the high rate of convergence. However, 
because of the lack of broad knowledge and supportive conditions it is not beneficial to the 
generation of innovative ideas. This is why we label it ‘stuck in the tunnel.’ 
In the above descriptions, it is assumed that the knowledge base and conditions of 
the initiative are in line with those of the firm. When they are not, i.e. in the case of a 
mismatch, the initiative must create the appropriate knowledge base and conditions for 
itself, independent of the firm. For example, A firm could provide a broad knowledge base 
with supportive conditions, but be incapable of providing a narrow knowledge base setting 
with controlling conditions, i.e. a tightly coupled setting where a limited range of specialist 
knowledge areas are to be integrated. In this example, the initiative must create that setting 
for itself by separating itself from the firm allowing for a narrow knowledge base and 
situation represents the ideal type trajectory with a move from broad to narrow knowledge 
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controlling conditions. Nevertheless, such situations of separation will remain problematic 
as the initiative remains strongly dependent on the firm - were it not alone for the 
complementarities - and therefore remains subject to the knowledge base and conditions of 
the firm. 
Timing multiple initiatives 
Firms consist of multiple initiatives whose life spans partially overlap. Because initiatives’ 
knowledge creation activity moves from exploration to exploitation, whilst their 
organizational conditions move from supportive to controlling, the aggregation of 
initiatives can lead to a balance or imbalance in firm conditions (Volberda, and Baden-
Fuller, 2003). If at the same time most of the initiatives are in an explorative mode then the 
overall conditions operating on them will be supportive. Similarly, if at the same time most 
of the initiatives are in an exploitative mode then the overall conditions operating on them 
will be controlling. This represents an imbalanced form of renewal for the firm. On the 
other hand, if at the same moment in time, multiple initiatives in the firm are in different 
stages of their life cycle, they will have levels of exploration versus exploitation and thus 
be subject to different levels of supportive versus controlling conditions. At the aggregate 
it may well be that they level out against each other causing a balanced form of renewal. 
Initiatives therefore, not only change the conditions of the firm after being selected in, as 
soon as they emerge they determine at their aggregate level the balance and imbalance of 
conditions relating to all the multiple ongoing initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The integrative framework ties in the conditioning view with the knowledge creating view, 
by pointing out how the two interact over time. The co-evolutionary view clarifies that 
organizational conditions and the knowledge base are interdependent and that they can 
reinforce each other in a divergent or convergent direction. By changing the organizational 
conditions and the organizational knowledge settings management can steer this direction. 
The challenge is to dosage this so-called dampening effect in such a way that idea 
generation converts to implementation in smooth and timely manner resulting in successful 
initiative trajectories. In the following chapters, these thoughts are empirically tested in 
firms that deal with such initiatives within their everyday activities. But first we turn to a 
discussion in chapter 5 of the methodology applied for the data selection, collection, and 
analysis.
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CHAPTER 5 
Research Methodology: 
A Process Study on Initiatives 
The previous chapters have explained our research aim and questions, they have presented 
existing views on initiatives from a conditioning and knowledge creating perspective, and 
they have proposed an integrative framework that serves as a lens for looking at our data. 
But before we can actually investigate the data, academic standards require that we 
discuss the methodology used for gathering and analyzing this data. This chapter therefore 
starts out with explaining how we used theory for looking at our data. In the next section it 
explains the research design, which was based on a process study. The chapter then 
explains the case selection, the data collection, description and analysis, and validity. 
THEORY AS A TOOL FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This study is rooted in Eisenhardt's interpretative methodology (1989), in which theory and 
data are allowed to interact. As is evident from the mere existence of the previous 
theoretical chapters, this study is not one based on grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Burgelman, 1983a), which proposes that researchers drop all tools. The study is 
based on prior studies and uses a framework to look at the data, but is yet exploratory in 
nature. The theory is used to offer an interpretative lens for looking at the data, although 
we remain open for new insights revealed by the data. As such, the previous chapter ends 
with a framework that focuses attention to certain aspects in the data collection and 
analysis in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the shear quantity of information. This 
serves as the a priori specification of constructs that Eisenhardt discusses (1989). Based on 
The theory chapters, specifically the previous one, have thus served to specify the 
propositions and elements that function as a tool for going into and looking at the data. As 
such it is both deductive and inductive in nature. 
the theory we carried out a selection of cases, called theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
76 
LARGER RESEARCH SETTING 
This study formed part of the larger research program of the Erasmus Strategic Renewal 
Center at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The center consists of various 
researchers that are interested in strategic renewal in general, yet each with their specific 
area of interest. The research activities of the center have resulted in various publications 
in different journals such as in Long Range Planning (i.e. Volberda, Baden-Fuller, and van 
den Bosch, 2001), Organization Science (i.e. Dijksterhuis, van den Bosch, and Volberda, 
1999), and International Studies of Management and Organization (i.e. Wielemaker, 
Elfring, and Volberda, 2001). It was on the basis of this center’s research program for 
context measurements of organizations (see appendix B), through the use of Volberda’s 
Flexibility Audit and Redesign method as well as previous research into internal 
trajectories of change (Volberda, 1992, 1996, 1998), that this study on initiatives was 
launched. More specifically, context measurements by the center (Wielemaker, M.W., 
Elfring, T., and H.W. Volberda, 2000) of the three firms investigated in this study were 
used in order to determine to a large extent the organizational conditions of the firms (see 
appendix B). It is with this research in the background that the process study described 
below was conducted.  
PROCESS STUDY 
Notwithstanding its subjective limitations (Numagami, 1998), a qualitative longitudinal 
case study was chosen as a research design for investigating initiatives because the study 
sought to answer how questions, because we had no control over events, and because it 
concerned dynamic and contemporary events (Yin, 1989). Or as Pettigrew would explain: 
"the simple answer is, because the longitudinal comparative case method best suits the 
research topic […], the contextualist mode of analysis […], and the broad research 
objectives (1990: 271)." The case study used a process study (Chakravarthy and Doz, 
1992) format similar to that of Burgelman (1983a) in his internal corporate venture study, 
which equals Van de Ven's  (1992) third type of process design: a "sequence of events or 
activities that describes how things change over time (170).”  
 The process study was contextualist (Pettigrew, 1990) for three reasons. Firstly, 
because it took both "vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections 
between those levels through time" (1990: 269) into account. The vertical levels equaled 
those of Burgelman: the front-line, the middle layer, and top management. Additionally, it 
also included the level of the firm in general, i.e. its conditions. The horizontal levels 
included the different units, departments, and other firms that were involved in the 
initiatives. Secondly, the study was contextualist because the initiatives' trajectory was 
traced through time. The initiative's evolution was analyzed from its conception until its 
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current status. Thirdly, because we looked for patterns in the interaction between context, 
the organizational conditions, and action, the initiative. Moreover, we tried to see how this 
interaction differed over the various stages of the initiative. These stages served for 
describing relations; however, they were not considered discrete or chronological but 
interactive and muddled (Quinn, 1980).  
CASE SELECTION 
We selected multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990) because we were not so 
much interested in a single initiative but in the general pattern of a multitude of initiatives, 
allowing a comparative analysis as well as an equifinality check. The use of a multiple 
case study has been criticized because: (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) " the focus on building 
and testing general constructs in multiple settings can harm the visibility of the 
interrelations within the context of a particular setting while the aim of any management 
researcher need to be to get as close as possible to the world of managers and to interpret 
this world and its problems from the inside. A single case study can give much more 
attention to the unique and typical characteristics of the particular social scene." However, 
a single case study falls short in highlighting theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Thus there is a tradeoff between the deep understanding of a particular social setting and 
comparative insights. Within this tradeoff we have opted for the latter, because we want to 
detect patterns revealed by the various initiatives and compare them with respect to 
different organizational conditions. Such use of multiple cases (Yin, 1989: 52) "is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more robust." 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) this is because multiple cases permit replication and 
extension.  
The case study was of an embedded nature. Specifically, rather than selecting 
initiatives in a single firm, various firms were selected in order to differentiate between the 
impact of different types of facilitating conditions on initiatives. In each firm 
approximately six to nine initiatives were investigated. This allowed for comparison of 
initiative trajectories across firms that represented different sets of facilitating conditions. 
Three firms were chosen on the basis of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). 'As Pettigrew (1990) noted, given the limited number of cases which 
can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases such as […] polar types in which the 
process of interest is ´transparently observable.´ Thus we chose firms that possess different 
sets of organizational conditions. As an approximation for these different sets of 
organizational conditions Volberda's (1996, 1998) typology of forms (rigid, planned, 
flexible, and chaotic) was used. We did not select a firm representing the rigid form, as that 
was uninteresting from an initiative viewpoint. We chose to select firms in different 
industries to further ensure differentiation of facilitating conditions. Other selection criteria 
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used were that they had to be large firms that (1) had a presence in the Netherlands for 
reasons of access, (2) sales revenues of over 100 million guilders, and (3) participated in a 
global industry (similar to Birkinshaw, 1997). In this way, in what could be called planned 
opportunism (Pettigrew, 1990), we selected three firms. KLM Cargo was selected because 
it categorized as a form in-between the flexible and chaotic. Ericsson was selected as a 
form because it categorized as lying in-between the planned and flexible, but leaning 
toward the flexible form. Van Ommeren was selected because it also categorized as lying 
in-between the planned and flexible, but in this case leaning toward the planned form. We 
knew the organizational form for each firm from a previous study (Volberda, 1998; 
Wielemaker, Elfring, and Volberda, 2000). 
 
Table 5.1: Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
In each firm initiatives were then selected in manner similar to Birkinshaw’s 
(1997) selection method. Firstly, senior management suggested about six initiatives that 
they considered particularly interesting from their viewpoint. Secondly, in order to offset 
the selection bias of the top managers somewhat, in each firm a smaller set of about three 
initiatives was analyzed that had been serendipitously encountered during our 
investigation, which in each firm lasted approximately six months. As for the kind of 
initiatives that were selected the criterion was that the participants in the initiative needed 
to consider the initiative to be an opportunity to create future goods and services for the 
firm that might potentially impact the firm’s strategy. Similar to Ancona and Caldwell 
(1992) these initiatives were at various stages of development: some had just started, while 
others were already completed. In this way we arrived at around 9 initiatives per company 
leading to a total of 25 initiatives (see table 5.1). 
Van Ommeren Ericsson KLM Cargo Total Flex. Profile as indicator of
different organiz. conditions Planned Flexible Chaotic 3 sets of  conditions 
Initiatives Tallin Internet NVOCC 
Latin America Internet Billing Jumpstart SCU 
Tank Container Telfort BU Logistics 
Cooperation Cable Dect E-Status 
Eastman Unax Cargo Info. System 
Splitter SDH Tracking & Tracing 
EDI System Profit Man. 
Unisource Product Portfolio 
Strat Distr. Term. Express 
Glass box 
# embedded cases 6 initiatives 10 initiatives 9 initiatives 25 initiatives 
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DATA COLLECTION 
Table 5.2: Data collection 
 
Firm Research team Job title Duration Initiatives discussed 
Van Ommeren A Member Board of Directors 2, 5 hrs Tank-Containers 
Member Board of Directors 1,5 hrs Tallin
Member Board of Directors 1,15 hrs Splitter
Director Marketing and Business 
Development Europe
1,5 hrs Cooperation
Eastman
Business Development Manager 1,5 hrs Latin America
Business Development consultant 1,5 hrs
Director Inland Tankshipping 1,5 hrs
Commercial Director Location E. 1,25 hrs
Director VOTT-Location V. 1,5
Director VOTT-Location B. 1 hr
Director VOTT-Location E. 3 hrs
Controller 1 hrs
Controller 1,15 hrs
13 interviews 
Ericsson B Strategic Business Developer 1 hr Internet
Internal consultant 1 hr Internet Billing 
Product Manager Unit B 1 hr Telfort
Product Manager Unit B 1,5 hrs Cable Dect
Head of R & D 2 hrs Unax
Strategic Business Developer 1,5 SDH
Strategic Business Developer 1 EDI
Business developer 1,15 Unisource
Business developer 1,5 Strat Distr. Term. 
Manager ESCC 1,5 Glass box
R&D employee 1
Unit B employee 2
Telfort project manager 3
Mobile manager 1,5
SDH Unit manager 1
Mobile unit employee 1,5
Unit A employee 1
Division manager of A 1,5
Division manager of B 1
ESCC manager 1,5
20 interviews 
KLM Cargo C CSC Business Unit manager 1,5 NVOCC
Customer  Services 1 Jumpstart SCU 
Factory manager 2 BU Logistics
SCU Business Unit manager 1,5 E-Status
IT Business unit manager 1 Cargo Info. System 
Personnel 1,5 Tracking & Tracing 
Mail Business Unit manager 1,45 System Profit Man. 
Cargo Development 1 Product Portfolio 
Business Planning 1,5 Express
Quality 1
IT Business unit 1,5
Ex. Vice President 1
Customer Service 2
Shipment control manager 1,5
Information manager in Operations 1,5
Personnel manager 1
Managemet team member 1
Operations manager 1,5
Corporate Development & Foreign  
Relations
1,5
KLM Business systems 1
20 interviews 
Total 53 interviews
Note that many more interviews were conducted for a previous research into the flexibility of the organization  
(Wielemaker et. al., 2000) 
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Data on the initiatives was collected by interviewing the key actors involved, who thus 
functioned as key informants (Campbell, 1955; Huber and Power, 1985; Kumar, Stern, and 
Anderson, 1983; Phillips, 1981; Seidler, 1974). Because in all instances there were various 
people involved in an initiative these were always multiple key informants (John and Reve, 
1982; Phillips, 1981; Seidler, 1974). Although there are known liabilities when using key 
informants (Huber and Power; 1985), we found that the liabilities involved in using key 
informants were offset by their thorough understanding of the initiative. Moreover, the key 
informants were always the key players, thus covering the important viewpoints. In using 
multiple key informants Kumar, Stern, and Anderson (1993) discuss two specific 
problems, although in their case this concerned interorganizational research: (1) a selection 
problem, and (2) a perceptual agreement problem. In this study there was no selection 
problem because it was quite evident who were the key actors involved in each initiative. 
The perceptual agreement problem was solved by the consensual approach (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988).  Whenever disagreement between informants was discovered they 
would be confronted with it and consensus would be reached.  
Data was collected from the key informants through semi-structured interviews 
that contained both general and more specific questions and were used as an interview 
guide (See Appendix A) similar to what Dutton and Dukerich (1991) and Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988) have done, and as has been suggested by Yin (1989). The initial 
questions focused, as Pettigrew suggested (1987), on the content (what was the initiative 
about) and context of the initiative (why did it come about). From there on the questions 
focused on the process (how did it take place). Mostly a single question, "describe how the 
project developed during the course of time," was enough to trigger the main process story. 
This in turn lead to questions of clarification or to questions on interesting aspects that had 
arisen. The semi-structured interview was mainly used as a back up to ensure that a broad 
range of topics was covered. In this way we developed initiative story-timelines, very 
similar to the tactic used by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988: 742) in which “decision 
stories” were developed by combining the accounts of each executive into a time line 
beginning with decision initiation. Similar to Ancona and Caldwell (1992: 645) "some 
accounts were retrospective, and some were about current activities." Sometimes notes 
were taken and in all cases the interviews were taped and then transcribed in English. 
Table 5.2 shows the interviews carried out in order to obtain a timeline of each initiative. 
The key informants ranged from front-liners to CEOs. In general the interviews lasted 
between one to two hours. As suggested by Pettigrew (1990) for the data collection we, for 
the larger part35, used a different research team for each firm; thus there were three 
research teams in total who each collected data on initiatives in a single firm. As explained 
by Eisenhardt (1989: 538) "the rationale behind this tactic is that investigators who have 
not met the informants and have not become immersed in case details may bring a very 
different and possibly more objective eye to the evidence." 
                                                 
35 Some researchers were involved in more than one firm. However, the larger part of the research team was only 
involved in a single firm, thus maintaining the underlying logic of keeping the teams separate. 
 A PROCESS STUDY ON INITIATIVES  
 81 
Company reports, strategic plans, copies of transparencies, letters and memo's, 
and in-company newsletters complemented the interviews. Similar to Pettigrew (1990), we 
also collected observational and ethnographic material, consisting of planned site visits for 
meeting staff and facilities, informal chance meetings and conversations, participation in 
formal meetings, sessions, and workshops.  
DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
The qualitative data was analyzed and visualized through tables and diagrams, which is in 
line with the recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1984). Quotes were used to 
provide examples of the issues at stake (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). 
Because such quotes represent the opinion of a single interviewee, we sought quotes that 
were exemplary and representative of the issue and we tried to provide quantitative support 
in terms of the amount or percentage of people or initiatives that displayed the same 
opinion or behavior (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Sandberg, 2000). The analysis was 
undertaken by the three heads of the research teams and differences were resolved through 
discussion.  
The analysis in this study is not distinct and separate from the collection and 
description. As Eisenhardt (1989:538) points out, "a striking feature of research to build 
theory from case studies is the frequent overlap of data analysis with data collection." 
While we were interviewing the key informants, we were simultaneously analyzing their 
remarks, thus mixing collection with analysis. However, this is considered appropriate in 
order to allow for adjustments during the investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Similarly, the 
analysis, or interpretation, is also mixed with the description (Patriotta, 1999).  The amount 
of data is so large that it is difficult if not impossible to describe it, unless one has a lens 
for interpreting or analyzing it. The framework and research question function as a lens, or 
as a priori defined constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989), for focusing our attention during data 
collection, description, and analysis. Notwithstanding this focus in attention, there is still 
the peril of "death by data asphyxiation (Pettigrew, 1990)." In order to show how we 
reduced the data and arrived at a set of propositions we follow a number of steps similar to 
what Eisenhardt (1989) and Dutton and Dukerich (1991) suggested. 
Step 1: Analyzing a single initiative 
Initially the analysis focused on understanding each initiative separately. The reason for 
this is to reduce the amount of data to that which concerns a single initiative, something 
Eisenhardt called a "within-case analysis," thus familiarizing the researcher and reader 
with the patterns of a single case, before looking at patterns across cases. The transcripts 
pertaining to a single initiative were read several times to grasp what the interviewees were 
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saying. Then a case description was made and the general trajectory plotted into a process 
diagram similar to that used by Burgelman for describing his internal corporate ventures 
(1983a). These case histories were then sent to the key informer of each initiative to verify 
that the case description was a fair representation.  
Step 2: Comparing initiatives in a single firm 
The initiatives of a single firm were then compared with each other to detect general 
patterns; something Eisenhardt (1989) called a cross-case search for patterns. First, the 
initiatives were analyzed by comparing the process diagrams and summaries of the 
separate initiatives and grouping them into similar categories. Then the initiatives were 
plotted in a table, in accordance with the general categories just found, and cross-compared 
for various dimensions that stemmed from the proposed framework. As a final check the 
transcripts of each initiative were read again to check more thoroughly for the different 
aspects plotted in the table, and to see whether any important information regarding the 
facilitating conditions was overlooked. This step was fed back to the firms by means of a 
report and a separate presentation to each of the firms involved. 
Step 3: Comparing initiatives across firms 
After having compared within a firm, a single table was then put together from the three 
separate firm tables. This table was then used to detect patterns across the firms. Again we 
focused on comparing the same dimensions as were mentioned in step 2, namely the 
elements that stem from the proposed framework. In this step we particularly focused on 
major pattern differences between the firms, and whether these could be explained by and 
attributed to the different sets of organizational conditions. For this latter purpose, we 
sometimes revisited the individual case studies. During a workshop this cross comparison 
was discussed with the participating firms in which the overall project results were 
presented. 
Step 4: Answering the research questions and verifying the propositions 
On the basis of the above we sought to answer the research questions and to see if the 
propositions were plausible. In accordance with Bacherach's discussion of the relationship 
between constructs and propositions (1989), and Eisenhardt's discussion of "measuring 
constructs and verifying relationships (1989: 543)," we firstly focused on each construct, 
by presenting evidence for the construct from all cases. This evidence was also presented 
in a table according to the suggestions of Miles and Huberman (1984). Secondly, we 
focused on the relationship between certain of these constructs, specifically between the 
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'internal' elements of the initiative and the 'external' organizational conditions. In this way, 
by iterating back and forward between theory and data, in the manner described by 
Eisenhardt (1989), we answered the research questions and verified the plausibility of the 
propositions.  
The use of a priori specified constructs as a guiding tool for analysis 
As described in the above steps, certain dimensions were focused on to guide the data 
analysis. Essentially they functioned as the lens that was described in the beginning of this 
section. As Eisenhardt (1989: 536) mentioned, such "a priori specification of constructs 
can also help to shape the initial design of theory building research." These dimensions 
arose from the framework presented in chapter four. They were the idea, the people 
involved, knowledge and resources, the conditions (form, administration, and roles), the 
phases, and the outcome (see table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3: The Key Constructs as a Guidance Tool  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on Patriotta (1991) Table2 
Element Focus Categorizations Measurement method 
Idea Type of Product vs. process Interv. data; opinion researchers 
Innovativene No, limited, new, radically new knowledge "
Strategy driven Yes vs. No "
Preceding Yes vs. No "
People Key players Purely descriptive "
Function Purely descriptive "
Hierarchical Top, middle, bottom "
Knowledge Type of relevant Broad vs. narrow "
Source of knowledge Firm vs. outside "
Resource Location of Purely descriptive "
Acquireme Problematic vs. Not problematic "
Return Yes vs. No "
Form Organizational 
Form Rigid, Planned, Flexible, and Chaotic  Farsys 
Structure U, M, X, and N form Interv. data; opinion researchers 
Initiative 
Social network Purely descriptive "
Form No, informal, formal team, and new unit "
Admin. Organization 
Managerial Steering vs. Motivating "
Initiative 
Procedure None vs available "
Control Management vs. self-control "
Roles Organization & 
Roles Prod. & org. champ., Selector, Motivator etc "
Phase Phase Linking, Interpreting, and Integrating phase Interv. data; opinion researchers 
Implementation Problematic, smooth but slow, smooth and Interv. data; opinion researchers 
Approval Formal Explicit, Implicit, or Rejection "
Established knowledge None vs. increase in firm's knowledge "
Outcome Successfulness Successful, mixed, unsuccessful, ongoing Opinion of initiators 
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For the idea we specifically checked whether the idea was a product or a process 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1986). Even though ideas were not categorized as incremental or 
radical (Henderson and Clark, 1990) because such a clear distinction is difficult (Lovas 
and Ghoshal, 2000), we did categorize them according to their level of inventiveness as 
perceived by the researchers. Trials with asking the participants, i.e. the initiators to carry 
out this judgement themselves proved inadequate: most thought their idea was radical. 
Although such high regard for ones own initiatives is perhaps a necessity for initiators, it 
was obviously flawed for research purposes. As a less subjective method for judging the 
innovativeness of the initiatives we leaned on the opinion of the researchers. 
Notwithstanding its subjective limitations, this enabled us to categorize initiatives in 
comparison with each other as having no, limited, new, or radically new knowledge. We 
also checked whether the idea was related to the strategy, or by something else such as a 
client, and whether the idea predated the team. 
As for the people involved we tracked who all the key players were, what their 
function was, what hierarchical level they had (in terms of the bottom, middle, and top 
levels), and naturally what role they played in the context- and content-wise development 
of the initiative.  We also verified for evidence of knowledge and resource seeking 
behavior through the development of an initiative. In particular we categorized the 
knowledge base that the initiative was drawing on as broad (generalist) versus deep 
(functionalist) and verified if it came from within or outside of the firm. As for the 
resources we checked whether initiatives had problems acquiring resources and where 
these resources that they needed were located. Moreover, we also checked whether there 
was any clear obligation of a return favor involved, as mentioned by the initiators 
themselves.  
With respect to the conditions, the organizational form was verified in two ways. 
Firstly, the form of the firm itself. This was described in terms of the Farsys measurement 
(appendix B) as planned, flexible, or chaotic, and in terms of its structure as a functional, 
divisional, matrix or network form. The initiative’s form was also analyzed. Firstly, in 
terms of its social network. Whilst with the 'people' we concentrated on questions such as 
"who is involved" and "what is their role", in this case we looked at the kind of relation 
amongst these people. In order to do so we abstained from actual measures of network 
constraint, size, density, and hierarchy (Burt, 2000). Rather, we used indirect measures to 
approximate the kinds of contacts. We followed Ancona and Caldwell (1992), for example, 
in assuming that contacts in one division are different from those in another division in a 
company. Such use of indirect measures has been considered valid by for example Burt 
(2000: Appendix 10/11) who says: "There has even been productive work at the radical 
extreme of measuring social capital without any network data." Secondly, we categorized 
the initiative’s formal form as having no, an informal, team or unit form. As for the 
administration we also differentiated between that of the firm and that of the initiative. The 
firm’s administrative and incentive system was classified as being steering or 
motivationally oriented. The presence of administration in the initiative was analyzed by 
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looking at the presence of procedures and whether management controlled the initiative or 
if there was a form of self-control. As for the roles that related to the initiative we tried to 
analyze whether they fit roles already present in the literature - such as that of the 
entrepreneur, the implementer, selector (Burgelman, 1983a), or motivator (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1993) -, or whether they represented new roles. We also analyzed all relevant 
roles to the initiative and then in hindsight determined whether they were related in 
particular to the organization, initiative, or both. 
All these previous aspects were checked for changes across the linking, 
interpreting, and integrating phases. The propositions talked about better idea generation 
and implementation. Idea generation could in theory be measured by both the amount of 
ideas generated and the level of innovativeness (actually only inventiveness). However, we 
did not seek to discover all initiatives present in firms, aside from the fact that it would be 
impossible to do so. Hence, the measure used as an indicator for “better idea generation” 
was the level of innovativeness of the initiatives with respect to each other as judged by the 
researchers. This is a feature of the idea itself and has been treated at that level. As for 
“better implementation” one way would have been to measure the percentage of approved 
initiatives. However, the number of initiatives that had reached the final phase and could 
be approved were limited and would not have presented a good indicator of the approval 
rate. Instead the opinion of the researchers was used to compare the initiatives that went 
through an implementation process. They judged the quality of that process by 
categorizing it as problematic, smooth but slow, or smooth and quick. Again, because 
numbers had little meaning in this study, if not alone because of the necessity to correct for 
scale and scope, the above subjective procedures were followed in order to get a more 
‘objective’ assessment. 
The approval was measured in terms of an explicit or implicit approval, or a 
rejection. We also analyzed whether the initiative added to the firm’s knowledge base. As 
for the outcome we measured the respondents subjective opinion about the success of the 
initiative, which is identical to the method used by Birkinshaw (1997). Just as he did  (in 
his table 2) we categorized initiatives as either success, mixed, or unsuccessful.  
DATA VALIDITY 
Based on criteria for judging quantitative studies, proponents of the case study research 
method have used four criteria in order to judge and guard the quality of the method: (1) 
construct validity, (2) internal validity, (3) external validity, and (4) reliability and 
replicability (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 
1989). Although some (Numagami, 1998) consider the latter two criteria irrelevant for case 
study research because they feel case study research is not seeking for universal laws, and 
although some have suggested other criteria for case research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), 
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the above mentioned four validity criteria remain the norm for judging qualitative case 
research. As such, we show in table 5.4 how this study relates to each of the four criteria. 
 
Table 5.4: Validity criteria and the tactics used to achieve them 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on Volberda (1992, figure 9.4) 
 
The construct validity, which relates to whether the evidence truly supports its 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989) and concerns the data collection, description (Yin, 1989) and 
analysis, was high for various reasons. Firstly, constructs were specified a priori 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Secondly, multiple sources of evidence were used: interviews, 
meetings, workshops, and documentary and archive data (Yin, 1989). In addition, the 
interviews were subject to triangulation as various people were interviewed on a single 
initiative (Pettigrew, 1990). Moreover, the key informers reviewed the case descriptions 
(Yin, 1989). Various investigators analyzed the same data separately and then came 
together to discuss a consensus (Eisenhardt, 1989). And last but not least, a workshop was 
also organized for the management of the three firms in which the findings were presented. 
The internal validity, which deals with the verification of the causality between 
key constructs (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and concerns the data analysis (Yin, 1989), 
appeared to be significant as all initiatives displayed a search for knowledge and resources 
Tests Case study Research phase 
Construct validity Framework as a priori specification of constructs (Eisenhardt, collection, description, and  
analysis 
Multiple sources of evidence: interviews, meetings, workshops, 
documentary and archive data (Yin, 1989)
collection 
Triangulation through multiple informants on a single initiative 
(Pettigrew, 1988) collection 
Review of cases by key informer (Yin, 1989) description and analysis 
Separate and then joint analysis by different researchers 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) analysis 
Workshop for presenting findings to all firms involved. description and analysis 
Internal validity Pattern matching of initiatives both within and across firms (Yin, 
1989,  Eisenhardt, 1989) analysis 
Explanation of different initiative patterns found (Yin, 1989) analysis 
External validity Multiple cases: 25 initiatives in three firms (Leonard-Barton, 1990; 
1989; Eisenhardt, 1989)
design 
Literal replication of certain findings within and across firms (Yin, 
1989,  Eisenhardt, 1989)
design and analysis 
Theoretical replication of certain findings attributed to different 
sets of organizational conditions across the firms. (Yin, 1989, 
Eisenhardt, 1989) 
design and analysis 
Reliability Use of case study protocol for investigating initiatives (Yin, 1989) collection 
The existence of a case study database of eight binders containing: 
protocol, documents, notes, interviews, slides and reports, 
analysis tables (Yin, 1989)
storage 
1989) 
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that was impacted by organizational conditions of the firms in which they were active. This 
was identified through pattern matching (Yin, 1989). The patterns of the causal impact of 
the organizational conditions were consistent within each firm, and differences in such 
patterns across firms could be attributed to different sets of organizational conditions.  
The external validity, which deals with the generalizability of findings and 
concerns the research design (Yin, 1989) and analysis, is high (Leonard-Barton, 1990) as 
25 initiatives in three companies were studied. As Yin (1989) explains this generalizability 
does not concern statistical generalization but analytical generalization in which “the 
investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 
1989, 36).” For such to be the case the study needs to move beyond a single case study and 
replicate findings. This study fulfills this requirement because it was a case study in which 
multiple initiatives were investigated within a single firm and because we also investigated 
these multiple initiatives across different firms (Leonard-Barton, 1990:250). This study 
contains certain findings that were repeated over the cases: literal replications that are 
discussed in the discussion. The study also contains findings that differed per firm but 
which we could attribute to a different set of organizational conditions: theoretical 
replications that are dealt with in the discussion chapter. In general these findings could be 
found to be generally consistent with previous research on initiatives and knowledge 
creation, and where this was not the case we offer an explanation for the contradicting 
finding.  
The reliability deals with ensuring that the operations of the study can be repeated 
by someone else with the same results and concerns the data collection (Yin, 1989) and 
storage. This was ensured by using a case study protocol and the development of a case 
study database (Yin, 1989). A case study protocol was drawn up to ensure that the data 
collection, which was carried out by the three different research teams, was conducted in 
the same way. The case study database contains this case study protocol, all collected 
documents, all the notes used, the transcribed interviews, all the slides and reports used for 
feedback to the firms, and the tables used for analyzing the data.  
LIMITATIONS 
Naturally, there are also limitations to the way in which the study was set up and 
conducted. More specifically, we address three general sets of limitations: selection biases 
and liabilities, data collection incongruencies, and data reduction.  
Various biases and liabilities in the selection of the cases could be said to exist. 
First, there is the issue of bias in the case selection. In each investigated firm, top 
management was asked to suggest around six initiatives that they considered interesting 
and that the research team might consider studying, which is the same tactic as followed by 
Birkinshaw (1997). Because top management can be expected to favor certain kinds of 
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initiatives - such as those that were initiated by themselves, that were top-down, that were 
successful, or that fit with their strategic thinking – this could have resulted in a selection 
bias. The study tried to do away with this bias by also selecting initiatives that were 
stumbled upon during the investigation. In other words, certain initiatives were not 
suggested by top management but mentioned by interviewees during our investigation. 
Overall, there is also the limitation, as noted by Birkinshaw (1997), that failures might be 
underrepresented, because “for a variety of reasons managers were reluctant to dwell on 
their less auspicious moments (Birkinshaw, 1997).” Although we did not detect such 
reluctance when failures were discussed, the point remains that they might just not have 
been brought up.  
Other liabilities could also exist in the case selection as we can infer from 
quantitative studies, which use control variables for this purpose. These studies used the 
age of an organization (Kanzanjian and Rao, 1999) or of a project (McGrath et al, 1995) as 
a control variable. In this study we selected large firms, which are generally older firms. 
As for the initiatives we recorded their duration and their stage of development at the time 
of investigation. To check for liability of size, quantitative studies use the size of the 
organization as a control variable (McGrath et al, 1995; Kanzanjian and Rao, 1999). Again 
we selected large firms with revenues of over 100 million guilders that operated globally. 
As for the initiatives we did not check for size, in part because the initiatives were 
unfolding and it was not quite clear what the boundaries of the initiative were in terms of 
who was in or out.  The quantitative study of Kanzanjian and Rao (1999) also checked for 
the liability of growth. Again, we selected large firms who have passed initial growth 
stages, and offered descriptions of each firm in which we discuss the growth they were 
experiencing. The quantitative study of McGrath et al, (1995) also controlled for the 
liability of culture and intersectional differences. As for the firms we selected, these were 
all situated in the Netherlands - similar to Birkinshaw (1997) who also investigated firms 
in a single country - with only Ericsson being a subsidiary of a foreign parent. The three 
were located in different industries in order to accentuate different facilitating conditions. 
Data collection incongruencies could have occurred because the data collection 
was purposely carried out by different research teams at each firm. It might have been that 
because the team members did not carry out the data collection at all the firms that the 
actual data collection could have occurred differently. However, this liability was traded 
off against the increased objectivity that could be achieved by separating collection and 
analysis in the manner described by Pettigrew (1990). Furthermore, to ensure the largest 
extent of congruence as possible between the research teams we used a protocol that was 
extensively discussed between the research team’s leaders. Moreover, collection 
differences turned out during the analysis as all researchers looked also at each other’s 
material. Although collection differences were found, these were not considered to affect 
the study in significant ways. 
Another limitation was caused by the reduction of the amount of data, as pointed 
out by Patriotta (1999) regarding his own data reduction. The case study database, 
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covering over eight binders, has been reduced to an amount of data bounded by the number 
of pages of this study. Naturally, portions of the data set have thus been omitted because of 
the cognitive, space, and time constraints imposed on the study. Possible insights might 
thus have been disregarded, but this was considered a necessary step in order to arrive at 
the outcome of the present study. 
CONCLUSION 
This study uses an interpretative approach whilst being guided by theory and propositions. 
The initiative process was investigated using a research format that is very similar to 
Burgelman’s process study (1983b). Three firms, KLM Cargo, Ericsson ETM, and Van 
Ommeren Tank Storage, were selected for analysis on the basis of theoretical sampling. In 
these firms 25 initiatives were selected on the basis of top management suggestions and 
serendipity. Data was collected by interviewing the key players in each initiative. The 
initiatives were analyzed by first analyzing a single initiative, then comparing initiatives 
within a single firm, and then comparing patterns across the three firms. The analytic 
generalizability is high as opposed to the statistical generalizability, which is low. Having 
explained the methodology in this chapter we can now turn to the findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Initiatives at Van Ommeren:  
Effective Implementation 
This is the first of four empirical chapters in which initiative trajectories are analyzed. 
This first empirical chapter focuses on initiatives within Van Ommeren.  The chapter starts 
by describing the situation at Van Ommeren at the time it was investigated. Then, an 
overview of the initiatives investigated at Van Ommeren is offered. The chapter moves on 
to analyze and describe, on the basis of the theoretical framework, certain patterns that 
these initiatives displayed within Van Ommeren. It ends by summarizing the main 
conclusions of the initiative process at Van Ommeren. 
VAN OMMEREN TANK STORAGE 
Koninklijke Van Ommeren N.V. was one of the three largest Tank Storage companies in 
the world (Van Ommeren, 1995) at the time of this investigation. In 1999 it merged with 
Pakhoed to become Vopak. Van Ommeren’s headquarters were located in the port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands. It combined tank storage “with tanker shipping, tank 
container operations and a network of agency and forwarding offices (Vopak, 1999).” At 
the time of investigation Van Ommeren had 38 tank storage terminals (Van Ommeren, 
1995) located all over the world near major shipping routes, capable of storing and 
handling oil products, chemicals and gases, and vegetable oils (Vopak, 1999). At the time, 
ocean tanker shipping activities were carried out by 10 vessels, the coastal and inland 
shipping activities by 96 vessels (Van Ommeren. 1995). In 1996 - the year of the 
investigation - Van Ommeren achieved a net turnover of 343 million euros and employed 
3111 people (Vopak, 1999). It had just gone through quite a major reorganization when the 
initiatives at Van Ommeren were investigated. 
 The reorganizations at Van Ommeren originated from a failed attempt to move 
into the trading business starting at the end of the seventies. In order to compensate the 
fluctuating results of the shipping business it seemed to make sense, at the time, to set up a 
trading division (Schwab, 1989). The purchase of the Ceteco trading company in 1987 
represented the ultimate realization of this strategy. Van Ommeren was renamed Van 
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Ommeren – Ceteco, its abbreviation V.O.C. being an intentional reference to the former 
Dutch East Indian Company. It was considered a dream come true. However, it was a 
dream that would not last as neither Ceteco nor the rest of the trading division provided the 
desired balance in the results (Van der Zaal, 1997).  
 In the 1990 the company therefore drastically changed its strategy; it divested the 
trading division and decided to concentrate on two core activities only: shipping and tank 
storage (Van Ommeren, 1991). The organization was streamlined through various cycles 
of “continuous reduction, rearrangement, reorganization and further reduction (Van der 
Zaal, 1997:18).” The amount of employees, for example, diminished from 3985 in 1993, to 
3466 in 1994, and to 2582 in 1995 (Vopak, 1999). Structurally the middle layer had been 
cut out, as well as 13 business units in order to create a flatter and more flexible 
organization. As is written in the annual report (Van Ommeren, 1994: 14), “The smaller 
number of hierarchical levels has shortened lines of communication…[this] has improved 
participation and responsiveness. ” The changes “were of an unprecedented magnitude for 
Van Ommeren, [placing] great demands on many members of the staff. Those who were 
spared by the rationalization process displayed a great deal of resilience. In many cases 
they had to take over their colleagues’ work in addition to their own (Van Ommeren, 1994: 
14).”  
 
Figure 6.1: Organization Chart of Van Ommeren (Van Ommeren, 1995) 
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As a result of the above reorganization the Van Ommeren organization consisted 
of three sectors (see figure 6.1): Tank storage, Shipping, and Transport services. The first 
two represented the two core activities of the company. In the course of the nineties the 
emphasis shifted increasingly “to the transport of liquid cargo as an addition to the tank 
storage operations (Vopak, 1999).” Each sector existed of three areas. Tank storage existed 
of Europe, America, and Asia & Australia. Shipping existed of Ocean tanker shipping, 
Inland tanker shipping, and Dry-cargo shipping, with the emphasis on Ocean tanker 
shipping. Transport services existed of warehousing & distribution, Agencies & 
forwarding, and Stevedoring. The three sectors were steered by the Management Board, 
which was in turn aided by the corporate staff departments. One of these was a small 
business development department, whose task it was to develop new business ideas that 
could not be carried out by the operating companies themselves.   
With the restructuring having ended (Van Ommeren, 1995), a major strategic 
reorientation meeting, termed “Stradivarius” took place in 1995. On the basis of consensus 
the core business and identity of Van Ommeren was reestablished. It concluded that its 
mission was to provide independent tank storage, especially for liquids (gas, chemicals, 
oil). Moreover, at the meeting it was decided to have clearer criteria and procedures for 
deciding on initiatives. As a controller said: “During the Stradivarius meeting … there was 
commitment about when the management board would approve projects instead of ‘we 
will look into it some day.” Having set the focus for the upcoming years and with the 
restructuring complete, Van Ommeren’s management was now interested in revitalizing 
the company that had taken so many punches recently. Their interest in an investigation of 
initiatives at Van Ommeren was therefore particularly prompted by their desire to revive 
the entrepreneurial behavior with employees that had survived the reorganization. 
Context measurement 
At the time of our investigation in 1996 Van Ommeren had completed the reorganization, 
revenues were up 50%, and the organization seemed back on track (Van Ommeren, 1995). 
The question at hand seemed how Van Ommeren could grow in the future? This question 
formed a major reason for the management to participate in the investigation. Before 
investigating the initiatives a context measurement was conducted in which Van 
Ommeren’s environmental turbulence, flexibility, structure, and culture were analyzed 
(Volberda, 1996, 1998; Wielemaker, Elfring, and Volberda, 2000; see appendix B). Van 
Ommeren’s environment was found to be simple, stable, and quite predictable, except with 
respect to the impact of laws. The industry in which Van Ommeren is active could be 
characterized as mature. There were very few new entrants, the growth rates were low, 
there was oligopolistic competition, and the amount of innovations was low. Concerning 
the latter Van den Driest says: “Sometimes an opportunity arises … We do not gamble 
because large sums of money are involved. We as Van Ommeren are financed quite 
conservatively ourselves. That was already the case at the time of the Van Ommerens. 
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Ships they built were often paid in cash at the time (Oosterwijk, 1997: 53).” Van Ommeren 
was reasonably flexible except with respect to the future strategy and personnel. The 
relations with the unions were particularly strained. Although the structure was flat it was 
nevertheless quite mechanistic owing to the strong planning and control systems. There 
was a high degree of standardization and formalization. The culture scored in between 
conservative and innovative, although it had a very strong socialization. The employees 
had a strong sense of common identity, a participative leadership style, and a heuristic 
management attitude. Overall, Van Ommeren characterized as a planned company that 
contained some entrepreneurial characteristics. 
INITIATIVES 
At Van Ommeren six initiatives where investigated. Case box 6.1 describes these six 
initiatives.  
 
CASE BOX 6.1 INITIATIVES AT VAN OMMEREN 
 
Table 6.1: Initiatives at Van Ommeren 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initiative I.  Splitter 
The Splitter initiative (appendix d) was about the set up and operation in cooperation with a client of a gas 
condenser splitter. Another client had previously suggested building the splitter to one of the board members. 
Originally, it was based on the assumption that there would be a shortage of naphtha. This would enable its 
substitution by a waist product of refineries: gas condense. Instead of burning this gas condense away it would be 
treated for reuse. Because, for some reason, the client disappeared out of the picture, the commercial manager 
decided to proceed with the idea.  Although other customers liked the idea they never came through when it came 
down to making deals. Finally a player in the oil industry, whom the commercial manager had met 10 years 
earlier during a conference, decided to set up and operate the splitter with her own resources. Van Ommeren 
delivers the water, nitrogen, gas, and takes care of storage. Within Van Ommeren there was initially quite some 
hesitancy to make commitments to a single client. At the time the market conditions made the contract turn out to 
be very prosperous. 
Initiative Idea Phase Basic process Outcome 
1 Splitter Link with client plant Integrating middle/top-down success 
2 Eastman Link with client plant Integrating middle/top-down success 
3 Cooperation Synergy between operating companies Integrating top-down ongoing 
4 Tank Container Setting up Tank container business Interpreting middle/top-down ongoing 
5 Latin America Geographic expansion into Latin America Interpreting middle/top-down ongoing 
6 Tallin Investment in terminal in Estonia Interpreting bottom-up Terminated 
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Initiative II.  Eastman Kodak 
The Eastman initiative (appendix e) was similar to the Splitter one in the sense that it was about a customer 
carrying out activities on Van Ommeren’s property. Here too there was hesitancy, because the initiative would 
create a dependency on a particular customer. That customer was a longstanding customer of Van Ommeren and 
it was he who suggested making a direct link between Van Ommeren’s terminals and his own chemical plant next 
door. Because the customer was in a hurry a working team was formed instantly. The team members were 
selected based on their political and knowledge contribution. The contract with the customer included an open 
bookkeeping agreement. At the time of the investigation there was a pipeline from the terminals to the client and 
the entire project was operational.  
Initiative III.  Cooperation 
The cooperation initiative (appendix f) was based on the idea of offering integrated logistics, a door-to-door 
service. The directors of tank storage and inland shipping thought that they should be able to create more 
synergies by cooperating, particularly in liquids. For edible oils the cooperation was already working pretty 
smoothly. At the operational level cooperation was structured in a quarterly meeting to remove as much 
inefficiency as possible. At the other levels it was very informal and pragmatic. There was no strategic team in 
place. The main issue was how to ensure a lower price as a result of the synergy so that customers would buy into 
it. 
Initiative IV.  Tank container 
The tank container initiative (appendix g) sought to get Van Ommeren involved in tank containers. Previously, 
Van Ommeren used to own a tank container division but it was divested around five years before the investigation 
because it was not performing well. That created an anti-container attitude. Nevertheless, the members of the 
initiative felt that intercontinental container transport by means of tank containers formed a perfect fit for Van 
Ommeren.  Moreover, the market indicated that containers would be in the lift. At the Stradivarius session the 
project was put forward, and became officially approved some months later. A work group that took care of the 
operationalization was formed, as well as a steering committee consisting of various political factions. 
Initiative V.  Latin America 
The Latin America initiative (appendix h) was about setting up a foothold in Latin America. Already in 1976, 
after the oil crisis, the understanding grew that a global presence was necessary.  The trading partner Ceteco, who 
had had a strong foothold in Latin America, had been divested. At the time of the initiative the most southern 
location in America was Mexico where an opportunity had materialized in 1982. Because there were no 
competitors there and the risks were deemed high the initiative never had the highest priority. In 1992 the idea 
was taken on again, initiated by the board. At the time of the investigation the management board was about to be 
presented the results of a fact-finding mission in the form of a market research report. It was already certain that 
Van Ommeren would conduct activities in Latin America. The question was now more in what form this would 
take place.  
Initiative VI.  Tallin  
The Tallin initiative (Appendix i) was about the take over of an existing terminal in Tallin, Estonia. A business 
developer at Van Ommeren had good contacts with a person at Mees and Hope who suggested the investment in 
Estonia. Although it involved quite some political risks, it looked as if very nice revenues could be made in the 
short term. The intention was to divest it somewhere in the near future again. The competitor, Pakhoed, already 
had a presence in Tallin and was very successful there. The initiative was kept secret from the management board 
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until the contract was almost ready to be signed with an Estonian partner. At that point the board became involved 
and terminated it because of a lack of confidence in the foreign partner and the political risks involved. 
 
 
The initiatives investigated at Van Ommeren display distinctive patterns, which are 
described hereafter in terms of (1) the kinds of ideas they dealt with, (2) the process they 
went through, (3) the impact of the organizational conditions on the initiative’s trajectories, 
and (4) the search for knowledge and resources.  
IDEAS 
Table 6.2: Initiative Idea Types at Van Ommeren 
 
Initiative Stimulus Idea Activities Type 
     
Splitter Client Link with client plant Organizing link with client Organizational 
Eastman Client Link with client plant Organizing link with client Organizational 
Cooperation Strategy Synergy between operating 
companies 
Discussions on 
cooperation 
Organizational 
Tank 
container 
Strategy Setting up Tank container 
business 
Market research and 
investment decisions 
Organizational 
Latin America Strategy Geographic expansion into 
Latin America 
Market research and 
investment decisions 
Organizational 
Tallin Opportunity Investment in terminal in 
Estonia 
Market research and 
investment decisions 
Organizational 
 
 
 
The initiatives at Van Ommeren were (1) all organizational in nature, and were (2) both 
strategy and market driven (see table 6.2). They were all organizational in nature because 
they affected the organization: the Splitter and Eastman initiative were about linking 
processes directly with a client; Tank container, Latin America, and Tallin were about 
expanding the organization in new areas; Cooperation was about creating synergy within 
the organization. Most of these initiatives (5 of 6) were organizational in the sense that 
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they were about adding something on to the existing organization: either a link to a client 
or an investment in a new business or geographic area. Only one initiative, Cooperation, 
was about a change within the existing organization, namely creating synergy between 
existing operating companies. 
 Both the market (3 of 6) and the strategy (3 of 6) drove initiatives at Van 
Ommeren (see table 6.2). Half of the initiatives were clearly market driven: Splitter and 
Eastman by a client, Tallin by a bank acquaintance. Cooperation, Tank Container, and 
Latin America were driven by the strategy. The Cooperation and Tank container initiatives 
fit in with the strategy of offering integrated logistics. Latin America fit in with the 
strategy of being a global player. It has to be noted, however, that the strategy equaled 
much more the decision process of the board than being a company-wide or formal 
phenomenon. As such the initiatives driven by the strategy could be said to have been 
driven by the board. 
PROCESS 
Whereas there were both bottom-up and top-down ideas at Van Ommeren, it is notable that 
they all had to proceed through the board’s decision making system (see table 6.3). The 
decision-making was centralized - no consensus model - meaning that both the 
management and supervisory boards had to agree on the initiative before it could proceed. 
This is underscored by the Tallin initiative: one idea that was kept away and hidden from 
the board until the moment of signing a contract arose. When the board was informed 
about the initiative it was instantly terminated. Overall, at Van Ommeren initiatives got a 
clear go or no-go signal from the board.  
Linking 
Even though Van Ommeren was attributing greater significance to strategy as a driver for 
idea generation, in essence idea generation remained primarily opportunistic. As the 
business development manager explained, this was always the case at Van Ommeren: 
“previously, Van Ommeren was very much opportunity driven, thus very much by clients 
suggesting opportunities, or banks and other stakeholders drawing attention to business 
opportunities.” And even in this investigation half the initiatives (3 of 6) were still clearly 
of this type: a client suggested Splitter and Eastman, an acquaintance suggested Tallin.  
Yet, even the initiatives that were based on strategy (3 of 6) were very much opportunity 
driven. The Tank Container and Latin America initiatives consisted of market research 
activities in which investment opportunities were being sought after. The Cooperation 
initiative sought possibilities for cooperation between two units. Evidently, these initiatives 
that were based on a strategic vision all let opportunities drive the process. 
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Table 6.3: Initiative trajectories at Van Ommeren 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board (Terminator) 
Dir. Bus. Dev./    
       Dir. Operat comp.      
       (Weak Org.  
        champ) 
When board is informed 
they terminate the initiative 
Line Managers (Initiator/Product champs) 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board (Initiator) 
Dir. Bus. Dev.  
(Org. champ) 
Market research to find best 
way forward. 
Board must choose strategy
Bus. Dev. Manager (Prod champ) 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board member  
   (Executive champ) 
Dir. Operat. Company (Org. champ) 
Waiting for decision by board 
for take-over or partnership 
Line Manager 
(Product champ) 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board (initiator) 
Directors of Tank  
storage and inland shipping  
(Org. champs) 
Evolutionary process: 
continuous discussions on  
cooperation. 
If a feasible area is found 
implementation goes 
smoothly 
Line Man.   
(Implementers) 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Not strategic, but opportunity 
Hesitancy to create 
dependency on one client
Dir. Oper. com 
(Org. champ) 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Commercial director. 
(Initiator/Product Champ) 
Dir. Bus.Dev./ 
Dir. Oper. com 
(Org. champs) 
Not strategic, but opportunity 
Hesitancy to create 
dependency on one client
Line Man.   
(Implementers) 
Board member (Executive champ) Splitter
Eastman
Cooperation
Container
Latin America
Tallin
Linking Interpreting Integrating 
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At this very early stage all ideas (5 of 6), whether suggested by the top or the 
bottom, immediately went to the management board for approval. The one that did not - 
the Tallin initiative - was instantly terminated by the board. This centralized decision-
making process was explained by one of the controllers as: “When there is a new idea … it 
goes directly to the board. The employees have the feeling that things are possible then. 
There is a quicker communication and the board displays signs of commitment.” As the 
director of Marketing and Business Development explained: “Whereas in the old days 
projects were presented ready-made to the board, nowadays the board is involved in the 
projects at a much earlier stage.”  
The centralized decision-making nature of Van Ommeren’s approach to initiatives 
was underscored by the more formalized annual “Stradivarius” strategy meeting where 
employees could bring forward ideas. A member of the management board explained the 
selection of ideas at the session as follows: “It was a truly free discussion… and if Tank 
Containers had emerged much lower then that would have been an interesting signal. Of 
course we must be enthusiastic about it, otherwise it will not happen. But there is a culture 
of open discussion, because you cannot squash initiatives. There are some trendsetters and 
their opinion counts heavily. There are a couple with a good track record who can make us 
reconsider something a second time.” Yet, even though management tried to involve 
employees in the selection of ideas the basic principle remained that initiatives had to 
posses the board’s consent. 
Interpretation 
The interpretation stage was characterized by a process in which ideas circulated in the 
management board. The director inland shipping explained: “The ideas must be shared by 
the management board. But because it is evolutionary, it goes quite slowly. First the idea 
must be shared … before anything can happen. There must be a feeling for the idea.” The 
board often asked a limited number of people to sort out certain aspects of the initiative 
and provide a report as a discussion piece. In the Latin America initiative the board asked 
Jacques [fictitious name] to conduct research for them: "First there was a desk-research 
which was presented to the board in February. Then Jacques [fictitious name] traveled 
around Latin America and visited six countries. Two intermediate reports have already 
been presented." 
Although the board was particularly focused on initiatives meeting the 12% ROI 
criteria, they were known to be open to other criteria and informal pressures as well. As the 
director of one of the operating companies explained: “Within the management board, 
support for such projects can particularly be found with John [fictitious name]: the most 
entrepreneurial of the three. John is a playful strategic thinker who evaluates projects not 
just on their commercial value, but also on their strategic value.” The super controller 
explains the criteria as follows: “Projects needed to meet the ROI criterion, about 12%. 
Nevertheless, this was not the only aspect that was considered. Other matters were also 
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taken into account such as the strategic value. Moreover, the decisions were often prepared 
in the informal circuit. What’s more, estimations were unsure and flexible; the ROI 
therefore served more as a target.” Initiative members that were not on the board tried to 
influence the board discussion through informal ties with an executive champion.  
During the entire decision-making process no formal team worked on the 
initiative yet. Instead all initiatives were carried out within the hierarchy during the 
interpretation stage (see table 6.4) often because they could be handled within a single unit. 
As the director of operating company explicated:  “In case project teams would have been 
put on the splitter project it would not have worked. Project teams have the tendency to 
become bureaucratic. Moreover, the project is then being pulled into various directions, 
whilst there is one clear direction necessary.” The only formal body that was sometimes 
introduced in the interpretation was a steering committee. It was installed by the 
management board to aid in the screening process. 
Integration 
Initiatives that have entered the integration stage - Cooperation, Eastman, and Splitter - 
showed little difficulty in getting integrated. This was in line with the clear selection of 
initiatives by the management board in the previous stage. Termination of initiatives - the 
business development manager said that “the success rate of projects lies between 5 and 10 
%” – was something that occurred in stages before the integration stage: during the 
integration stage no initiatives were terminated.  
 
Table 6.4: Units involved in Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existing  
Operating unit 
Existing  
Operating unit 
Informal Project 
team 
Team is cross-functional, 
and ad-hoc (not formal) 
Existing  
Operating unit 
Existing  
Operating unit 
Formal Project 
team 
Team is cross-functional 
Within  
the board 
Within existing 
hierarchy 
Operational  
meeting 
Very informal setting 
Ad hoc gatherings 
Existing Operat. 
company 
Within  
hierarchy 
Existing Bus.  
Develop. unit 
Existing Bus.  
Develop. unit 
Existing Operat. 
Company 
Exist Operat. 
Company 
Project secret from board 
Latin America
Eastman
Cooperation
Container
Splitter
Tallin
Linking Interpreting Integrating 
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The actual integration of the initiative was often carried out in task force or 
project team like setting: the Splitter initiative in an informal project team, the Eastman 
initiative in a formal project team, and the Cooperation initiative in an operational meeting. 
These teams were kept away from the head office to avoid meddling by headquarters. As 
the director of one of the Tank storage company said: Director Tank Storage: “The team 
leader is on location and not at the head office because then he is open to too much 
political danger… The preparations and operationalization of the project is carried out by a 
work group.”  
Van Ommeren used to have incentive systems, but these were abandoned because 
it was too difficult to attribute the success of an initiative to a specific person. As the 
director of one of the operating companies explained: “Rewards for new ideas created 
problems on the work floor, because the subjective allocation of bonuses by the 
management to certain individuals led to tensions as others who had also contributed to the 
project did not receive a bonus.” This could explain why not a single initiative at van 
Ommeren showed the use of incentive systems. 
APPROVAL 
The approval process at Van Ommeren was typified by the following sequence. First, the 
initiative members tried to influence the management board through informal contacts. As 
the director Marketing/Business Development explained: “There will soon be a 
recommendation to the management board, who will probably accept it because there has 
been extensive consultation beforehand. Because of the short lines and the informal 
contacts it has already been precooked.... I meet them in the corridors and in the bathroom 
where the official presentation is precooked.” Secondly, the management board at a very 
early stage discussed the initiative, often involving some requests for refinement. Failure to 
consult the management board, according to a controller, was “not done according to the 
new rules” and caused the termination of an initiative as happened to the Tallin initiative. 
Thirdly, the management board took a formal decision on the initiative. However, as the 
controller explained: “the board has no autonomous decision making rights: the board also 
has to turn to the supervisory board.” Therefore fourthly, the supervisory board took the 
final decision.  
ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITIONS 
The very strong centralized decision-making system benefited the integration stage by 
giving initiatives a clear go-ahead, but was detrimental to the generation of new ideas. 
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Moreover, because the system was open to informal manipulation it was especially 
attractive to those who knew how to pull the strings, thereby excluding those that did not.  
 The centralized decision-making system was very strong at Van Ommeren and 
was located in the management board. The initiatives could not circumvent the board of 
directors' decision-making procedures. Therefore, most initiatives took quite some effort to 
inform the board about their progress. In the Splitter initiative, for example, "Mary 
[fictitious] and all other personnel made reports of all visits and circulated it around the 
board." The Tallin initiative was terminated exactly because the board was not involved, as 
a director of one of the operating companies explains: “the board was involved much late, 
causing the termination of the ‘Tallin’ project.” All the initiatives at Van Ommeren that 
were not terminated all passed through the boards centralized-decision making system. 
However, the strong centralization of decision-making killed off entrepreneurial 
behavior. As one of the interviewees said: "Everything that is new is kind of suspect; there 
is no entrepreneurial culture present. The current older generation are not the most 
entrepreneurial people." The ideas at Van Ommeren were often ideas that had been around 
for a long time or that fit well with the existing activities. Only the Cooperation initiative 
formed more of a departure from the existing mode of thinking, but it showed to evolve 
slowly. Tank container was a new line of business for Van Ommeren, but it was something 
they had done some years earlier. All other initiatives were strongly related to Van 
Ommeren’s existing business. Overall, the initiatives at Van Ommeren were not very 
radical in nature. Moreover, the amount of ideas encountered during the investigation was 
less than those in Ericsson and KLM Cargo. It seems safe to conclude that Van Ommeren 
displayed little entrepreneurial activity, which in itself is not that surprising given the bulk 
industry that it operates in.  
 One could also wonder whether the openness of the decision-making system to 
informal manipulation was also cause of a diminished entrepreneurial atmosphere at Van 
Ommeren. A member of the Tank Container initiative explains such manipulation: 
"Commitment for the project had already been created in the corridor with the board of 
directors… The [brainstorm] meeting was therefore intended to create commitment within 
Van Ommeren… Competing projects were killed off during the meeting..." The Tallin 
initiative was criticized by a board member for failing to use the informal channels: "The 
board of directors should not be surprised. People ought to get commitment through 
informal channels. They should tell the board of directors in advance about their plans, 
which is something that is accommodated by the informal culture that we have." This 
importance of the informal channel led Tallin initiative members to complain that: “the 
conditions to which the project should adhere to ought to have been formulated first. That 
is also a very important task of the board of directors: ensuring predictability, projects 
should comply with so and so." Although we found no evidence that people refrained from 
coming forward with ideas because of this aspect, it was notable that the people that did 
come forward with ideas all had good informal connections with the board. 
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 Another aspect that was considered to have resulted in less entrepreneurial 
activity was the fact that a restructuring in which many people had lost their jobs had 
preceded the investigation. As one of the board members explained: "We are on the verge 
of transforming from a conglomerate to a focused organization. Only afterwards is it 
possible to peek over the fence again. But at the moment we are not ready for that yet. In 
this painful phase of cutbacks you cannot walk too far ahead, that is not good and causes 
mixed signals. The matter has to come to rest first, especially emotionally, before you can 
start becoming somewhat more adventurous again." 
KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES 
Because most initiatives represented investment proposals, most effort was initially aimed 
at building legitimacy within the board by building a knowledge base and convincing 
people who mattered in the organization (see figure 6.2). The knowledge base was 
particularly built through market research and writing up this knowledge in reports which 
were then distributed to the board. Because the proposals were investment proposals rather 
than technological concepts, little resources were needed for their development. Therefore 
the search at Van Ommeren focused on obtaining market information and on co-opting 
opinion makers in the firm. In half the initiatives the director of marketing and business 
development was contacted for his good contacts with the board, even when he had no 
direct link with the initiative.  
 The knowledge that was contributed by the initiatives to the existing knowledge 
base at Van Ommeren was therefore quite limited. This was not surprising given that the 
firm had just concentrated on what it considered its core again: tank storage and shipping. 
Instead, most initiatives represented opportunities to operationalize the existing knowledge 
base. Not surprisingly most initiatives were therefore carried out within units. The only 
reason others were brought in is for knowledge that particularly fit investment proposals, 
as a Splitter initiative member explained: "The project teams are put together [with] for 
example, a technical guy such as James [fictitious name], a lawyer, a financial guy and a 
commercial person."  
The formal strategy as an indicator of the future knowledge base was a weak 
guide for initiative behavior at Van Ommeren. The director of Tank Storage, for example, 
therefore believed: “it is a good idea to make the Stradivarius meeting an annual event in 
order to achieve knowledge transfer with respect to the progress of projects and the results 
of operating companies. Moreover, in this way the noses point in the same direction within 
the concern. It creates commitment about the major strategic trajectories and it is a good 
way to reflect.” As opposed to this desire there was no clear future knowledge base that 
functioned as a reference for initiatives. The only reference was the management board’s 
decision-making system. 
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Figure 6.2: Initiatives at Van Ommeren 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOLLOW-UP 
Van Ommeren confirmed many of the above findings both during an in-company 
presentation as during a workshop with other companies participating in the investigation. 
In part they attributed the lack of entrepreneurial behavior to an industry effect – the tank 
storage and shipping industry was experiencing low margins and lots of mergers – as well 
as to the fact that it was still so soon after the restructuring.  
The low margins in the industry eventually resulted in Van Ommeren merging 
with Pakhoed, another Dutch tank storage and shipping firm. After an initial failure they 
finally merged with Pakhoed in October 1999. Being part of Vopak now, Van Ommeren 
no longer exists as a separate company anymore. It should be said that despite the low 
margins in the industry, Van Ommeren, did stress that they felt there was room enough for 
entrepreneurial behavior.  
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This entrepreneurial behavior was not showing itself because the restructuring 
had just occurred. It had been a period in which many people had lost their colleagues and 
in addition had to take on their jobs next to their own. The atmosphere was not such that it 
was very stimulating for people to come forward with ideas yet. It was thought that this 
would improve with time. The board also though that by having a meeting annually, like 
the Stradivarius one, enthusiasm and stimuli for ideas would be created. But again, this 
was still something that needed to prove its worth.  
However, whether these speculations would ever have come true will remain 
unknown as Van Ommeren as a separate firm no longer exists. As a result of the merger 
with Pakhoed, the employees became involved in yet another reorganization. Whether the 
new combination will allow for initiative behavior is something only time can tell. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, Van Ommeren’s initiatives were few and not very radical in nature. Most 
initiatives were investment proposals and therefore barely required any resources during 
their development. Effort was put into obtaining the necessary market information and 
obtaining a sufficient level of legitimacy. The centralized decision-making system of the 
management and supervisory board determined initiative survival. Autonomous behavior 
outside this decision system was not tolerated and led to the termination of an initiative. 
The decision-making system was prone to informal manipulation and therefore not very 
transparent. However, if initiatives got a go-ahead by the board they showed little 
difficulty getting integrated. Van Ommeren then was not very innovative, but it was 
effective at implementing the concepts that were approved. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Initiatives at Ericsson ETM:  
Convergence through Consensus 
This is the second of four empirical chapters in which initiative trajectories are analyzed. 
This second empirical chapter focuses on initiatives within Ericsson ETM.  The chapter 
starts by describing the situation at Ericsson ETM at the time it was investigated. Then, an 
overview of the initiatives investigated at Ericsson ETM is offered. The chapter moves on 
to analyze and describe, on the basis of the theoretical framework, certain patterns that 
these initiatives displayed within Ericsson. It ends by summarizing the main conclusions of 
the initiative process at Ericsson ETM. 
ERICSSON ETM 
Ericsson ETM in the Netherlands was the first subsidiary of Ericsson Sweden, an 
internationally operating supplier of telecommunications equipment (Pehrsson, 1996). The 
Ericsson group as a whole has been described (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) as a 
differentiated network structure, consisting of subsidiaries that work purely for the local 
market and those in lead markets whose function exceeds the local market. As a typical 
local company Ericsson ETM in the Netherlands engages in sales, product development, 
and manufacturing. Within the Ericsson group it is classified as a major local company 
(MLC), a title given to subsidiaries that contribute at least 5 percent to Ericsson’s global 
operations (Graetz, 1996). Ericsson ETM is just one of various independently operating 
Ericsson companies in the Netherlands such as Ericsson Data Services, Ericsson Radio 
Systems, and Ericsson Business Mobile Networks (Van Sluijs, 1996). Ericsson ETM 
consists not just of a marketing and sales function but also of an R&D and European 
logistics function. In 1996 the total amount of Ericsson ETM employees in the Netherlands 
was around 1100 people (Van Sluijs, 1996)” with a turnover of over 1 million Euro (1996, 
Ericsson ETM website).  
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Figure 7.1: Organization Chart of ETM in 1996 (Ericsson, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ericsson ETM was faced with a deregulation in their marketplace that had a large 
impact on the company’s modus operandus. Like most Ericsson companies (Graetz, 1996) 
Ericsson ETM used to have a close relationship with the national telecom operator, the 
Dutch PTT, which represented the bulk of the business and was more technologically than 
market focused. In 1993 the telecommunications industry was subject to deregulation, 
which brought new customers into existence. For ETM this meant that it no longer 
exclusively was to serve the Dutch PTT, it now faced new clients such as Telfort and 
Libertel.  These new clients were less technologically focused and required a different 
handling by Ericsson ETM. Because the old and new clients were competitors they wanted 
Ericsson ETM, who was dealing with most of them simultaneously, to ensure that leakage 
of confidential information would be prevented. All these events resulted in a 
reorganization and a cultural change that took place in the latter part of 1993 (Van Sluijs, 
1996).  
The pattern of reorganization is very similar to what happened at other local 
subsidiaries of Ericsson outside of the Netherlands. Graetz (1996), for example, describes 
how at Ericsson Australia the management style used to be traditional, paternalistic, and 
bureaucratic with the organization being conservative, middle management compliant and 
a focus on engineering and technology. She explains (306) “the new structure emphasized 
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the customer divisions as the ‘drivers of the business.’ The functional divisions, such as 
Systems Design and Engineering and the Supply Division (factory operations), now 
operated in support of the different customer divisions ...The focus was [now also] on 
serving the customer better … The aim of this restructuring was to create a more 
responsive, more competitive organization, more focused and more attuned to the needs of 
the market place (Graetz,).” Pehrsson (1996) similarly describes how Ericsson Germany 
also became organized along customer-oriented divisions. These developments at other 
Ericsson companies reflect very well what occurred at Ericsson ETM, which completely 
terminated the production of phones, shifting from production to R&D, Marketing, and 
Sales (see figure 7.1).  
The change from working with a technologically oriented monopolist to helping 
get new operators started on the liberalized market constituted a frame-breaking event for 
Ericsson ETM. The new working method used for acquiring new operators has been 
described elsewhere as follows: 
  “The way in which systems usually go about establishing relations with network operators 
typically assumes the following pattern. After the authority responsible for the issuing of 
licenses in a country or region has announced its bid, Ericsson and its competitors respond and 
make contact with the potential operators. Sometimes Ericsson appears in a given country even 
before the deregulation process has started ... Ericsson supports each of the potential operators 
by providing plans for their technical development, network engineering and marketing. 
Another important way of support is by working out methods of argumentation that may be 
used to persuade the responsible politicians to grant licenses to the operators in question 
(Pehrsson, 1996: 169). “ 
At Ericsson ETM the reorganization entailed a shift from a functional to a matrix form, 
where it was now common practice to set up teams that were dedicated to helping new 
operators get started. These teams worked with tollgates, as operators often needed to meet 
stringent deadlines. Once the customer was given the license the team would evolve into a 
new client-axis. Although teams were already known within the R&D department, it had 
now become common practice within Ericsson ETM as a whole.  
Context measurement 
Ericsson ETM had shifted from a production to a data company and from supplying a 
single national operator to multiple operators. As an extension of that transformation it was 
evaluating its future direction by means of scenario planning and the drawing up of 
strategic plans. Its interest in the investigation, therefore, was primarily driven by a desire 
for a reflection on their strategic process. 
The strategy process at Ericsson was derived from the scenarios, termed ‘Vision 
& Strategy 2005,’ that consisted of three positions that had been drawn up by headquarters 
in Sweden in response to the convergence of the telecom, computer, and media industry: 
(1) Gran Tradizione, (2) Service Mania, and (3) Up-and-Away. In the Gran Tradizione 
scenario convergence does not occur with consumers clinging on to existing technology. In 
the Service Mania scenario consumers subscribe to interactive service packages that are 
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mainly delivered over the phone. In the Up-and-Away scenario most services are offered 
over the Internet and paid for through advertising. These scenarios were considered to 
involve different business models that showed different patterns of revenue distribution 
across the players in the value chain. Based on the ‘Vision & Strategy 2005’ scenarios an 
intermediate step, wanted-position-2000, was determined in terms of the business, people, 
and structure. Every year a strategic plan, called the ESP (Ericsson Strategic Plan) was 
drawn up that specified how that intermediate step was to be achieved. The strategic plan 
was a yearly exercise that involved employees from all units and levels who supplied 
content related to their unit.  
Part of the investigation consisted of measuring the context in which initiatives 
took place at Ericsson ETM. The environmental turbulence, flexibility, technology, 
structure, and culture were analyzed (Volberda, 1996, 1998; Wielemaker, Elfring, and 
Volberda, 2000; see appendix B). Ericsson ETM showed to be operating in a complex, 
dynamic but fairly predictable environment. Ericsson was fairly flexible with a moderately 
routine technology, a structure that demonstrated both organic and mechanistic elements, 
and a fairly innovative culture. As stated above, all levels were involved in the strategy 
process, which could be described as a consensus model of strategy making. Because ETM 
was mainly a local marketing organization for headquarters in Sweden there were high 
pressures for short-term revenues. Yet, Ericsson ETM was a technology firm, with a strong 
R&D department that worked at an international level. This technology aspect was evident 
in the high amount of interaction with headquarter staff in Sweden and with other local 
subsidiaries in other countries. It is an aspect that would emerge as well in the 
investigation into the initiatives at Ericsson. 
INITIATIVES 
At Ericsson ETM nine initiatives where investigated. Case box 6.1 describes these nine 
initiatives.  
 
 CONVERGENCE THROUGH CONSENSUS  
 111 
CASE BOX 6.1 INITIATIVES AT ERICSSON ETM 
 
Table 7.1: Initiatives at Ericsson Telecommunications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initiative I.  EDI 
The Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) project (appendix j) consisted of the creation of an EDI link between 
Ericsson ETM and the Dutch PTT. PTT had suggested the EDI link in May 1996, because such a link with their 
top 10 suppliers would enable them to manage their operations better. Ericsson ETM tried to postpone the project 
as they were switching over to SAP at the time. Therefore the project was split into two phases. In the first phase 
a stand-alone system was set up at Ericsson ETM and an EDI link was made to the PTT. In September 1997 the 
second phase was to be carried out: Ericsson ETM’s SAP would then be connected directly to PTT’s information 
system. Within ETM this project occurred in a top-down fashion and was developed in a team composed of 
people from logistics, automation, and marketing & sales. 
Initiative II.  Unisource 
Unisource (appendix k) is an alliance between PTT Telecom, Telia (Sweden), the Swiss national telephone 
company and Telefónica (Spain). The latter quit the alliance in the spring of 1997. The alliance was formed to 
protect the home markets of the national telecom operators against new entrants and to build a position on 
international markets. In order for Ericsson to become a supplier for the alliance it set up a project with the same 
name as the alliance: Unisource.  Becoming a supplier to the alliance was considered of strategic importance, as 
Ericsson was already supplier to the alliance’s members. Moreover, the alliance was considered to become a very 
innovative customer, which would benefit Ericsson’s innovative skills. The manager of Ericsson’s Marketing & 
Sales division (division ‘A’), which catered to the former national telecom operator PTT, championed the project. 
He initiated the idea and allocated resources to the initiative.  Integrating it into the organization went smoothly. 
The products required by the alliance showed a close fit with Ericsson’s portfolio. New competencies lay 
specifically in the area of international coordination between the different Ericsson subsidiaries as Unisource 
operated internationally. 
Initiative III.  Strategic Distribution Terminals 
The ‘Strategic Distribution Terminals’ (appendix l) is concerned with the distribution to consumers through 
retailers of mobile phones, also called terminals. With the emergence of a new mobile telecom competitor, 
Libertel, in the Dutch mobile telecommunication market a need arose for a new distribution system of mobile 
phones, other than through the national telecom operator’s shops (Primafoon). Ericsson considered this an 
Initiative Idea Phase Basic process Outcome 
1 Strat. Distr. Term. EDI link with client Integrating Top-down success 
2 Unisource Become supplier for International Alliance Integrating Top-down success 
3 EDI Set up distribution network for mobile phones Integrating Top-down mixed 
4 Glass Box Involve customer in development Integrating Bottom-up success 
5 Cable Dect Telephony over cable via air-DECT technology Integrating Middle/top-down success 
6 Internet Set up Internet business Interpreting Bottom-up ongoing 
7 Unax Ericsson software on non-Ericsson hardware Interpreting Bottom-up ongoing 
8 SDH (2nd phase) Reposition portfolio at lower rather than high end Integrating Bottom-up mixed 
9 Internet Billing Enable charging specific Internet Interpreting Bottom-up ongoing 
10 Telfort (B) Smart card for transactions over the phone Interpreting Top-down ongoing 
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opportunity because at that time mobile phones formed a major part of Ericsson’s worldwide product portfolio. 
On the initiative of Ericsson headquarters’ in Sweden a separate Mobile division was set up at Ericsson ETM that 
was to distribute terminals through various distributors and retail outlets. Because this project was set up in a top-
down fashion, acquiring resources formed no problem. The Mobile division worked in close cooperation with the 
logistics division because the mobile terminal market is much faster and requires much shorter delivery times (24 
hour swap service) than the traditional telecom services. The Mobile phones division was at the time one of the 
‘cash cows’ in the Ericsson portfolio. 
Initiative IV.  Glass Box 
Glass Box (appendix m) was considered an organizational innovation that aimed to make the relation with a 
customer more transparent by getting customers involved in the development of his product. It was thought that 
especially in the case of IT- related-products cooperation with the customer during the development stage would 
facilitate the customization of an IT-system. A customer, the former national telecom operator PTT, passed on the 
idea to Ericsson ETM’s Marketing & Sales division (division ‘A’). The customer’s involvement was high. 
Employees of the former national telecom operator PTT were present at meetings of the steering group and were 
involved in the decision making process. The Glass Box project entailed a mentality shift as the customer was 
now involved in processes that were previously concealed from the customer.  The steering group was considered 
to have provided the necessary support in breaking the resistance that this project encountered. Although the 
Glass box initiative worked out quite well, the knowledge acquired has not been transferred to other projects. 
Initiative V.  Cable Dect 
The Cable Dect project (appendix n) applied DECT (Digital Enhanced Cordless Telephony) technology, normally 
used in the air, to the cable. DECT technology enables receiving a return signal over the coax cable allowing 
telecommunication and other services to occur over the cable. This allows cable operators to provide new services 
that they were previously unable to offer, such as telephony. Some technical experts from the Strategic Business 
Development group initiated the project. They later moved as a business development unit to the New Telecom 
Operator division (division ‘B’), where they continued to pursue the initiative. The New Telecom Operators 
division provides the resources for the continuing development. At the time of the investigation a trial was being 
conducted with an interested potential client. The development of the Cable Dect project is only considered 
possible through the cooperation between Ericsson ETM’s R&D division, and Ericsson subsidiaries in Emmen 
and Enschede. Obtaining commitment from headquarters in Sweden has proven difficult as the project is regarded 
as too nationally specific. 
Initiative VI.  Internet 
Because of the close links between the Internet and telecommunications it was a common belief at Ericsson ETM 
that they had to develop business in this area. The Strategic Business Development group initiated this project 
(appendix o) by identifying opportunities related to the Internet together with people from other units and 
divisions. The outcome was presented to the management team of Ericsson ETM. As result three areas were 
identified: (1) the Internet as a marketing tool, (2) the Internet for internal communication, (3) Ericsson products 
for the Internet. The first two areas were to be covered by the Strategic Business Development group. They, for 
example, created the Ericsson ETM web site and participated in the national Media-Plaza event, which was 
sponsored by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ). The last area, that of providing an overview of Ericsson’s 
Internet products, was carried out by someone from the Marketing & Sales division (division ‘A’). At the time of 
the investigation preliminary results were presented to the Management Team (MT) of Ericsson ETM, but 
resource allocation decisions were still dangling. Current developments in the projects are the results of 
enthusiasts working in their spare time. 
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Initiative VII.  Unax 
The UNAX project (appendix p) seeks to develop a platform that enables using Ericsson software on non-
Ericsson hardware. The development of this product is based on JAVA technology. The direct trigger was that it 
took about half a year to translate Ericsson software into versions that would allow it to be used on non-Ericsson 
hardware. UNAX would do away with the need for translation. It was expected that with UNAX more Ericsson 
software could be sold for use on non-Ericsson hardware. Ericsson ETM’s R&D division paid for the start-up of 
the project. The Management Team (MT) of Ericsson ETM also supported the project. However, there was no 
commitment from headquarters in Sweden as it was considered threatening to Ericsson’s US subsidiary and they 
were afraid that it would cannibalize on existing business. Hence, rather than the envisioned full-blown version a 
mini platform was being built. To speed up the development of that platform and to acquire resources for the 
project a client was sought who would take care of these aspects. 
Initiative VIII.  SDH 
The SDH project (appendix q) represents a new network standard for transmission and control of data in 
telecommunications. The new technology allows the network to operate more intelligently. In case there are any 
malfunctions in the network, the new technology detects the location of the problem and automatically reroutes 
the transmission of data and voice. The SDH initiative aims to commercialize this technological innovation 
through the development of SDH based products for the telecommunications market. The market consisted of 
three levels: (1) the backbone structure, (2) the transit network, and (3) the exit network. Ericsson headquarters 
decided to focus on developing SDH products for the highest level, the backbone structure. However, the 
customers - the operators - preferred to introduce SDH technology in the exit network. This caused the project to 
come to a halt. Nonetheless, the manager of the SDH unit at Ericsson ETM still saw opportunities for the project. 
He gathered support from other local companies of Ericsson as well as from the Management Team (MT) of 
Ericsson ETM and convinced headquarters in Sweden to shift course. With the aid of a partner a new portfolio 
was created consisting of SDH products for the lower exit level. This shift allowed the SDH unit to regain ground 
with its customers but also to acquire some related business. 
Initiative IX.  Internet Billing 
The Internet billing project (appendix r) did somehow not form part of the previously mentioned Internet 
initiative. The idea is to develop a product that offers operators the opportunity to charge Internet users for 
specific forms of Internet usage. A marketing representative working in the New Telecom Operators division 
(division ‘B’) initiated the project. He conceived the idea while working in the Marketing & Sales division 
(division ‘A’). The development of this project, which is purely bottom-up, was moving very slowly. Attempts of 
the initiator to gain support and acquire resources both in the Marketing & Sales division (division ‘A’) and in the 
New Telecom Operators division (division ‘B’) have failed because the idea was not related enough to the 
existing business of these divisions. At the time of investigation it looked as if the project would get developed in 
cooperation with the R&D division of Ericsson ETM because the R&D division considered it to fit with their 
perspective on necessary future competences. Whilst the development continued in a piecemeal manner, a client 
was being sought after who would supply the necessary funding for a more speedy development of the project. 
Initiative X.  Telfort 
The Telfort initiative (appendix s) consisted of two ideas. The first is to become the preferred supplier for Telfort, 
a new telecom operator for the fixed network. The second idea is a technique that would enable financial 
transactions over the fixed phone. Telfort, a potential new competitor on the fixed network, brought the idea to 
use a smart card to route calls over their network.  Because Telfort initially aimed to target the business market a 
system was required that distinguished lucrative phone calls, for example international phone calls, from non-
lucrative phone calls, for example regional phone calls for which Telfort must pay the national telecom operator 
PTT a fee.  During the feasibility study Ericsson ETM discovered that its solution to the parallel transmission of 
voice and data enabled the offering of all kinds of services that could be electronically paid for by the smart card. 
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At the time of investigation the project was in the start-up of its development phase and was in the process of 
becoming a separate unit. Various competencies were to be assembled in this unit: expertise in voice and data 
transmission, smart card technology, financial expertise, and professional project management. Telfort paid for 
the initial feasibility study. Ericsson ETM is seeking participants who can take on the financial risks for the 
upcoming phases because Ericsson ETM only wants to take on responsibility for the technological solutions and 
minimize its risk. 
 
 
The initiatives investigated at Ericsson ETM display distinctive patterns, which we 
describe hereafter in terms of (1) the kinds of ideas they dealt with, (2) the process they 
went through, (3) the impact of the organizational conditions on the initiative’s trajectories, 
and (4) the search for knowledge and resources. 
IDEAS 
Initiatives at Ericsson ETM are (1) mostly not driven by strategy, and (2) are either of an 
organizational or product type. Most initiatives (8 of 10) were solutions to problems or 
issues that customers were faced with. In four cases the ideas came directly from the client: 
EDI, Glass Box, Cable Dect, and Telfort. In two cases, Unax and SDH, the initiatives were 
driven by existence of some problem. In two other cases, Internet and Internet Billing, it 
was employees who had an interest in Internet technology who pushed the idea. There 
were only two initiatives that could be classified as being driven by strategy: Unisource 
and Strategic Distribution Terminals. However, even in these cases the strategy that they 
were based on was a response to market developments. Overall, most initiatives are not 
driven by strategic intent, but represent a response to market developments or problems 
that arose. 
The initiatives are either of the organizational (4 of 10) or product type (6 of 10), 
with no clear preference for either one (see table 7.2). The existence of both types is not 
surprising given Ericsson ETM’s context. Firstly, because global Ericsson products are 
often not directly suitable for the Dutch market, requiring the development of products that 
are specific to this market. The Cable Dect initiative, for example, was to enable telephony 
over the vast cable network in the Netherlands: a situation very different from other 
Ericsson countries. Secondly, because the Dutch market was recently undergoing quite 
some changes - owing to the liberalization of the telecom market - changes in the Ericsson 
ETM organization were necessary. The Strategic Distribution Terminals initiative, for 
example, was about the set up of a complete new unit that was to market mobile phones to 
retailers. This was a result of new mobile operators entering the Dutch market who needed 
a new outlet, next to the shops of the former national monopolist operator, from which 
consumers could purchase mobile phones. Ericsson therefore needed to develop this retail 
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channel from scratch, which required a completely new unit with people that were much 
more marketing oriented than the previous Ericsson employees. 
 
Table 7.2: Initiative idea types at Ericsson ETM 
 
Initiative Stimulus Idea Activities Type 
     
EDI Client EDI link with client Link Ericsson and client’s 
systems 
Organizational 
Unisource Strategy Become supplier for 
International Alliance 
Organize cooperation with 
subsidiaries in other 
countries 
Organizational 
SDT Strategy Set up distribution network  
for mobile phones 
Set up new marketing 
organization 
Organizational 
Glass Box Client Involve customer in 
development 
Co-development with 
customer; remove fear of 
sharing 
Organizational 
Cable Dect Client Enable telephony over the 
cable through air-DECT 
technology 
Find technical solution Product 
Internet Interest/ 
Technology 
Set up Internet business Define Internet activities 
that can be marketed 
Product 
Unax Problem Enabling use of Ericsson 
software on non-Ericsson 
hardware 
Development of Java 
application 
Product 
SDH Problem Reposition portfolio at tower 
rather than high end products 
Create products to sell at 
lower end level 
Product 
Internet 
Billing 
Technology Enable charging specific 
Internet Usage 
Develop technological 
solution 
Product 
Telfort Client Smart card for financial 
transactions over the phone 
Develop technological 
solution 
Product* 
 
* The Telfort project is essentially about offering a new product. However, it is also very organizational in nature 
 as a complete new unit needs to be set up and the entire mode of working at Ericsson needs to be adapted. 
 
PROCESS 
There are two trajectories at Ericsson: a top-down (4 of 10), and a bottom-up (6 of 10) 
trajectory (see table 7.3). It is notable that all the top-down initiatives move smoothly 
across the three phases. It is also notable that most of these top-down initiatives (3 of 4) 
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were organizational in nature: EDI, Unisource, and SDT. As noted in table 7.3, the Telfort 
initiative could also be considered organizational even though it has been categorized as a 
product initiative, because it also involves the setup of a complete new organization. In 
that case all top-down initiatives at Ericsson ETM are of the organizational type.  
The bottom-up trajectories tended to seek approval far up the echelon (see table 7.3) as top 
management at Ericsson ETM was involved in all instances (10 of 10), and headquarters in 
Sweden in a large portion (8 of 10). Nevertheless, this is often in vain because these top 
levels tend to ask for consensus at the lower levels before they will sign on to the initiative. 
The interpretation phase therefore shows to be the phase where initiatives encounter some 
difficulty in getting through. Because of the consensus model quite some time delays occur 
and more radical initiatives tend to be held back. However, once initiatives do pass this 
selection by consensus they are smoothly implemented.  
Linking 
In the linking phase we see that initiatives tend to (1) be driven by non-strategic reasons, 
(2) shop around for necessary competencies, and (3) quickly test the reaction of higher 
echelons all the way to headquarters in Sweden. As previously explained, in this initial 
phase initiatives were not primarily driven by strategic consideration, but rather by a 
problem, client demand, personal interest, or market opportunity. The limited role of 
strategic intention at Ericsson is also echoed in a study by Huzzard where employees were 
asked to restate the companies values (2000: 356), “For example, the 1996 Ericsson 
Annual Report assures us that the company’s shared values consist of professionalism, 
respect, and perseverance (Ericsson, 1996: 15). However, the hollowness of the claim … is 
exposed by the complete failure to recognize them by any of the informants interviewed in 
the paper's empirical investigation. When asked to reply to the question ‘what do you see 
as Ericsson’s common values? The replies forthcoming suggested no incidence of common 
values whatsoever.” At ETM the initiative accounts suggest that people gain ideas because 
of their existing activities, knowledge, or interests rather than because of a certain strategy. 
The linking phase also reveals a search for competencies. Contact with parties 
outside the immediate hierarchy, such as with other subsidiaries (6 of 10) or with an 
outside partner (3 of 10), is particularly made during this phase in order to obtain 
knowledge about competencies that the initiative lacks. The Cable Dect initiative, for 
example, brought in various competencies from other parties; GTI Vitel was contacted for 
knowledge of Cable TV, software firm ICT for their project leadership competence, 
Ericsson Enschede for competence in Dect technology, and Ericsson Emmen for their 
radio knowledge. In many initiatives (see table 7.2) two people play an important role as a 
broker: a business developer (8 of 10) and the R&D manager (5 of 10). These two were 
particularly contacted to check the merits of an idea and to find out where certain 
competencies could be found. Here is why a marketing representative who had an Internet 
billing idea went to the business developer: “Well, because Jacques is always interested in 
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novel things. It is also to sharpen your own teeth. At the time he was also busy with a 
couple of other things for the Internet.” This business developer introduced him to the 
R&D manager where the initiative was developed further. 
 
Table 7.3: Initiative trajectories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Smooth  
implementation 
Major change  
to existing  
business.  
Cooperation  
with many  
outside parties 
1. Glass Box 
2. Cable Dect 
3. SDH 
4. Unax 
5. Internet 
6. Internet Billing 
7. Electronic Data Interchange 
8. Unisource 
9. Strategic Distribution Terminals
10. Telfort 
Smooth  
implementation 
Top 
Middle
Bottom Front-liners 
(Implementers) 
Smooth  
implementation 
Top 
Middle
Bottom 
Top 
Middle
Bottom 
HQ/MT/New Mobile Div. Manager 
Business Manager 
(Prod. champ.)
Marketing 
representative (Implementer)
As soon as the
MT recognized the
need for corrective
action
implementation
went smoothly
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Bus. Man.  
(Prod. champ.) 
Marketing rep’s  (Initiators)
HQ/MT/ 
St. Com. (appr.) 
Div Man. (Spons.) 
Development 
team
Smooth 
implementation. 
Pilot depends 
on client
 
Middle 
Bottom 
Bus. Developer  
(Initiator/Product) 
Bus. Man.  
(Org. champ) 
Marketing rep.’s (implementers) 
Difficulty seeing 
immediate ROI
No clear sponsor 
yet
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
MT/Steering committee (Selector) 
                                  HQ (aware) 
S.B..Dev. / Mark. reps (Init./Prod.Ch.) 
HQ not
cooperative;
project seen as
threatening to
other subsidiary
Mainly done
within R&D
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
R&D Developers (Initiators & Prod.) 
MT/HQ aware of it
R&D Manager (Org. champ) 
Main problem
was getting a
readjustment
of the strategy.
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
MT (Approver) 
          HQ (disapproves) 
Bus. Man.  
(Org. champ)
Marketing reps (Initiators) 
All done in spare 
time and by use 
of slack
Not backed by top
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Mark. rep. (Initiator/product champ.) 
MT (Aware of it)           
R&D dev.
Top 
Middle
Bottom 
Div Man (Org. ch.) / MT appr. 
Mark rep. (Init./product champion) 
1
2
3
4
5
7 
8
9
10 
CEO/MT (Initiators) /  
             Steering group 
Middle managers 
          (Product champ.) 
HQ/Div. manager (Initiator) / 
                 MT/Steering group 
Bus. Man. 
 (Product champ.) 
R&D Manager 
(Discussant.) 
Bus dev.  
(Org. Champ)
R&D Manager  
(Discussant) 
Div. Man/MT/R&D Man (Exec. Ch.) 
                            St. Com. (appr.) 
                                           HQ (aware) 
Bus. Dev. 
(Broker)
R&D manager  
(Org champ)
Bus. Dev.  
(Discussant)
6
Linking Interpreting Integrating Linking Interpreting Integrating 
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In the linking phase initiators tend to contact the upper echelons quite early to test the 
reaction. The management team of Ericsson ETM was contacted in the linking stage by 
every single initiative. Headquarters in Sweden were contacted in the linking stage by 8 of 
10 initiatives; only two initiatives, EDI and Internet Billing, did not do so. However, 
contacting these upper echelons in the linking stage did not result in instant approval by the 
upper echelons. Some initiatives were outright disapproved, as for example the Unax 
initiative, whilst most were sent back for further development and consensus making. 
Interpretation 
The interpretation phase is characterized by (1) the use of a consensus model, (2) the use of 
teams, and to a lesser extent (3) the use of steering committees, and (4) the need for clients 
to get approved. Every single bottom-up initiative mentioned that they were obliged to 
operate according to a consensus model. This meant that the management team would refer 
proposals back to the initiative members with the assignment to obtain consensus amongst 
the most important players before presenting the initiative again. Interviewees never 
suggested that this deteriorated the quality of their proposals; in fact, they often claimed it 
improved them. However, as a business manager explained it caused quite some slow 
down:  “I would say that Ericsson’s culture of consensus has its disadvantages … Basically 
because everyone has their own budget ... See, you have to have consensus and that takes a 
lot of time.” And as a marketing representative explains, it also is detrimental to more 
radical ideas: “The closer the idea is to the current frame of mind of people, and let’s say 
you can do it, then a lot can happen. But if you talk about totally different areas where we 
are not a player yet, then it is a really painful way in this organization. The consensus 
model operates not just at the local subsidiary level but also at the level of the 
headquarters, as is exemplified by a remark of the business manager involved in the SDH 
initiative: “We had to involve our colleagues in Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain because 
we alone were too small and could not influence decision making in Stockholm 
[headquarters]. Because of our alliance we were able to commit Stockholm to a second 
attempt at developing an SDH [lower level] portfolio.”  
The team structure is used in most initiatives (9 of 10) at Ericsson during this 
phase (see table 7.4). All top-down initiatives, not surprisingly, have a formal team 
structure in this phase. Of the six bottom-up initiatives, two already had a formal team 
structure from previous activities - the Glass Box and SDH initiatives -, and three set up an 
informal team structure in this interpretation phase – Internet, Unax, and Internet Billing -.  
Overall the process at Ericsson suggests that initiatives make wide use of team structures, 
be they informal or formal. It is also evident that in many instances (6 of 10) these team 
structures emerge out of weak and strong ties that predated the team. 
During the interpretation phase, about half the initiatives (5 of 10) were faced 
with a steering committee that was installed by the management team to aid them in 
managing the initiative better (see table 7.3). The people on board the steering committee 
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often consisted of specific management team members that had a stake in the initiative, 
either because they were strongly in favor of it, or because they were strongly opposed to 
it. As a strategic staff member explains, these committees were sometimes considered a 
blockade: “At a certain moment, out of nowhere, a steering committee was formed 
consisting of  … and I was to report to them: as a buffer between the management team 
and me. … Quite a nuisance.”  Yet, these steering committees were also appreciated 
because they were more dedicated to the initiative than the management team, and people 
realized that if the committee was convinced, then management team would not pose much 
of a problem.  Overall, the steering committee was considered an administrative 
mechanism that had both positive and negative aspects. 
 
Table 7.4: Initiative form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the fit with the formal strategy – the Ericsson Strategic Plan (ESP) and 
‘wanted position 2000’ – was officially a crucial selection criteria, it was particularly the 
existence of a client that functioned as such in practice. Before presenting proposals to the 
Dedicated team 
To acquire client 
Split off team to 
become new unit
Telfort
Weak ties mark. 
Rep and R&D 
Garage work  
within R&D 
Internet Billing
Existing formal 
Team & subsid. 
Existing formal 
team 
Existing formal 
team 
Team already existed. The 
issue was readjusting strategy SDH
Unax
Inf. gathering 
interest. people 
Informal 
teams Internet
Weak/Strong ties 
between units 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Within 
existing unit
Cooperation with other units  
and subsidiaries Cable Dect
Strong ties 
client – CEO/MT 
Formal project 
team 
Formal project 
team 
EDI
Formal small  
team 
Formal larger 
team 
Separate Mobile
division 
Team intentionally 
grows into new unit 
Strategic
Distribution
Terminals
Linking Interpreting Integrating 
Weak ties 
subsidiaries 
Formal large  
project team 
Formal small 
project team 
Unisource
Team existed for 
previous project 
Existing
team 
Initiative was a correction to an existing 
initiative Existing
team 
Glass Box
Developers  
within R&D 
Informal 
team 
An organizational unit has been  
conceptualized, but it has problems  
materializing 
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management team, initiators made sure that the initiative fit well with the strategy as 
formulated in the Ericsson Strategic Plan (ESP) and in the ‘wanted position 2000.’ 
However, making initiatives fit with the strategy was not much of a problem, because the 
strategic plan was quite broadly framed and consisted of three scenarios. Moreover, the 
ESP plan was written annually and certain projects would just be written into the plan of 
next year. Not surprisingly, the only initiative that was not considered to fit the strategy by 
the interpretation phase was the Internet billing initiative; all other (9 of 10) initiatives 
were considered to fit the official strategy by the end of this phase. Being a local marketing 
organization the administrative criterion that was most relevant at Ericsson ETM was the 
necessity to guarantee a quick return-on-investment. In practice, this implied that a client 
needed to be recruited before selection could occur. As a marketing representative 
explains: “[If this option does not work] then I’ll tie it into an … offer which I have lying 
here worth tens of millions of guilders, and if the client says ‘yes do it,’ then I’ll have the 
space to give it hands and feet … So I think I need customer to get things going.” Similarly 
a business manager explicates: ”How can you do something in a firm with a limited 
budget? Well, besides garage work it also means that you have to do a lot together with 
clients.” Not surprisingly, of the six bottom-up projects three already had a client - Glass 
Box, Cable Dect, and SDH - and three were seeking one - Unax, Internet, and Internet 
Billing. 
Integration 
Those initiatives that enter the integration stage (6 of 10) - SDT, Unisource, EDI, Glass 
Box, Cable Dect, and SDH - are implemented very smoothly. Interviewees confirmed that 
as a result of the consensus model there is agreement amongst all relevant parties 
concerned and that therefore there is no difficulty in implementing the initiative. Besides 
agreement, it is notable that at Ericsson ETM the control systems operate effectively 
during this stage ensuring the implementation of selected projects. Even the transformation 
of two initiatives into an organizational unit or division of the formal Ericsson ETM 
organization is flawless: the Unisource customer axis and the Mobile division. This mirrors 
the expertise that has been built up within Ericsson on acquiring new customers, setting up 
a new customer unit, and rolling out a telecom infrastructure for the new customer. 
APPROVAL 
Approval at Ericsson is very much dependent on obtaining consensus and having a client 
as a sponsor: this ensures approval by the management team. Once that approval is 
obtained, implementation goes smoothly. Organizational initiatives, those that dealt with 
changing something within the Ericsson organization (4 of 10) and who were mostly top-
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down in nature (3 of 4), all clearly required explicit approval (4 of 4). This contrasts with 
the product ideas (6 of 10), which intended on providing a new service or product to the 
market and were mostly bottom-up in nature (5 of 6), where we have a much more diverse 
picture. Two initiatives, Telfort and SDH, obtained explicit approval. Three initiatives 
obtained implicit approval, Unax, Internet, and Internet Billing. One initiative, Cable Dect, 
obtained a clear signal that it needed to find a client as a sponsor. Overall, all the six 
bottom-up projects required a client to obtain approval: Glass Box, Cable Dect, and SDH 
already had a client; Unax, Internet, and Internet Billing were seeking one. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITIONS 
At Ericsson there is a clear shift in organizational conditions from supportive to controlling 
ones across the three phases, with one exception: the consensus model is not supportive 
enough for more radical initiatives and those than require speed. The linking phase is 
supported by various conditions. Firstly, the network of social ties between headquarters, 
various subsidiaries, and units is very helpful in creating opportunities to exchange 
knowledge. In many initiatives we find that people from headquarters were contacted or 
visited the local subsidiary giving presentations and interacting with local employees. 
There were also vast amounts of contacts amongst various Ericsson subsidiaries, 
particularly aided by former colleagues who had made career moves from one unit or 
subsidiary to the other. Secondly, ideas are never terminated by anyone at any level, 
thereby creating an environment that is not hostile to initiatives. All initiatives, even those 
that were not particularly approved, such as the Unax initiative that threatened to 
cannibalize existing business, were told to reformulate or redefine themselves or to gain 
more support, but never were they told that they were off limits. Thirdly, being a very 
technologically oriented company the presence of the business development and R&D unit 
resulted in quite some ‘inventor types’ being available who proved particularly helpful in 
performing a broker role for others. They referred people on to others with the necessary 
competences. 
 The interpretation stage shows a shift from supportive to controlling conditions. 
In this stage the experience with the set up of teams proves a very supportive condition. 
The consensus model and the installment of steering committees is supportive in the sense 
that initiators can always hope of carrying out their initiative so long as they can convince 
others: if not now then later. However, it is controlling in the sense that they filter out 
radical initiatives and those that require speed. Top management’s failure to stick out its 
neck and take charge is unsupportive for these kinds of ideas.  
With the emergence of new telecom operators next to the former national operator 
PTT, Ericsson ETM needed to change its organizational structure from a functional form 
catering a single client to a matrix form catering various clients (see figure 7.1): the so-
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called customer axes (Graetz, 1996; Van Sluijs, 1996; Mulder, 1997). Moreover, Ericsson 
needed to be able to respond more quickly and dedicatedly to the interests of potential new 
operators. It therefore enabled the quick setting up of dedicated teams, specifically in the 
New Telecom Operators division, in order to help the new potential operators, such as 
Libertel, Enertel, and Telfort, acquire licenses and rollout their infrastructure.  This 
transformation has been described by Van Sluijs (1996: 485) as “the structure of the 
Ericsson ETM organization has gone through a drastic change in 1993 in which the classic 
strongly separated hierarchical structure was exchanged for (1) a flat organization with (2) 
clear “interfaces” with external and internal customers, and (3) decentralized 
responsibilities and authorities.”  
The new organizational form of the Ericsson ETM organization has a positive 
effect on the manner in which the initiatives create their own ‘organizational’ form. 
Particularly the use of teams and steering groups stand out. Most initiatives (7 of 10) 
involved the setting up of team structures for the development of the initiative (see table 
7.4). Only three projects, Glass Box, SDH, and Cable Dect did not because they already 
had a team structure or an organizational unit in place that developed the initiative. In the 
linking stage (table 7.4) many initiatives (8 of 10) involved links with strong or weak ties. 
Generally speaking, strong ties would initially be consulted; if the strong ties could not 
help them out, they were referred on to weak ties. Of these strong/weak ties based 
initiatives most (6 of 8) would transform into a team form. This process is exemplified by 
the following remark: 
“Especially in the start-up stage, few people were involved, so financing was not a big deal. 
After that, we went to the Management Team of ETM to ask for additional resources…No one 
is appointed as manager. If we find a client [sponsor], the number of people will grow and the 
organization needs to be more formal and outlined.”  (Division manager) 
 
At Ericsson there were no explicit incentive systems that were in place to motivate 
people to pursue initiatives. However, the one incentive that was mentioned by some, at 
least in the Internet initiative, was that the initiative offered one the chance to pursue a 
(international) career elsewhere in the organization by creating visibility for an employer. 
However, this incentive was mentioned only in the case of the Internet initiative. Overall, 
incentive systems apparently had little influence on bottom- and middle-up initiatives. 
Instead people seemed much more motivated by factors that could be described as intrinsic 
motivators: solving client problems (3 of 5), finding technological solutions that could help 
clients (1 of 5), personal interest (1 of 5). 
As for the administrative system, it exerted its influence mainly in the interpretation 
phase. Another administrative mechanism used for both bottom-up, middle-up, and top 
down projects was the use of steering committee’s (5 of 10) consisting of internal 
stakeholders and at least some management team members (see table 7.3). In the 
integration stage we see that most projects have already been approved, at least partially, 
which is why the members focus on convincing the market rather than the management 
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team per se. Overall the projects display a process in which the control systems are 
tightened along the way, as is exemplified by the following remark: 
“To Ericsson it [the project] was a trial and error process. We gave it a lot of thought before we 
implemented it, but we did not write anything down in procedures and processes. One 
advantage is that you can start much faster and you are very flexible in the way you want to do 
the next step.”  
(Business manager) 
 
At Ericsson the initiatives display a clear division of roles. Generally speaking 
product champions were mainly front-liners and middle managers, whereas the 
organizational champions consisted of the division managers. They often headed the 
steering group and fought for their initiative within the management team meetings. The 
resource owners (Mulder, 1997) were either the same division managers or clients. The 
idea generator and initiator roles could not be attributed to any specific level: all three 
levels were involved in these roles. However, it is notable that most (7 of 10) idea 
generators and initiators were in direct contact with clients, be it at the division (4 of 7), 
business manager (1 of 7), or marketing representative level  (2 of 7). The two that did not 
display this pattern from strong/weak ties to formal teams, merely used the ties for 
obtaining knowledge, as was the case in Cable Dect, or used them to create a larger 
consensus, as was the case in the SDH initiative. 
KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES 
We clearly see a search for knowledge and resources at Ericsson. Only two initiatives, EDI 
and Unax, show a limited need for incorporating new knowledge and are better typified as 
implementation projects. All the rest (8 of 10) involve a search for new knowledge, 
especially during the linking and interpretation stages although not in the integration stage 
(see table 7.3). Although new knowledge is incorporated in the initiatives there is not a 
single initiative that does not build on existing knowledge in Ericsson. As for the 
resources, most initiatives (7 of 10) showed an increase in resource requirements along the 
way (see table 7.3).  This is also exemplified by the following quote: 
When it started to get more body we said we ought to ensure that other divisions start 
contributing because our budget is very limited. I mean, we can give some money but as soon 
as it exceeds the 50.000 guilders you want commitment, other wise you just cannot manage.”  
(Strategic staff unit member) 
 
The investigation stage was financed by [the division]. It is likely that a consortium of 
participants will be needed, consisting of banks and … we are talking 600 million 
guilders…You have to start this project on a large scale to gain acceptance, which requires a 
lot of money.  Ericsson simply cannot invest 600 million guilders … the financial risk had to 
be taken by other participants. 
(Business manager) 
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Particularly upon entry into the integration stage resource demands surged as was 
the case with SDT, Cable Dect, Unax, Internet Billing, and Telfort. Clients form a main 
source for obtaining necessary resources for those initiatives that consists of product ideas 
(4 of 6).  In all these instances obtaining such a client was actually a condition for the 
initiatives to obtain explicit approval. 
 
Figure 7.2: Initiatives at Ericsson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOLLOW-UP 
Ericsson ETM confirmed many of the findings during an in-company presentation and in a 
workshop organized with the other companies participating in the investigation. Ericsson 
ETM particularly recognized the need for more skunk work type settings to allow for more 
radical speedy initiatives that were being held back by the consensus model. They also 
recognized that initiatives focused on the divisional level rather than Ericsson ETM in 
total, because the resource allocation was organized along the divisions. However, they 
explained that they were pondering about the set up of a separate new venture unit to deal 
with these issues. This, they hoped, would also allow for more initiatives that superseded 
the divisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, at Ericsson there are two initiative trajectories: a top-down and bottom-up 
one. The latter trajectory is characterized by a consensus building process, which renders a 
lot of support and ease of integration but also leads to time delays particularly during the 
interpretation process when approval is sought and causes problems for radical initiatives 
to become selected in. Being a technologically focused firm we see much knowledge 
linking activity at Ericsson. Those involved in an initiative easily contact other 
subsidiaries, headquarters or even outside firms for obtaining knowledge. The initiatives at 
Ericsson show an evolution of organizational form, which moves from strong and weak 
ties to an informal and then formal team. The organizational form of Ericsson ETM aids in 
this process, because it resembles a matrix structure in which people are used to setting up 
dedicated teams for acquiring new clients. This expertise is clearly reflected in the setting 
up of initiative teams and the use of various control measures such as tollgates and 
milestones. Incentives seem to have little effect on Ericsson employees other than the 
chance to create more visibility for oneself and thus improve one’s career chances. The 
administrative system operates on the interpretation phase and seems absent in the linking 
and to a lesser extent also in the integration stage. Idea generation, which occurs in the 
linking stage, is based more on the existing knowledge base and activities of the initiators 
than on some formal strategy. Strategic fit is used as an administrative criterion in the 
interpretation stage but because it is so broad fails to function as a selective device. Instead 
the crucial criterion relates to the ROI and is generally covered by having a client sponsor 
the initiative. The managerial roles are fairly straightforward: the product champion is 
mostly a front-liner or middle manager and the organizational champion or resource owner 
is the division manager who often heads a steering committee and fights for the initiative 
within the management team of Ericsson ETM. Particularly notable at Ericsson is that the 
broker role is related to specific people rather than to their level. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Initiatives at KLM Cargo:  
Creative Drift 
This is the third of four empirical chapters in which initiative trajectories are analyzed. 
This third empirical chapter focuses on initiatives within KLM Cargo.  The chapter starts 
by describing the situation at KLM Cargo at the time it was investigated. Then, an 
overview of the initiatives at KLM Cargo is offered. The chapter moves on to analyze and 
describe, on the basis of the theoretical framework, certain patterns that the initiatives 
displayed within KLM Cargo. It ends by summarizing the main conclusions of the initiative 
process within KLM Cargo.  
KLM CARGO 
KLM Cargo, the freight division of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, forms one of the major 
players in the air cargo industry (Volberda, 1998). In 1995, at the time of the investigation, 
KLM Cargo had around 2500 employees (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 2001) and 
transported cargo worth 773 million Euros in revenues with an average occupancy rate of 
70.9 percent (KLM, 1996). As opposed to some other major airlines, such as Lufthansa 
Cargo, KLM’s cargo has always been tightly interwoven with its passenger transport. By 
combining the transport of passengers and cargo, with ratios varying between 60/40 and 
70/30 on combo-aircraft, KLM manages to obtain a higher flight frequency to many 
destinations than if such sharing had not occurred (Nelms, 1996: 53). Although Cargo and 
Passengers share the same resources – the airplanes – since 1991 they are organized as 
separate divisions within KLM. The follow-up of this organizational restructuring was 
reaching its completion when in 1995 the initiatives at KLM were investigated. 
The restructuring process started when KLM realized, as Jacques Ancher, CEO of 
KLM Cargo put it (Nelms, 1998: 165), that, “the airline’s ultimate customers were 
introducing their own repositioning policies [in the air cargo industry]. And if they [the 
customers] were changing we certainly needed to be changing alongside them.” In 1989 
KLM therefore set up a corporate program, ‘Vision'93’, that was to determine KLM’s core 
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business and desired position for the year 1993. As a result, KLM was restructured into 
two divisions: Passenger and Cargo (Volberda, 1998). 
 
Figure 8.1: Organization Structure of KLM Cargo in 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1994 this new division called KLM Cargo launched the ‘Division in 
Transition’ program, which “included not only changes in strategy and structure, but also 
the goal of effecting organizational change throughout the organization (Volberda, 1998: 
266).” No longer did KLM Cargo consider itself as merely a traditional cargo carrier. 
Instead, it perceived itself as a provider of integrated logistics (Volberda, 1998). As 
Jacques Ancher said (Nelms, 1998: 165), “Most carriers tend to stick to traditional 
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business. We decided that that certainly has to be one line of our business, but that there 
will certainly be other lines as well of our business to focus much more on adding value.” 
As Volberda states (1998: 200) “This new strategic schema brought along a very different 
perspective of competitive forces: other logistics providers such as Fedex, United parcel 
Service (UPS), [and] NedLoyd, not the traditional airlines, became their new competitors.” 
To enable this shift to integrated logistics the Cargo division (see figure 8.1) 
restructured in 1995 into a flatter structure in order “to get closer to customers, [to] cut … 
down the bureaucracy, and empower … people to act innovatively and swiftly (Volberda, 
1998; 265).” The traditional cargo operations were grouped in a functional factory 
consisting of three departments: Operations, Sales, and Customer Service (Volberda, 1998; 
Nelms, 1998). Next to this functional factory five semi-autonomous business units were 
also set up for specific product/market combinations: Cargo Service, Airmail Services, IT, 
Logistics Services, and Special Cargo  (Volberda, 1998; Nelms, 1998; KLM, 1996). The 
whole system was aided by seven staff departments (Volberda, 1998). KLM Cargo made 
its managers reapply for management positions, it helped create self-organizing teams in 
the functional factory, and it organized training seminars, interactive workshops, and 
awareness courses (Volberda, 1998: 267). Bouby Grin, KLM Cargo’s director of strategy 
and governance, sums up the new structure as: 
“Lying between the concept of a functional and fictional [virtual] organization with the 
functional being the basic rock solid but thereby very inflexible organization, while the 
‘fictional’ [virtual] organization is totally flexible but has no definite or permanent structure…. 
Units by nature will be much more market oriented and customer focused than functional 
departments; they create more room for entrepreneurial scope and they cope better with erratic 
growth patterns.” (Nelms, 1998: 165) 
 
For KLM Cargo the Division in Transition program represented a radical 
transformation. Volberda (1998: 269) describes the transformation as going “from a rigid 
to an extremely chaotic organizational mode …offering an increasing number of added-
value services to customers (transporting dangerous goods, live animals, or expensive 
paintings), attracting new customers, and providing non-transport related logistic services 
(assembly of components, stock maintenance).” This lead the international Air Cargo 
Association to give KLM Cargo an award in 1998 for being “the first to push the 
boundaries within the industry to a new dimension, [thus] forcing a change and giving air 
logistics a new meaning (Nelms, 1998: 166).” The fundamental nature of the shift is also 
underlined by Jacques Ancher, Executive Vice-President of KLM Cargo (Volberda, 1998: 
61): “Our greatest challenge is to let go; there is no place for a command and control 
culture. We have to prepare for mistakes, and be prepared to learn from them. This 
requires an entirely different mindset to the one we had last year; it demands nothing short 
of fundamental change.” 
 This radical shift, however, did cause some problems or as KLM Cargo’s vice-
president said, “we had some misfortunes, such as trying to develop the new product 
worldwide too quickly (Nelms, 1996: 56).” Volberda (1998) is more specific in stating 
these misfortunes. First, the information systems and the skills of the employees were not 
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ready and suitable for the change. Second, the segmentation of the department into 
functional departments and business units caused “large sequential interdependencies and 
fights about who owns the customer (269).” Third, lower level managers had not been 
involved in the change process and therefore offered much resistance. KLM Cargo took 
corrective action to alleviate these problems such as the creation of a ‘business systems’ 
department, which was responsible for coordinating the departments and units, 
standardizing the service portfolio, focusing the strategic vision, and creating Cargo values 
through a code of conduct (Volberda, 1998). Notwithstanding these corrective measures, 
overall KLM Cargo could still be characterized as quite chaotic at the time of the 
investigation. 
Context measurement 
KLM Cargo wanted to participate in the investigation because it was interested in 
receiving feedback on the effects of the new strategy and reorganization. Before the 
initiatives were investigated, a context measurement was conducted in which KLM Cargo 
was analyzed on the aspects environmental turbulence, flexibility, technology, structure, 
and culture (Joppe, 1995; Volberda, 1996, 1998; Wielemaker, Elfring, and Volberda, 2000; 
see appendix B). Cargo’s environment was found to be complex and dynamic, yet 
somewhat predictable. Cargo showed itself to be fairly flexible with a routine technology, 
quite an organic structure, and a reasonably innovative culture. Translated into the various 
organizational levels KLM Cargo seemed to consist of layers that were still trying to get to 
terms with each other. Whilst top management was busy setting out the strategy for the 
future, middle management was still thinking very much in the old strategic mode and felt 
the top failed to explain this new strategy and did not provide them any clarity. The front-
line felt the top was very conceptually preoccupied, yet out of touch with every day 
operational issues. The newly hired front-liners on the other hand were very enthusiastic 
about top management’s strategic vision, but felt held back by middle management when 
they tried to accomplish changes. 
INITIATIVES 
Similar to Van Ommeren and Ericsson ETM at KLM Cargo nine initiatives where 
investigated. Case box 8.1 describes these nine initiatives below.  
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CASE BOX 8.1 INITIATIVES AT KLM CARGO 
 
 
Table 8.1: Initiatives at KLM Cargo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initiative I.  Cargo Information System 
The Cargo Information System initiative (appendix t) consisted of an electronic presentation of KLM Cargo’s 
commodity products that would enable these standard products to be offered to customers and intermediaries 
through channels that also lye outside existing stores. The first releases consisted of sending floppy disks to all 
sorts of customers. However, the initiative had aimed too much at sophisticated Information technology instead of 
consumer-friendliness. A major issue in the initiative turned out to be the gathering of the necessary data from the 
diverse units that lacked a clear information system. Either the data could not be located, or it was unknown 
which unit owned the data, or units did not want to release the data. These issues have troubled much of the 
development of the initiative and have caused major delays and readjustments to the project. 
Initiative II.  Tracking and Tracing 
The Tracking & Tracing initiative (appendix u) is about obtaining tracking and tracing information and making 
this commercially available to clients. Another aim was to ensure better internal process controls for the 
Operations department.  The top of operations came with the tracking idea, which matched with other ideas at 
Business development on tracing. Initially the project tried to achieve its goal by hooking up internal registration 
systems. However, the data was either not suitable or not obtainable because of the involvement of third parties 
that took care of the handling. Therefore, the initiative shifted to technological means of tracking and tracing 
products. At the time of investigation a small pilot was being conducted as part of the development program. 
There is a strong realization that the system must first prove to work 100% before any implementation can be 
considered. 
Initiative III.  System Profit Management 
Based on the new strategy to move to Integrated Logistics a new management decision support system was 
considered necessary as optimization criteria for the short, middle, and long-term business had changed. 
Moreover, the shift to offering an integrated product rather than merely a transportation service was considered to 
involve many more decisions requiring a management decision support system. The initiative (appendix v) sought 
to set up such a system by the name of ‘System Profit Board.’  Notable is that the top-down initiated project 
involved all functional departments of the factory but none of the business units yet. A demo has already been 
made.  
Initiative Idea Phase Basic process Outcome 
1 Cargo info. System Present Cargo’s offerings electronically to clients Integrating Top-down mixed 
2 Tracking & Tracing Track and trace goods Interpreting Top-down ongoing 
3 System Profit Man. Create Management Decision Support System Integrating Top-down ongoing 
4 Product Portfolio Develop method for dealing with client requests Interpreting Top-down ongoing 
5 Jump start SCU Re(de)fine future position of business unit Interpreting Bottom-up ongoing 
6 NVOCC Decouple cargo space from flights: larger cap. Interpreting Top-down ongoing 
7 Express Offer full logistics in Business Unit Integrating Top-down ongoing 
8 BU-Logistics Provide an Express Product Interpreting Top-down ongoing 
9 E-Status Handle dangerous goods Interpreting Bottom-up ongoing 
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Initiative IV.  Product Development 
The Product Development initiative (appendix w) is about the development of a methodology to translate client 
wishes into a tangible KLM Cargo offering, and is considered essential for the success of the customer-focused 
strategy of KLM Cargo. The project was initiated by Sales who needed to be able to deal better and quicker with 
potential client requests. The project involves almost all units of KLM Cargo and is supported by the System 
Profit Board of KLM Cargo. The idea is that a project group responds to the request of a customer and comes up 
with a solution for how KLM Cargo can best handle it. This would then be put before the System Profit Board for 
approval, and then via Sales proposed to the customer. The initiative was an offspring of the strategy of offering 
value-added services. 
Initiative V.  Jump-start SCU 
This SCU initiative (appendix x) consists of specifying in more detail what operational activities should be 
carried out by the Business Unit SCU instead of by the somewhat overlapping departments of Sales and 
Operations. The initiative seeks to redefine for the longer future in detail the strategic position of the SCU 
business unit. At the time of investigation the initiative could be described as a discussion at the top management 
levels including that of the business unit SCU. The lower levels were not involved yet, as the discussion still 
needed to crystallize more and the unit itself was still heavily involved in the development of Product-Market 
combinations.   
Initiative VI.  NVOCC 
The NVOCC initiative (appendix y) was about the idea that the capacity for freight transport could exceed the 
capacity of KLM’s airplanes by allowing freight to be transported through third parties. Because such a 
decoupling of cargo-space and flights involved obtaining certain transport and cargo licenses the original idea 
was to set up a separate unit for this, called NVOCC: a name reminiscent of the Dutch shipping companies. And 
indeed the initiative obtained a license in the USA. However, owing to KLM’s alliance with Northwest the idea 
changed. No longer was obtaining a pacific network necessary anymore. Instead what remained to be worked out 
was the core of the idea, the decoupling of cargo-space and flights. Although the initiative was generally 
considered as being crucial, at the time of the investigation those involved had difficulty explaining other KLM-
ers what it was all about. 
Initiative VII.  BU-Logistics 
The Bu-Logistics initiative (appendix z) evolved out of the idea that the network offered to customers should be 
world encompassing, therefore larger than the KLM network alone. Moreover, it also sough to offer full logistics 
services. Because these services would conflict with KLM’s existing agents, a separate logistics provider called 
SCS was set up. In practice CSC was not perceived as separate from KLM. Therefore the initiative arose to bring 
it within KLM Cargo as the business unit Logistics.  However, at the time of the investigation the person who was 
put in charge of developing the concept has told management to first specify more clearly what they want out of 
the initiative. 
Initiative VIII.  Express 
The Express initiative (appendix aa) focuses on offering express products to clients.  In order to do so the main 
challenge lies in setting up the appropriate infrastructure. The initiative consist of various subprojects (1) an 
express product for Europe, (2) an intercontinental express product, and (3) a worldwide express product as a 
separate business. The latter is purely conceptual and will probably be carried out in cooperation with existing 
external couriers. The first two form the main purpose of the initiative. The initiative was initiated by the CEO in 
response to a high customer demand for express products. The designated ‘manager express’ through informal 
 CREATIVE DRIFT  
 133 
contacts got the people from different units together that were in one way or another also busy with express 
products. The product is developed in a small team. The project is on target to be implemented provided the 
Passenger division cooperates.  
Initiative IX.  E-Status 
The initiative’s purpose is to obtain a license that allows KLM Cargo to handle the documentation, declaring, 
packaging, and transportation of dangerous goods in the Netherlands (appendix ab). An intern in the firm got the 
idea. Three years later, now a sales representative at KLM Cargo, he and another co-worker are still involved in 
getting the project going. The drive for the project is dependent on these two, as they both feel that the initiative 
would bog down if they quite pursuing it. They have convinced both the business unit manager and the CEO that 
cooperation with an external partner is essential for the obtaining the E-status. At the time of the investigation 
negotiations with that external partner were ongoing. 
 
 
The initiatives investigated at KLM Cargo display distinctive patterns, which we describe 
hereafter in terms of (1) the kinds of ideas they dealt with, (2) the process they went 
through, (3) the impact of the organizational conditions on the initiative’s trajectories, and 
(4) the search for knowledge and resources.  
IDEAS 
Most initiatives at KLM Cargo are (1) of an organizational nature and (2) driven by the 
new strategy and reorganization (see table 8.2). The organizational nature of the initiatives 
(7 out of 9) meant that they focused on changing something in the organization rather than 
on developing an end product or service. Even in the case when initiatives were about the 
offering of a product or service, their focus was still on changing the organization. Because 
KLM Cargo’s organizational processes are often unsuitable for delivering that new product 
or service, initiatives focused on getting the systems in place first, causing it to become 
organizational in nature. The Cargo Information System initiative, for example, wanted to 
present Cargo’s product offering to clients. However, because Cargo’s existing 
information systems did not provide the necessary information, the initiative centered on 
making the existing knowledge in KLM Cargo explicit and available. 
Most initiatives at KLM Cargo were driven by the new Integrated Logistics 
strategy and accompanying reorganization (7 out of 9). The new strategy caused the 
existence of new business units that still required further refining: the BU Logistics 
initiative represents the setup of such a unit, the Jump-start SCU initiative is about the 
longer term strategy of such a new business unit, and the NVOCC initiative moves from 
decoupling Cargo not just from the Passenger division, but from flights as well. The new 
strategy also required new systems and services: the System Profit Management initiative 
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deals with setting up a decision system for initiatives, the Product Development initiative 
is about setting up a system for dealing with client requests, the Tracking and Tracing 
initiative is about setting up a system for tracking goods, and the Cargo Information 
System initiative is about setting up a better internal information system. Clearly, strategy 
rather than the market drives initiatives at KLM Cargo. Only two initiatives were driven by 
the market: a demand for the transport of dangerous goods drove the E-Status initiative and 
a demand for express products drove the Express initiative. 
 
Table 8.2: Initiative idea types at KLM Cargo 
 
 
Initiative Stimulus Idea Activities Type 
     
Cargo 
Information 
System 
Strategy Present Cargo’s offerings 
electronically to clients 
Make Cargo’s knowledge 
explicit 
Organizational 
Tracking and 
Tracing 
Strategy Track and trace goods Set up an infrastructure or 
an information system that 
enables this 
Organizational
* 
System Profit 
Management 
Strategy Create Management  
Decision Support System 
Make decision routines 
and criteria explicit 
Organizational 
Product 
Development 
Strategy/ 
Client 
Develop method for dealing 
with client requests 
Reorganize process to 
enable client request 
handling 
Organizational 
Jump-start  
SCU 
Strategy Re(de)fine future position  
of business unit 
Operationalize corporate 
strategy 
Organizational 
NVOCC Strategy Decouple cargo space from 
flights for larger capacity 
Redefine cargo’s domain Organizational 
BU-Logistics Strategy Offer full logistics in  
Business Unit 
Operationalize corporate 
strategy 
Organizational 
Express Client Provide an Express Product Set up infrastructure Service 
E-Status Client Handle dangerous goods Obtain License for 
transport of dangerous 
goods 
Service 
 
*  Although tracking and tracing also had a non-organizational purpose, namely to offer a tracking and tracing 
service to clients, in essence it first aimed at achieving this for internal operations purposes.  
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Process 
With the initiatives at KLM being clearly strategy driven, they result in initiative 
trajectories that are mostly top-down in nature (see table 8.3, initiatives 1 to 7). Cargo’s top 
is ahead of the rest of the firm in terms of the strategy. Hence, the initiatives, which are 
based on this new strategy, show difficulty getting past the middle level, which is still 
operating in the old strategic mode. The one bottom-up initiative, E-Status, initiated by a 
newly hired front-liner who was enthusiastic about the new strategy (table 8.3, initiative 9), 
also did not get past the middle, confirming the bottleneck nature of the middle layer. 
Quite a number of initiatives (table 8.3, initiatives 5 to 8) therefore evolve into discussions 
between the top and middle levels. If initiatives do get past the middle level, they bump 
into difficulty getting implemented (table 8.3, initiatives 1 to 5). This is because the 
organizational system is either still operating in the old strategic mode with unsuitable 
systems or when it has been reorganized it is still too chaotic.  
 
Table 8.3: Initiative trajectories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basically a  
discussion with top: 
kept secret from  
rest of BU 
Conceptually well 
 thought out, 
Difficulty to  
implement in  
chaotic organization 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Cargo Development 
Cargo Dev..  
(Product champ)
Sales Manager 
  (Implementer)
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Cargo Development (broker)          
Middle manager
Operations
Very planned.
Chao. contxt.
Organization
moves
quicker
than team
thinks poss.
Operations Manager
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Cargo Development 
Sales M. (Prod. champ.) 
Sales M. 
(Implementer)
BU’s don’t play
role yet
Is ahead of
BUs position
Sales M. 
(Initiator.) 
    V.P (Sponsor)
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Difficult integration
expected in chaotic
organization
Cargo Development
Sales M.  
(Prod. champ.)Sales M. 
(Initiator.) 
    SPM Staff Manager 
                    (Sponsor)
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
V P Cargo Development
BU manager
Top 
Middle
Bottom 
Cargo Dev. (INIT.) / V.P Spons. Project not  
embedded 
within 
organization 
Still very vague 
Various owners 
Operations / Sales Manager 
(Prod. Champ.)
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Discussion from 
structure, not from 
needs/ capabilities 
Project vague 
Middle Man. refuses 
Prod. Ch. role 
Various sponsors 
Various middle managers 
(Prod. Champ.)
Cargo Dev. (Initiator) / V.P 
Sponsor
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Smooth
implementation:
just depends
on cooperation
of Pass. division
Straightforward
project
Remains at
a low level
whilst clearly
 fitting
the strategy
Middle management
is bottleneck
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
V.P. (Knows about it) 
BU manager (Weak 
sponsor)
Sales rep. (Initiator/prod. Champ.) 
V.P. (Initiator) 
Manager Express
          (Product 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 1. Express Service 2. Tracking and Tracing 
3. System Profit Board 
4. Product Development 
5. Cargo Information System 
6. NVOCC 
7. BU Logistics 
8. Jump-start SCU 
9. E-Status 
Cargo Dev. (Discussant)
Cargo Dev. (Discussant)            
Linking Interpreting Linking Interpreting
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Linking. Most (7 of 9) ideas are generated at the top levels (see table 8.3), with 
approximately half of those generated by Cargo Development: a unit that develops 
corporate strategy. Not surprisingly, most ideas (7 of 9) are very conceptual in nature as 
well, having been generated on the basis of the corporate strategy (see table 8.2) rather 
than by client suggestions. The BU Logistics initiative exemplifies this conceptual nature 
of the initiatives at Cargo when the project manager says that it “started out as an 
unspecified box with a dotted line in a diagram, which could some day become a unit.”   
When initiators did not belong to the top (2 of 9), they immediately checked with 
that top level, notably with Cargo Development, to see whether their ideas fit in with 
corporate strategy. This was because KLM Cargo typically operated on the basis of 
strategic intent. Corporate strategy formed a reference point for the selection of initiatives. 
Not surprisingly, the unit that took care of corporate strategy – Cargo Development – was 
involved in every single initiative during the linking stage: either as the idea generator, as a 
broker, or as a discussant (see table 8.2). This linking was purely vertical: there was no 
cross-unit linking during this stage that caused any ideas to emerge. This comes as no 
surprise, because ideas were driven by strategy rather than by knowledge sharing or new 
technological possibilities. 
 
Table 8.4: Initiative form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existing Cargo 
Develop. unit 
Existing Cargo 
Develop. unit 
Formal project 
team 
Team is cross-functional 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy Formal project team 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Formal project 
team 
Formal project 
team 
Use of SPM as 
control board 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Formal project 
team 
Use of SPM as 
control board 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Existing Cargo 
Develop. unit 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
An organizational unit has been 
conceptualized, but it has 
problems materializing 
Existing Cargo 
Develop. unit 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Weak/Str. ties 
in hierarchy 
Formal project 
team 
Formal project 
team 
In Chemical  
unit of BU 
In Chemical  
unit of BU 
Cargo Information 
System 
Tracking & Tracing 
System Profit 
Management 
Product 
Development 
Jump-start SCU 
NVOCC 
Express 
BU Logistics 
E-Status 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Linking Interpreting Integrating 
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Interpretation. Once the concepts are born - often strategic in nature - the top 
transfers the initiative to the middle level. The initiative is either operationalized within an 
existing unit (see table 8.4: initiatives 5,6,8,9) or in a project team that is formally installed 
by top management (see table 8.4: initiatives 1,2,3,4,7). From then on, top management - 
in the form a of a body called the System Profit Board - follows the development of the 
initiative from a distance. Because the initiative is already considered to fit with top 
management’s strategy, the initiative focuses on operationalizing the project during the 
interpretation stage.  
At Cargo almost all these teams are formed during the interpreting stage, with one 
team formed during the integrating stage; in none of the cases were any teams formed in 
the linking stage. They typically functioned as operationalizating rather than idea 
generating mechanisms. Although the teams were formal, in the sense that they had 
formally been appointed, only one team started out with a very structured form, namely the 
tracking and tracing initiative. The project leader described the administration of the 
initiative as: “The project has a very clear structure, that is actually acted on. We have 
carefully described within which period certain matters must be dealt with, what has to be 
realized, against what costs, which members, and how reporting should occur.” Such a 
clear structure was also imposed on the Cargo Information System initiative after the initial 
unstructured team proved not to work that well. As the manager of Cargo Development 
said, “I chose for the blue print method so that everyone could see concretely what the 
plans were, what the consequences were, and who should get involved.” The other teams 
were not structured when they started out, but became structured along the way as is 
exemplified by the Express manager: “Cooperation arose through coincidence. Through 
informal contacts we found out who else was busy with an express product and then we 
sought agreement.” If we take into consideration that the Cargo Information Systems team 
also started out less structured, we can conclude that most formal teams (4 of 5) at Cargo 
started without a detailed administrative structure. 
Similarly, all the initiatives that were developed within an existing unit rather than 
within a team were also very unstructured when they started out. As the product champion 
of the NVOCC initiative illustrates: “The roles in the project have not been clearly 
determined, but are instead very vague. The organization [form and administration of the 
initiative] is also very vague.” Whether initiatives are developed within existing units or 
within formally appointed teams, at KLM Cargo there is little administrative structure 
when initiatives start out. The project leader of the NVOCC initiative underscores this 
when she says: “Projects in Cargo are never formal, because project based work is not 
common at Cargo. There is a lot of teamwork but it is more ad-hoc. And we do not need 
any formal team here either.” 
The middle managers, often business managers who have been with KLM Cargo 
over many years, show difficulty understanding what the top intends with a strategy that is 
far reaching. That this strategy is far-reaching is illustrated by the manager of Cargo 
Development when he says: “We do not want to show the world all that we are capable 
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of…There is a lot of magical power in the organization that cannot be made explicit.” 
Because many initiatives are an offspring of this far-reaching strategy, they show difficulty 
getting operationalized by the middle level, which still needs to come to grips with it. As 
the project leader of the NVOCC initiative explains: “The strategy is conceptually very 
good, but it is so complex that nobody can fully grasp how it is to be implemented.” The 
interpretation phase at KLM therefore shows quite some discussions between the middle 
and top in order to understand what management’s intentions are with the initiative. The 
reason people participate in an initiative is because they have been ‘asked’ to manage the 
project and it is judged to be of strategic importance. However, because of a lack of 
understanding between the layers, the middle managers hesitate to act as strong product 
champions. The manager of BU logistics exemplifies this when he says: “I was asked to 
take on the project, but I gave the assignment back. Let them first figure out what it is that 
they actually want.” 
 
Integration. After having come to grips with what the initiative is all about, the initiative 
members move on to detail it in terms of the parties and systems that are to implement it. 
This integrating phase proves to be extremely problematic for the initiatives. Firstly, 
because they are confronted with ‘old’ modes of thinking, systems, and infrastructure, 
which were suitable for the ‘old strategy,’ but not for the initiatives based on the new 
strategy. Secondly, because the units that have been set up on the basis of the new strategy 
lack appropriate control systems and are still too chaotic to ensure effective 
implementation. 
 Corporate strategy is so far ahead of the rest of the organization that this becomes 
problematic when the initiatives that are based on this ‘new’ strategy need to be 
implemented. As explained before, middle management already has great difficulty in 
understanding corporate strategy. Consequently, at the front-line level the problem is even 
larger as the ‘old’ thinking, working practices, and systems are still largely in place, and 
there has been no trickling down of the ‘new’ strategy. One of the Business Unit managers 
describes this as: “There is a hole that exists between the strategic thinking on the one hand 
and the operational thinking on the other hand. There is little in-between.” The product 
champion of NVOCC alternatively says: “Very few people understand the project. This is 
because the project is so abstract and so broad. Many people just do not get the 
possibilities yet.” Except for a lack of understanding, the working practices are out of 
touch and unsuitable for the new strategy, as the Cargo Information System initiative 
exemplifies:  “People are not accustomed to explicitizing knowledge or updating it. And 
the disciplinary handing over of such knowledge was also a problem.” This leads to a 
situation in which initiatives fail to become integrated, or as the NOCC manager says: “We 
have great difficulty in getting this project embedded in the organization and to keep it 
embedded.” 
 Not all the front-line is a fortress of the ‘old’ strategic thinking. New business 
units have been set up from scratch in which newly hired people work the front lines. They 
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are very enthusiastic about the new strategy, but are confronted with an organization that is 
often staffed by middle managers that grew up with the ‘old’ strategy and systems that are 
still very chaotic in nature. These units lack a strong control system that would allow 
effective implementation. The project leader of the Tracking & Tracing initiative expresses 
this as, “The organization wants to move faster than the technology [system] allows.” In 
other words, the strategy-operations mismatch causes initiatives to encounter problems 
when they try to get integrated in the organization. 
APPROVAL 
Because most projects are top-down and strategy driven they have implicit if not explicit 
top management approval from the start. However, they need to acquire legitimacy at the 
middle and bottom levels for them to get approved and adopted by those levels. To enable 
that, they need to develop their knowledge further by operationalizing it. Their main 
problem, however, is that there are no incentives for lower levels to sponsor the initiative 
and subsequently adapt their systems. Hence, the initiatives lack the implementation 
systems that would allow them to be ‘approved’ by the lower levels. Hence, although top 
management approves most initiatives implicitly or explicitly, the initiatives have a 
problem gaining approval at the lower levels. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITIONS 
The organizational conditions at Cargo are such that they do not support entrepreneurial 
behavior at the middle and lower levels, even though they have been intended to achieve 
just that. Firstly, because rather than being stimulated by corporate strategy the middle and 
lower levels have become dependent on top management explaining them the strategy and 
whether their ideas fit in. Secondly, the lack of controls with respect to the organizational 
systems has created a setting that does not allow for the development and implementation 
of ideas. This situation in which top management controls heavily in terms of the strategy, 
but abstains from control in terms of the systems has been very unsupportive for 
entrepreneurial activity, which is therefore limited to the top with the exception of a few 
newly hired front-line employees. 
 Cargo’s strategic intent limits rather than stimulates employees at lower and 
middle levels. The strategy that has resulted from the “Division in Transition” program is 
considered somewhat “holy” and regarded as coming from above. The lower levels have 
not caught up with this strategy, they do not understand it, and it is therefore very hard for 
them to participate. The few that do understand it, such as the newly hired front-liners who 
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previously worked for logistics companies, have difficulty getting past the middle. A level 
that still stems from the ‘old’ strategy and is not in tune with the ‘new’ strategy. As one of 
them says: “It would be handy if we could take this directly to top management instead of 
having to go through the Business Unit manager. That would decrease the amount of time 
involved.” The intentionality of the strategy is so strong that everyone who does have an 
idea immediately checks its strategic fit with the Cargo strategy department. In this sense, 
the strategy is still very controlling with respect to any ideas that might float.  
Whereas there is much organizational control, it limits itself to the strategy 
process and excludes any control over the firm’s administrative systems. Cargo’s 
management purposely did not introduce such a strong command and control structure 
(Nelms, 1998), because that they felt that such a control system would disempower 
employees. Consequently, Cargo did much to stimulate entrepreneurial behavior: flattening 
the organizational structure, diminishing the bureaucracy, and empowering people 
(Volberda, 1998). Ironically, it is exactly the lack of a control system that has become 
unsupportive for entrepreneurial behavior. Initiatives dropped flat on a system that lacked 
any implementation systems; the organization constituted no soil for initiatives to 
germinate in. Even the team structures, which might seem more supportive for initiatives, 
were chaotic in nature as is illustrated by various remarks. The Sales manager said: 
“Although working in teams occurs, these are not well-defined project structures.” A sales 
representative said: “There are no clear and fixed roles.”  And the project leader of the 
Product development initiative said: “Cooperative procedures have not been documented.” 
Overall, Cargo with its chaotic form and weak administrative control system provided a 
context that was oversupportive for those pursuing an initiative.  
KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES 
As expected, the initial stage of the initiative process at KLM Cargo concentrates on 
forming the knowledge base. This knowledge base is very conceptual in nature and 
emanates from or via the Cargo Development unit to the rest of the organization. Because 
the initiative comes with this ‘corporate’ blessing, the initiative does not focus on 
acquiring resources in the next stages, taking it for granted instead, but concentrates on 
operationalizing the knowledge base in order to gain legitimacy. However, because the 
operationalization requires the cooperation of the middle and lower levels and the use of an 
effective administrative system, the knowledge development halts. 
The initiatives’ knowledge base starts out at a very broad conceptual level, in part 
because most initiatives are based on the conceptual strategy that resulted from the 
‘Division in Transition’ program. The Business Unit manager illustrates this when he 
describes the BU Logistics initiative: “It started as an empty organizational unit in may 
1994. Beforehand it was an unspecified box with a dotted line in the organizational 
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diagram, which might some day evolve into a unit.” Development of the initiatives’ 
conceptual knowledge base was thus very much tied to the Cargo Development unit, which 
set up the ‘new’ strategy. Because, the knowledge is so conceptual and so much based on a 
single source - Cargo Development - there is no cross-linking to other units. The only 
linking is a vertical one to the Cargo Development unit, to check the strategic fit. 
 
Figure 8.2: Initiatives at KLM Cargo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because Cargo’s top management is so strongly involved from the beginning, 
blessing most initiatives from the start, the initiatives’ pursuit focuses not so much on 
acquiring resources but on acquiring legitimacy. To achieve that, the initiative needs to 
operationalize the broad conceptual knowledge into more practically applicable 
knowledge. As Cargo delivers services rather than products, practical knowledge refers to 
operational rather than technological knowledge. Therefore, the search initially focuses on 
finding people who understand the concept. As the manager of the Express initiative says: 
“through informal contacts it became clear who were also busy with an express product 
and in that way cooperation was sought.” Gaining the necessary understanding proves to 
be difficult as is evidenced by the discussions that many initiatives get into (see table 8.2). 
If the understanding does arise, the next challenge is to transform the conceptual into 
operational knowledge. This proves to be the main stumbling block at Cargo, because the 
existing operational systems, i.e. the control systems, are very weak and not suited for 
these initiatives. Since the knowledge creating process comes to a halt, so does acquiring 
the necessary legitimacy. The initiative therefore also fails to obtain the funds that it could 
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have counted on obtaining had it been able to operationalize the originally so conceptual 
knowledge. 
FOLLOW-UP 
In a workshop organized for all the participating firms in the investigation, KLM Cargo 
confirmed many of the above findings, but stressed that the situation at the time of the 
investigation concerned the initial implementation of the “Division in Transition” change 
program, a phase that was concerned with constructing the main strategy and structure. 
The set-up of the appropriate systems was considered to naturally follow this chaotic 
phase. And indeed, during our investigation KLM Cargo was already moving to a less 
chaotic context, as was clear from the context measurement. On top of this, Cargo’s 
management also took corrective measures to alleviate problems that arose as a result of 
the change program and that affected the initiatives negatively. 
The corrective measures had already been set in motion at the time of our 
investigation. Business Systems had already been set up to improve the coordination 
between the different units and departments. The System Profit Board initiative was being 
set up to improve decision making on initiatives. As the project manager explains this 
included the set up of criteria and rules that were up to then still lacking: “people find it 
difficult to accept that the way in which we work is going to change… The discussion 
shifts from a deliberation about the outcome of a decision to the criteria and rules by which 
a decision is to be taken. The output is then a given. There can be no deliberation about 
that anymore. This objectivity is quite difficult for some people.” Management also took 
more time (Nelms, 1996) in explaining the ‘new’ strategy to the rest of the organization, as 
the initiative investigation had shown that particularly the middle level formed a bottleneck 
for the trickling down of the strategy. Overall, it seemed that many of the problems that the 
initiatives had countered, were being dealt with in the aftermath of the change program, 
although these changes had not been implemented yet at the time of the investigation.   
CONCLUSION 
Overall, KLM Cargo’s initiatives seem fairly radical and ambitious in the sense that they 
are based on a strategy that is considered far-reaching in the air cargo industry. Almost all 
initiatives emanate from the top through the strategy unit, namely the Cargo Development 
unit, showing the strategy process to be very intentional. This ambitious strategy resulted 
in an extremely broad knowledge base, but without the depth needed, resulting in a chaotic 
situation. This is confirmed by the limited amount of bottom-up ideas. The middle level 
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has a hard time interconnecting the top and bottom because of the large discrepancy 
between the visionary strategy of the top and the down-to-earth bottom. Cargo’s 
organizational conditions are oversupportive for the initiative process. Firstly, because the 
strategy is so ambitious that it is not understood by the lower levels and therefore fails to 
stimulate initiative. Secondly, because the weak control system creates an oversupportive 
context for the initiative to be created. At Cargo, because of the corporate blessing of 
initiatives from the start, the initiative concentrates on developing knowledge rather than 
on acquiring resources. However, the quest to operationalize the very conceptual 
knowledge into operational knowledge proves to be a bridge too far for most initiatives. 
First, they must overcome resistance to the ‘new’ strategy on which they are based. 
Second, they bump into a weak control system that fails to aid implementation of 
initiatives. The latter was an insurmountable challenge at the time of the investigation. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Comparing Co-evolutionary Patterns  
A Cross-Case Comparison of Initiatives 
Whereas the previous empirical chapters focused on initiatives within each separate firm - 
Van Ommeren tank storage, Ericsson ETM, and KLM Cargo - this chapter focuses on 
comparing initiatives across the three firms. The chapter starts with describing the major 
differences between the three firms in terms of their initiative trajectories. Then three ways 
for explaining these differences are discussed. First, the conditioning view is considered. It 
attributes differences in initiative trajectories to different sets of organizational conditions 
in the context of these initiatives.  Second, the knowledge-creating view is discussed. It 
ascribes differences to the way in which the processes are managed content-wise. Third, 
the chapter reflects on the co-evolutionary view, which draws on the conditioning and 
knowledge creating views. This view attributes differences to the interplay between 
organizational conditions and the knowledge-creating process. The discussion of the three 
views is accompanied by revisiting the propositions that were formulated at the beginning 
of the study. The chapter ends by offering conclusions. 
INITIATIVES 
When all the individual initiative patterns within each firm (Tables 6.3, 7.3 and 8.3 as well 
as appendices C to AB) are aggregated together, we arrive at an overall general initiative 
pattern for each firm. Although this is, of course, a simplification of reality, it allows us to 
more clearly see the difference in the general trajectories of initiatives across the three 
firms. The initiatives in each of the three firms clearly display such a distinct trajectory 
pattern (see figure 9.1): (1) Van Ommeren showed a middle/top-down trajectory, (2) 
Ericsson shows both a top-down and a bottom-up trajectory, and (3) KLM Cargo shows a 
trajectory in which initiatives remain stuck at either the top or the bottom level.  
At Van Ommeren Tank Storage the initiatives showed a middle/top-down 
trajectory. Only in the initial linking phase did we see that other levels are allowed to 
contribute, for example by means of the idea sharing “Stradivarius” meeting. However, in 
practice this role was limited to middle management, because they possessed the necessary 
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personal links with the board. Not surprisingly, the initiatives that were proposed at Van 
Ommeren were much less inventive than they were at the other two firms. Once the ideas 
were in the open, they were immediately subject to the centralized decision making 
system. The initiative was then passed on down the hierarchy to be developed and 
implemented. Although, as opposed to the other two firms idea generation was problematic 
at Van Ommeren, their development and integration occurred very smoothly. 
 
Figure 9.1: Initiative trajectories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 At Ericsson Telecommunications there are two basic initiative trajectories: a top-
down one, and a bottom-up one. Compared to Van Ommeren there is clearly more room 
for bottom-up processes to occur and the front-line level is also much more involved in the 
entire initiative process. Bottom-up idea generation is stimulated by the constant 
interaction that exists with other departments, subsidiaries, and headquarters, by the 
involvement of employees in the strategy process, the ease of setting up teams, and the 
presence of innovative units. The latter function as sounding boards for people who 
wonder around with ideas and they consist of various business-development units and the 
R&D department. They embody creativeness and expertise and function as brokers by 
referring initiators to others elsewhere who posses necessary knowledge. Because the 
initiatives are not subject to an instant centralized selection but to one of consensus, they 
have more time to refine themselves and acquire support in order to be selected in. This, of 
course, comes at a cost in terms of speed and radical nature. Yet once they have been 
selected by consensus, they are fully backed. Similar to Van Ommeren, the integration of 
the initiative proceeds very smoothly. 
 At KLM Cargo there are also two trajectories, yet very different from the ones at 
the other two firms: a trajectory in which initiatives remain at the top level and one in 
which they remain at the bottom level. These single-level trajectories are the result of 
middle management not functioning as a vertical integrator, thus constituting a bottleneck 
for vertical communication. This is in part because middle management, who largely stems 
from the “old” organization, finds the corporate strategy and initiatives too complex to 
grasp. Thus, corporate strategy remains at the top and does not trickle down. Similarly, 
middle management does not pass on the initiatives that exist amongst the newly hired 
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front-liners that are motivated by the strategy. Even though middle management and parts 
of the operational work force find it hard to grasp the new corporate strategy, at KLM 
initiatives of a much more inventive nature are generated than was the case at the other two 
firms. In contrast, the integration phase reveals to be problematic because the necessary 
resources and knowledge cannot be acquired. Middle management’s bottleneck nature 
exacerbates the problem even more during this phase. The chaotic loose structure and lack 
of controls leads to a lack of coordination amongst different units and a lack of decision-
making that is necessary to carry out the initiatives. 
THE CONDITIONING VIEW 
The organizational conditions of the three firms vary from (1) controlling for Van 
Ommeren, to (2) a mixture of supportive and controlling for Ericsson ETM, and to (3) 
oversupportive for KLM Cargo (see table 9.1). According to the conditioning view, it is 
these different sets of organizational conditions that result in different initiative-
trajectories. 
 
Table 9.1: Case Comparison according to the Conditioning View 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Van Ommeren Tank Storage’s organizational conditions characterized as having a 
control focus, certainly in the phases after the initial linking phase. This was first of all 
exemplified by the hierarchical form in which initiatives showed very little cross unit 
activity; they were instead mainly developed within existing units. The hierarchical 
distance was such that front-liners had little contact with the board; only middle 
management had personal contacts with the top level. The control focus was also 
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illustrated by the strongly centralized decision-making system for evaluating and 
implementing initiatives. This was accompanied by an administrative system that can be 
described as one of strong steering. Every initiative needed to pass through and obtain the 
approval of the management and supervisory board. The only exception to this control 
focus existed in the linking phase, where the management set up a meeting, Stradivarius, in 
order to stimulate the generation and sharing of initiatives amongst employees. Yet in this 
meeting it was only middle management that was engaged in initiative initiation and even 
they immediately focused their attention on the board in order to influence the centralized 
decision-making system. 
At Ericsson Telecommunications the organizational conditions are more a 
mixture of supporting and controlling conditions than was the case at Van Ommeren. Now 
it is not only the linking but also the interpretation phase that has supportive conditions; 
only the integration phase has controlling conditions. Various aspects illustrate this 
environment that is mixed supportive and controlling. First of all, the matrix form with its 
use of teams to acquire new clients or develop new products enabled cross-unit ties and the 
setup of initiative teams. Accordingly, the hierarchical distance between the front-line and 
the top levels was quite low, with front-liners often dropping in to the CEO’s office to 
convey their ideas. At Ericsson ETM there was also a climate of interchange with people 
from headquarters or other subsidiaries. They gave presentations for anyone interested to 
attend and functioned as brokers for those with ideas. As for the administrative system this 
could be described as one of moderate steering. Although there were strategic plans with 
targets and budgets, people from all levels and units had been involved in scenario-
planning sessions as well as in the write-up of the Ericsson Strategic Plan (ESP). Also, 
management would not control decision-making, but would instead leave it to the initiators 
to reach consensus with their peers, allowing top management to function as motivators. 
As opposed to the generally supportive conditions in the first two phases, the integration 
phase shows a strong control focus. Once initiatives have been selected they are subject to 
the clear project control measures used at Ericsson, which entail the use of milestones, 
tollgates, and pilots. This is not surprising given that Ericsson ETM is a subsidiary, which 
is experienced in rolling out telecommunications infrastructure. 
 KLM Cargo’s organizational conditions have the strongest support focus of all the 
three firms, thus lying at the opposite end of the spectrum from Van Ommeren. This 
support focus remains effective across all the three phases that the initiatives flow through. 
Various aspects exemplify this support focus. The organizational form can be described as 
loosely coupled. It exists of units with activities that have been envisioned on the basis of 
corporate strategy, of which some are in the process of being set up whilst others still only 
exist on paper. Although the strategy has been devised top-down at corporate levels, top 
management purposely refrains from installing control measures believing that the 
empowerment of employees is necessary to create a more responsible work force. Certain 
units are thus not more than boxes on a piece of paper waiting for employees to take 
charge of setting them up. The administrative system, which can be described as one of 
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weak steering, causes KLM Cargo to be of a chaotic nature, something that is lamented by 
many employees who feel a loss of direction. This chaotic nature is stressed by the lack of 
vertical integration, in which middle management blocks vertical communication. Yet, 
corporate management feels this ambiguous state, in which there is a lack of controls, as 
necessary for bringing about a more initiative-taking work force. Certainly the newly hired 
employees are particularly motivated by this attitude. 
Revisiting proposition 1 
The conditioning view leads to propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c (See figure 9.2). Proposition 1a 
stated that firms with controlling organizational conditions in the retention phase have 
better implementation. Proposition 1b stated that firms with supportive organizational 
conditions in the variation phase have better idea generation. And proposition 1c stated 
that firms that shift from supportive organizational conditions in the variation phase to 
controlling ones in the retention phase have better overall generation and implementation 
of ideas.   
 
Figure 9.2: Revisiting proposition 1 
 
Proposition 1a:  Firms that provide controlling, rather than supportive, organizational conditions 
in the retention phase of initiatives show better implementation of initiatives. 
 
Proposition 1b:  Firms that provide supportive, rather than controlling, organizational conditions 
in the variation phase of initiatives show better generation of initiatives. 
 
Proposition 1c:  Firms that provide supportive organizational conditions in the variation phase of 
initiatives and controlling ones in the retention phase of initiatives show better 
overall generation and implementation of initiatives. 
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Translated to the three firms these three propositions lead to certain expectations. 
First (1a), one would suppose that Van Ommeren, with the most controlling conditions in 
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the retention phase, would be best at implementing ideas but would in turn find it 
problematic to generate innovative36 ideas because it also has controlling conditions in the 
variation phase. Second (1b), that KLM, with the most supportive conditions in the 
variation phase, would generate the most innovative ideas but would find it problematic to 
effectuate them, because it also has supportive conditions in the retention phase. Third 
(1c), that Ericsson ETM would have the best throughput of ideas from the variation to the 
retention phase, with the ideas being more innovative than at Van Ommeren yet less than 
at KLM Cargo. This because it has supportive conditions in the variation phase and 
controlling ones in the retention phase.    
Comparing the three firms (see table 9.1), the data indeed provides support for the 
three propositions of the conditioning view. KLM Cargo, for example, with the most 
supportive conditions in the variation phase has the most innovative initiatives. Van 
Ommeren, on the other hand, with the most controlling conditions in the retention phase 
showed to be much better at implementing ideas than KLM Cargo. Ericsson ETM with 
conditions shifting from supportive to controlling, displays the best throughput. Compared 
with Van Ommeren its ideas are more innovative, although compared with KLM they are 
less innovative. Yet in the latter case, they get implemented smoothly as opposed to those 
of KLM Cargo. 
 
Figure 9.3 The Outcome versus Organizational Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 In this chapter Innovative is used purely in the sense of being inventive ( not in the sense of implementing). 
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By depicting the data in a graph (see figure 9.3) we can detect these patterns more 
clearly. The x-axis shows the organizational conditions ranging from controlling to 
supportive conditions. Thus Van Ommeren, with the most controlling (supportive-
controlling-controlling) conditions, was situated most to the left. Ericsson, with mixed 
supportive/controlling (supportive-supportive-controlling) conditions, is situated to the 
right of Van Ommeren. KLM Cargo, with the most supportive (supportive-supportive-
supportive) conditions, is located on the far right. On the y-axis various aspects of the 
initiatives that were mentioned in the propositions have been depicted: the innovativeness 
(better idea generation) and better implementation. 
The implementation of the initiatives was coded as smooth and quick (value 2), 
smooth but slow (value 1), and problematic (value 0). The initiatives of all the three firms 
were coded by three different researchers (of a different research team) with an intercoder 
reliability of 77%. The implementation was best at Van Ommeren (1.8), then Ericsson 
(1.4), and worst at KLM Cargo (0.5). This sequence coincides with a decrease in 
controlling conditions and thus provides support for proposition 1a, which states that 
controlling conditions are best suited for implementing initiatives. 
The innovativeness of the initiatives was coded by assigning a value of 0 to no, 1 
to limited, 2 to new, and 3 to radically new knowledge. The same coders that coded the 
implementation coded this aspect as well with an intercoder reliability of 80%. We see that 
the innovativeness of the initiatives increases if they occur in more supportive conditions: 
0.8 for Van Ommeren, 1.5 for Ericsson, and 1.9 for KLM Cargo. This finding provides 
support for proposition 1b: supportive conditions result in better (in terms of 
innovativeness) idea generation.  
The throughput of initiatives is a measure for the overall process. It has not been 
measured, because that would have required a complex weighing of the importance of 
innovativeness versus implementation. Yet, by looking at the three firms it is immediately 
clear that Ericsson scores best on the throughput. Notwithstanding that KLM Cargo's ideas 
are innovative, it fails to accomplish a reasonable throughput because the implementation 
is problematic. Compared to Van Ommeren, Ericsson also has a smooth implementation 
process (although much slower), but outperforms Van Ommeren in innovativeness (1.8 
instead of 0.5). With Ericsson being the firm that shifts from supportive (in the linking and 
interpreting stage) to controlling (in the integrating stage) conditions, it supports 
proposition 1c. 
 
Overall, the data provides support for the conditioning view, which attributes differences 
in initiative trajectories to differences in organizational conditions of the firms in which the 
initiatives are situated. Supportive conditions are considered beneficial for idea generation. 
This is exemplified by the KLM Cargo case, which is the case with the most supportive 
conditions and the most innovative initiatives. Controlling conditions are considered 
beneficial for idea implementation. This is exemplified by the Van Ommeren case, which 
is the case with most controlling conditions and the smoothest and quickest 
COMPARING CO-EVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS 
152 
implementation of initiatives. The best throughput is considered to be obtained by shifting 
from supportive conditions in the initial stages to controlling conditions in the final stages 
of the initiative process. This is exemplified by the Ericsson case, which is the firm that 
shifts from supportive conditions in the linking and interpreting stages, to controlling 
conditions in the integrating stages.     
THE KNOWLEDGE -CREATING VIEW 
That initiatives show different trajectories is, according to the knowledge-creating view, 
particularly the result of internal idiosyncrasies, i.e. a result of variations in the knowledge 
base, form, administration, and roles of the initiatives themselves. According to the 
knowledge-creating view it is these internal variations, rather than external organizational 
conditions, that explain the different trajectories that exist. In this view, one expects not 
only to find differences amongst the three firms - as external conditions will inevitably 
impact internal aspects - but also between different kinds of initiatives. Below we therefore 
not only focus on interfirm differences but also between different types of initiatives. 
Knowledge base 
Table 9.2: Case Comparison according to the Knowledge-Creating View 
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In the knowledge-creating view the main task of initiatives is to build up a 
knowledge base of their own during their life span. The knowledge base that is built up 
stems from prior knowledge, other specialist knowledge, and integrative knowledge that 
spans the two. The availability of these kinds of knowledge explains the distinct initiative 
patterns present in the three firms (see table 9.2). 
At KLM, with its visionary plans, there existed a very broad integrative 
knowledge that embarked on new domains previously unknown to KLM and the airline 
industry at large. In fact, the corporate strategy was so far reaching that many KLM Cargo 
employees found it difficult to grasp it themselves. Nevertheless, as a result of the far-
reaching strategy, the knowledge content created in the initiatives at KLM Cargo was 
much more innovative than at the other two firms. However, because the new areas were 
so unchartered there was a lack of prior knowledge. The actual integration of knowledge in 
the integration stage thus proved to be problematic because there was no prior knowledge 
from which to bridge to other specialist knowledge. Hence, at KLM the horizontal 
knowledge flows were thus hindered by the absence of vertical knowledge flows. As such 
initiatives remained very much in the concept stage, failing to translate into tangible 
outcomes. 
 
Figure 9.4 Initiative Relation to Strategy  
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integrated, because it was closely related to the prior knowledge. Because Van Ommeren 
already had a lot of marketing knowledge, the amount of new knowledge acquired was 
thus limited. Consequently, this resulted in few innovative ideas being born and most 
knowledge flows being exclusively vertical. The lack of broad integrative knowledge 
explains the lack of cooperation with outside partners, but also makes it clear that because 
the knowledge areas are so interrelated, integration was not an issue at Van Ommeren. 
Ericsson represents a mixture of the above two firms in that both broad integrative 
and specialist knowledge are present. Being a technological firm there is much prior 
knowledge within the firm. This technological focus is underlined by the presence of the 
large R&D department in Ericsson. Simultaneously the firm, perhaps because of its links 
with other subsidiaries and the involvement of employees in scenario planning and the set 
up of the strategic plan, possesses much integrative knowledge, much broader than Van 
Ommeren albeit somewhat less broad than KLM Cargo. Because the specialist knowledge 
that is required is often located in other units, subsidiaries, or even outside companies, a lot 
of knowledge sharing occurs with these units. Ericsson thus possesses a mixture of 
horizontal and vertical knowledge flows that enable it, much better than the other two 
firms, to develop its knowledge base. 
It is also interesting to see how the build-up of the knowledge base gets triggered 
in the first place. We see that in the initial linking phase strategy mattered to the initiative 
in 48% of the cases (see figure 9.4). In other words, about half the initiatives were driven 
by strategic and the other half by non-strategic reasons, mostly by a problem encountered 
or a client request. In the interpreting phase, when the selection is made, we see that 
strategy mattered to a much higher extent, namely in 76% of the cases. When comparing 
the three firms it is evident that the role of strategy differs amongst them. At KLM Cargo 
strategy motivated most initiatives as 78% of all cases were related to the strategy in the 
initial linking phase. At Van Ommeren about half the initiatives were strategically 
motivated. Ericsson ETM stands out amongst the three as only 20% were driven by 
strategic considerations in the first phase. Overall, we can conclude (1) that strategy 
matters more in the selection of initiatives than in their initiation, and (2) that idea 
generation is triggered both by strategic and non-strategic considerations. 
Initiative form 
In order to create knowledge certain forms are required during the process. The 
knowledge-creating view assumes that the organizational form of an initiative formalizes 
during the course of an initiative. This was expressed in assumption 2d, which stated that 
initiatives move from an informal structure in the linking phase to a formal hierarchical 
structure in the retention phase. In other words, in terms of formalization it was expected 
that the initiative would transform from an initial non-team form, to an informal team 
form, then to a formal team, and then eventually to a separate unit. If we attribute an 
increasing score to each - with the non-team form being 0, the informal team as 1, the 
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formal team as 2, and the separate unit as 3 - we can depict the general pattern of the 
development of organizational form within the initiatives themselves (see figure 9.5). 
  
Figure 9.5 Initiative Form over Time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From figure 9.5 it is clear that all initiatives on average formalize their 
organizational form during their life span. The same goes for the three firms individually; 
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linking stage at Ericsson, where we would expect less formalization, are due to the fact that 
quite some initiatives (4 of 10) at Ericsson emanated from existing projects, which were 
already organized as formal teams. During the interpreting stage Van Ommeren showed 
lower formalization scores. This is explained by the centralized decision-making system at 
Van Ommeren that did not stimulate team formation, even in an informal manner, before 
the board selected the initiative. The other two firms, Ericsson and KLM, show a more 
linear patter of formalization during the life span of initiatives. Hence, assumption 2d on 
the formalization of the initiative form seems plausible. The formalization data is in line 
with the finding that almost all initiatives (19 of the 25, see appendix C) started out with an 
idea before a team was formed. Clearly, in these firms ideas preceded teams. This 
suggests, in these firms at least, that teams served not as mechanisms of idea generation 
but as vehicles for knowledge integration. 
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Initiative administration 
In order to manage the initiative process the knowledge-creating view assumes that the 
initiative must set up an administrative system of its own. Over the course of an initiative 
the knowledge-creating view assumed that the build-up of such an administrative system 
would increase. This was expressed in assumption 2e, which stated that initiatives move 
from the absence of any administration in the linking phase to the use of its own 
administration in the retention phase. In other words, the initiative was assumed to move 
from no procedures to the use of procedures, and simultaneously from no control, to 
management control, and then self-control. By attributing metrics to this sequence (no 
procedures 0, procedures 1; no control 0, management control 1, self control 2), the 
general pattern of the development of the administrative system of the initiative can be 
depicted (see figure 9.6). 
 
Figure 9.6 Initiative Administration over Time  
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Van Ommeren. In terms of variance, it is notable that Ericsson and KLM have more 
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administrative system in the initial stage. This is in line with the finding that management 
had a strong control focus at Van Ommeren. 
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Initiative roles 
In the various sorts of trajectories (see table 9.2) - be they top-down (12), middle-up (5), or 
bottom-up (8) – there are various roles that stand out because they relate not to a 
hierarchical position but to knowledge expertise. The players that perform these ‘expert’ 
roles are typically the inventor types, i.e. business development, corporate development, 
and R&D. These kinds of players are notably absent at Van Ommeren, where there was a 
lack of knowledge creation. At Ericsson ETM it is particularly business development and 
R&D that perform this expert role. Not only do they posses relevant knowledge, but they 
also function as brokers for referring people onward to others with more relevant 
knowledge. Somewhat similarly, at KLM Cargo, Cargo development’s role lies in its 
expertise on the corporate strategy; this is the reason why they are often consulted. 
Although in the conditioning view most roles are tied to hierarchical levels, in the 
knowledge-creating view roles, particularly that of the broker, are related to the task that 
they perform, i.e. an innovation task.  
Revisiting proposition 2 
Figure 9.7: Revisiting proposition 2 
 
Proposition 2a:  Initiatives that can build on broad, rather than deep, knowledge bases in their 
linking phase show better generation. 
 
Proposition 2b:  Initiatives that can build on deep, rather than broad, knowledge areas in their 
integration phase show better implementation. 
 
Proposition 2c:  Initiatives that build on broad knowledge in the linking phase and deep 
knowledge in the integrating phase show better overall generation and 
implementation of initiatives. 
 
Assumption 2d: Initiatives move from an informal structure in the linking phase to a formal 
hierarchical structure in the retention phase. 
 
Assumption 2e: Initiatives move from the absence of any administration in the linking phase to 
the use of its own administration in the retention phase. 
 
 
 
The Knowledge-Creating view leads to propositions 2a, 2b, and 2c (see figure 
9.7). Proposition 2a stated that initiatives that possess broader knowledge bases in the 
linking phase show better idea generation. Proposition 2b stated that initiatives that possess 
deep knowledge areas in the integrating phase show better implementation. Proposition 2c 
states that initiatives that possess broad knowledge in the linking phase and then deep 
knowledge in the integrating phase have better idea generation and implementation. 
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Translated to the case data these three propositions lead one to suppose the 
following. First (2a), one would expect that KLM, with the broadest knowledge in the 
linking phase, would generate ideas that are the most innovative, but would find it 
problematic to effectuate them, because it lacks deep knowledge in the integrating phase. 
Second (2b), that Van Ommeren, with the most deep knowledge in the integrating phase, 
would be best at implementing ideas, but would in turn find it problematic to generate 
innovative ideas in the linking phase. Third (2c), that Ericsson ETM, with a mixture of 
broad knowledge in the linking phase and deep knowledge in the retention phase, would 
have the best throughput of ideas, with the ideas being more innovative than at Van 
Ommeren yet less than at KLM Cargo. 
 Comparing the three firms (see table 9.2), the data indeed provides support for the 
three propositions of the Knowledge-Creating view. KLM Cargo, for example, with the 
broadest knowledge in the linking phase, has the most innovative initiatives. Van 
Ommeren, on the other hand, with the deepest knowledge in the retention phase showed to 
be much better at implementing ideas than KLM Cargo. Ericsson ETM with a mixture of 
broad in the linking phase and deep knowledge in the integrating phase, displays the best 
throughput. Compared to Van Ommeren, it has ideas that are more innovative. Compared 
to KLM, it might have ideas that are less innovative, but at least they get implemented 
smoothly as opposed to those of KLM Cargo.  
 
Overall, the data also provides support for the Knowledge-creating view, which attributes 
differences in initiative trajectories to differences in the organization of knowledge both in 
the initiatives as well as in the firms in which they are situated. Broad knowledge is 
considered beneficial for idea generation. This is exemplified by the KLM Cargo case, 
which is the case with the broadest knowledge and the most innovative initiatives. 
Specialist knowledge is considered beneficial for idea implementation. This is exemplified 
by the Van Ommeren case, which is the case with most specialist knowledge and the 
smoothest and quickest implementation of initiatives. The best throughput is considered to 
be obtained by shifting from broad knowledge in the initial stages to specialist knowledge 
in the final stages of the initiative process. This is exemplified by the Ericsson case, which 
is the firm that shifts from broad knowledge in the linking and interpreting stages, to 
specialist knowledge in the integrating stages.     
THE CO-EVOLUTIONARY VIEW 
According to the co-evolutionary view conditions and knowledge must co-evolve for 
initiatives to be successful, be it that this is necessary but not sufficient. If the two do not 
co-evolve there is a mismatch between conditions and knowledge. In that case, the 
initiative must take corrective action or it will terminate. For the initiatives to be successful 
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the conditions and knowledge must also converge and the area they span must be large. 
But most importantly, the co-evolutionary process must be subject to an appropriate 
amount of dampening. If we look at the three firms we see that all the three firms show co-
evolution, but (1) that at KLM Cargo conditions and knowledge failed to converge, but 
that they spanned a large area, (2) that at Van Ommeren they converged right from the 
start, yet they failed to span a large area, (3) that at Ericsson ETM they converged and also 
managed to span quite a large area, (4) in all the three firms knowledge and conditions co-
evolved, yet in the specific initiatives where a mismatch occurred the initiative took 
corrective action or perished. 
 
Table 9.3: Case Comparison according to the Co-evolutionary View 
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At KLM Cargo (see table 9.3), the conditions and the knowledge co-evolved, the 
area spanned by the conditions and knowledge over time was large, but there was no 
convergence. There was co-evolution because at all times the supportive conditions were 
matched with a broad knowledge base. This resulted in a large area that was spanned by 
the knowledge and conditions over the three consecutive stages. The large area indicates 
that KLM Cargo was very innovative, which was indeed the case. However, at KLM 
Cargo the conditions and knowledge failed to converge, resulting in a failure to reach 
implementation. 
At Van Ommeren (see table 9.3), the conditions also co-evolved, only this time 
the area spanned by the conditions and knowledge over time was very limited, yet 
convergence was maintained at all times. There was once again co-evolution, in this case 
the controlling conditions where matched by a specialist knowledge base that remained so 
over all the three stages. As opposed to KLM Cargo, this configuration led to a very small 
area that was spanned over time. This small area indicates that Van Ommeren was not very 
innovative, which was indeed the case. Nevertheless, because of the constant convergent 
situation of knowledge and conditions, initiatives were easily implemented at Van 
Ommeren. 
At Ericsson ETM (see table 9.3), we again see co-evolution, but the area spanned 
by the conditions and knowledge lies in between that of the two previous firms, and 
although there is convergence it takes longer to achieve than at Van Ommeren. In this case 
the co-evolution involved a shift from supportive to controlling conditions that was 
matched by a shift from broad to specialist knowledge. In the linking stage the supportive 
conditions were matched by broad knowledge; in the integrating stage the controlling 
conditions where matched by specialist knowledge. The amount of area spanned by the 
conditions and knowledge over time was less than at KLM Cargo, but much more than at 
Van Ommeren. Such an area indicates that there was quite some innovation, although not 
to as much as KLM, which was indeed the case. As opposed to KLM, at Ericsson 
initiatives did manage to reach convergence in the integration stage. Because it took more 
phases to reach convergence than at Van Ommeren, initiatives at Ericsson did reach 
implementation, but at the cost of a time-consuming process. 
Of course the above discussion of the findings is based on a general overview of 
initiative patterns in the three firms. The general overview displayed co-evolutionary 
patterns: there were no mismatches between conditions and knowledge bases. But what if 
specific initiatives displayed different patterns from the general pattern in their host firm? 
In other words, what if co-evolution was not present? At KLM Cargo and at Van 
Ommeren we find two such examples (see figure 9.8). The Tracking & Tracing project at 
KLM Cargo, for example, was very specialist in nature and required controlling conditions 
to obtain all the necessary data from various units so that cargo could be traced. However, 
the knowledge was broad at KLM, with the required specialist knowledge being 
unavailable, and the conditions were without any controls, leaving the initiators without 
instruments to enforce data supply. Thus, the initiative set up its own conditions and 
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knowledge base. The tracking and tracing initiative was to be based on a specialist 
technological solution bought from outside the firm, and the team was reduced to bring on 
a more controlled setting. From then on, the initiative has shown to proceed much better. 
At Van Ommeren, there was the Tallin project. It concerned broad knowledge that lay 
outside the specialisms of Van Ommeren, namely investment in the Soviet Union. Yet the 
organizational conditions were too constraining to allow for the development of such an 
initiative. The Tallin project thus created supportive conditions for itself, by separating 
itself from the rest of the firm, and thus from the latter’s constraining conditions. However, 
in the integration stage it needed to match up with the knowledge base and conditions of 
the firm at which point it failed. Both the initiative’s knowledge base and its conditions 
where too distant from those of the firm, resulting in the termination of the initiative. 
 
Figure 9.8: Mismatches according to the Co-evolutionary View 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revisiting proposition 3 
The Co-evolutionary view of initiatives lead to propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c (see figure 9.9). 
Proposition 3a stated that co-evolution of conditions and knowledge is a necessary 
requirement for successful initiatives. Proposition 3b stated that the more supportive the 
organizational conditions and the broader the knowledge base the more innovative the 
initiative. Proposition 3c states that the more controlling the organizational conditions and 
the deeper the knowledge base the better the implementation of the initiative.  
 
Figure 9.9: Revisiting proposition 3 
 
Proposition 3a:  Co-evolution of conditions and knowledge is a necessary requirement for 
successful initiatives. 
 
Proposition 3b:  The more supportive the organizational conditions and the broader the 
knowledge base the more innovative the initiative. 
 
Proposition 3c:  The more controlling the organizational conditions and the deeper the 
knowledge base the better the implementation of the initiative. 
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Translated to the case data these three propositions imply certain expectations. 
First (3a), that in all the three firms co-evolution will be present and that in the instances 
where there was not, initiatives would take corrective action or be terminated. Second (3b), 
one would expect that KLM, where the supportive conditions and broad knowledge span 
the largest area, would possess the most innovative initiatives, but that because of a lack of 
convergence they would have a problematic implementation Third (3c), that Van 
Ommeren, with the highest convergence of controlling conditions and specialist 
knowledge, would perform best in implementing the initiatives, but that because they did 
not span much area they would not be very innovative. 
Looking at the initiatives in the three firms (see figure 9.8), the data provides 
support for the three propositions of the Co-evolutionary view. The first proposition (3a) 
claims that co-evolution is a necessary condition and in case this is not achieved initiatives 
must undertake corrective action or they will fail. In all the three firms there is indeed co-
evolution, meaning that at every moment in time, the knowledge and conditions are 
equidistant from the x-axis. One could perhaps question why it is that the three selected 
firms are each representative of a different co-evolutionary type? The answer is now 
obvious. The three firms were chosen for their different sets of organizational conditions. 
As became apparent in the knowledge-creating view, knowledge is related to the 
conditions: the division of knowledge matches the division of labor. The Co-evolutionary 
view states that it is actually a necessary requirement that knowledge matches the 
conditions. Hence, different sets of organizational conditions translate into different sets of 
knowledge creation processes, and thus into different co-evolutionary types. Differences in 
outcomes are then due to differences in dampening of the process. 
If we look at corrective trajectories of initiatives within the firm, we see that such 
is very difficult to achieve. At Van Ommeren, the overall pattern was that the knowledge 
base was too narrow and the conditions too controlling. Initiatives that tried to correct this, 
by creating supportive conditions through their own form and administration and by 
networking to obtain broad knowledge, i.e. the Tallin project, got terminated. At KLM 
Cargo, corrective action refers to creating more controlling conditions and more specialist 
knowledge. Here too, we see that it is very difficult for initiatives to take corrective action, 
with some exceptions such as the Tracking and Tracing initiative. At Ericsson there is not 
much need for corrective action as overall the right pattern of conditions and knowledge is 
available. Nevertheless, here too we see that truly radical ideas have difficulty setting up 
new forms and administrative systems for themselves. Overall, if we look at all the three 
firms, it is very hard for initiatives to sidestep the path-dependent form and administration 
of the firm in order to set up more appropriate ones for themselves. 
The second proposition (3b), which claims that initiatives with conditions and 
knowledge that span a large area over time are more innovative, is supported by the 
general patterns in the three firms. Van Ommeren showed the smallest area - covered by 
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the controlling conditions and specialist knowledge over time - and indeed its initiatives 
were not very innovative. Ericsson ETM covers a much larger area - because its conditions 
shift from supportive to controlling and its knowledge from broad to specialist over time – 
and shows much more innovative initiatives. KLM Cargo shows the largest area of all – 
because it maintains broad knowledge and supportive conditions over all stages – and 
indeed possesses the most innovative initiatives of all. An increasing area spanned is thus 
related to more innovative initiatives. 
The third proposition (3c), which claims that convergence of knowledge and 
conditions is necessary for implementation is also supported by the data. KLM Cargo, 
where there is no convergence between conditions and knowledge – the conditions 
remained supportive and the knowledge remained broad – indeed has difficulty in 
accomplishing implementation. Ericsson ETM, where there is a gradual move towards 
convergence – it moves from supportive conditions and broad knowledge in the linking 
stage to controlling conditions and specialist knowledge in the integration stage - shows 
good albeit slow implementation. Van Ommeren, where there was convergence - between 
controlling conditions and specialist knowledge across all the stages – showed the best and 
most speedy implementation. Increasing convergence is thus accompanied with increasing 
ease of implementation.  
Although not mentioned as a proposition, the dampening effect, whether natural 
or managerial- had to be of appropriate dosage. At KLM, where there was a divergent 
pattern, there was no dampening effect from the management: it hoped for self-control. 
Instead, a natural dampening effect occurred because the organization could not 
indefinitely create more and more supportive conditions nor add broader and broader 
knowledge.  Notwithstanding, this lead to the situation where convergence was absent, 
resulting in a limited implementation of initiatives. At Van Ommeren, on the other hand, 
management’s strong control dampened the co-evolutionary pattern so strongly that it 
converged to specialist and controlling conditions way too fast, namely already in the idea 
generation stage. Although good for implementing ideas, it hindered the generation of 
innovative ones. Only Ericsson seems to have a co-evolutionary trajectory in which the 
dampening effect of the consensus model seems to lead to a reasonably suitable trajectory, 
although in the initial stages the pattern could be more divergent to allow for more radical 
innovations.  
The above findings demonstrate how conditions influence the knowledge base 
and how the knowledge base influences conditions, as well as how co-evolution is more 
than adaptation between the two. At the genotype level conditions influenced the 
knowledge base. At KLM Cargo oversupportive conditions drove a knowledge base that 
became so broad that it lacked depth. At Van Ommeren the strong controlling conditions 
limited the formation of linkages to other knowledge areas, thus enforcing a knowledge 
base that, although deep, was very narrow. The conditions also influenced initiative 
survival at the phenotype level, by selecting them in or out. We saw that at Van Ommeren 
management decided on the selection whereas at Ericsson a consensus model paved the 
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way for retroactive legitimation of initiatives. The other way round, we see that the 
knowledge base also influences the conditions. At Ericsson, for example, the newly formed 
knowledge base on electronic payment via the telephone culminated in the setup of a new 
unit, thus changing the condition set of the firm. The dampening effects in the three firms 
clarify that the conditions and the knowledge base do not just adapt to each other but that 
they co-evolve. The natural and managerial dampening effects can go in different 
directions, i.e. diverge (KLM Cargo) or converge (Van Ommeren), and can do so at 
different speeds (Van Ommeren was fast; Ericsson was slower). As such the findings 
suggest some level of managerial intentionality to be necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the data provides support for the Co-evolutionary view, which attributes 
differences in initiative trajectories to differences in the co-evolutionary process of 
knowledge and conditions of over time. If the conditions and knowledge cover a large area 
it is considered beneficial for idea generation. This is exemplified by the KLM Cargo case, 
where supportive conditions and broad knowledge cover the largest area over time; it 
possesses the most innovative initiatives. Convergence of conditions and knowledge is 
necessary for implementation. This was exemplified by the Van Ommeren case, which is 
the case with most convergence of specialist knowledge and controlling conditions over 
tall the stages; it had the smoothest and quickest implementation of initiatives. The best 
throughput is thus considered to be obtained by shifting from supportive conditions and 
broad knowledge in the initial stages to controlling conditions and specialist knowledge in 
the final stages of the initiative process. This is exemplified by the Ericsson case, which 
does exactly that; it has the best throughput of innovative ideas. According to the co-
evolutionary view, initiatives build on the form and administration of the firm. If these are 
inappropriate, initiatives will fail or they must take corrective action. Because of the strong 
path-dependency of form and administration it is very hard for initiatives to correct any 
mismatches on their own. It is thus up to firms to create the appropriate conditions in the 
organization.    
 Creating these appropriate conditions depends on management’s ability to reach 
an appropriate level of damping. Although natural dampening occurs, as was evident in 
KLM Cargo, intentional managerial dampening is necessary to ensure a proper conversion 
form broad knowledge and supportive conditions to deep knowledge and controlling 
conditions. Such forceful dampening must be measured; otherwise it will cause excessive 
dampening, as was the case at Van Ommeren. As such, Ericsson Telecommunications 
seems to have found the better level of intentional managerial dampening of these three 
firms.
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CHAPTER 10 
Reflection and Discussion: 
Concluding Remarks 
In this book we investigated the initiative process, in particular how organizational 
conditions and the knowledge creating processes affect initiatives, and suggested a co-
evolutionary approach as a basis for understanding initiatives. This chapter starts off by 
revisiting the research questions of Chapter 1 and reflects on how the findings provide an 
answer to those questions. Then, the limitations that were present in this research study 
are reflected upon. This is followed by a discussion of the implications that this study has 
for both theory and managers. Finally, various venues for future research are suggested. 
FINDINGS 
“How do initiatives emerge and develop in firms?” was the question that instigated this 
study. Three perspectives were presented to answer this question: (1) the conditioning, (2) 
the knowledge-creating, and (3) the co-evolutionary perspective. The conditioning view 
takes the position that it is the organizational conditions that determine the trajectory of 
initiatives. It provides an answer to the second research question on what the influence of 
the organizational conditions is on the trajectory of initiatives. These organizational 
conditions are of two types: supportive and controlling. Supportive organizational 
conditions are beneficial to the generation of initiatives. Controlling conditions are 
necessary for the implementation of initiatives. According to the conditioning view 
successful trajectories of initiatives are those that show a shift from supportive conditions 
in the initial stages to controlling conditions in the final stages. Based on whether firms 
supply a context that specifically caters to initiatives we can distinguish between a 
constraining and a facilitating conditioning view. In the constraining conditioning 
approach, organizational conditions are in place to guide all sorts of firm activities, not just 
initiatives. The control system is not fine-tuned to initiatives and is consequently regarded 
as hostile; it limits the survival chances for the more autonomous and radical initiatives. 
The best that can be done for initiatives is to relax the influence of the control system on 
initiatives. In the facilitating conditioning view, the firm is considered to supply favorable 
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conditions for initiatives. This view neglects the notion that firms also have other activities, 
besides initiatives, for which to create appropriate conditions. It also tends to underplay the 
need for controlling conditions that enable implementation during the later initiative 
stages. Notwithstanding their differences, both views stress that successful initiative 
trajectories are the result of their organizational context.  Unlike the two views that present 
a very static view of organizational conditions, this study points out that different 
organizational conditions, i.e. controlling and supportive conditions, can simultaneously 
coexist within the firm because they operate on different phases of initiatives. 
 The knowledge creating view neglects the impact of organizational conditions on 
the development of initiatives. Instead, it focuses on the unfolding of the internal processes 
of the initiative. It provides an answer to the third research question on what the influence 
is of the knowledge base on the trajectory of initiatives. It assumes that other knowledge is 
linked to, that ideas emerge as a result of this knowledge brokerage, and that they are then 
developed through integrating specialist knowledge. Knowledge creation is then supported 
by the availability of broad knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1995), i.e. horizontal knowledge 
flows, whereas the integration of knowledge is supported by the use of deep or specialist 
knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1995), i.e. vertical knowledge flows. As the knowledge 
creation process moves from linking to integration it therefore also moves from a broad to 
a narrow knowledge base. This entails a move from loose to tight coupling of the initiative 
members which requires the build up of the initiative’s own organizational form, such as a 
team, its own administrative system, and the use of the appropriate knowledge roles, such 
as brokers. The only recognition of any organizational conditions is that they are assumed 
to facilitate this knowledge creating process. But the implications of this recognition, 
namely that these conditions are often not specifically set up for initiatives but for other 
activities as well, is neglected. Overall, according to the knowledge creating view, 
successful trajectories are the result of a shift from broad to deep knowledge in their 
content-wise development. 
 This study proposes a co-evolutionary view that synthesizes the knowledge 
creating with the conditioning view, thus clarifying that both aspects, conditions and 
knowledge, must match and co-evolve with each other over time. It provides an answer to 
the fourth research question at the beginning of this study on whether there is any value in 
combining the two perspectives. Because resources are necessary for creating appropriate 
conditions the co-evolutionary also answers the other research question on how resource 
acquisition and the creation of knowledge interact. This co-evolutionary view points to 
various requirements for successful trajectories of initiatives. First, broad knowledge must 
be accompanied by supportive conditions and deep or specialist knowledge must be 
accompanied by controlling conditions. This principle is exemplified by the initiatives that 
showed a mismatch and their ensuing corrective action. The Tallin initiative, for example, 
was based on broad knowledge but was embedded in a firm with controlling conditions. In 
order to survive, it temporarily separated itself from the firm in order to create the 
appropriate supportive conditions. The Tracking and Tracing initiative, on the other hand, 
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was based on specialist knowledge but was embedded in a firm with supportive conditions. 
It consequently set up a separate system with controlling conditions.  
Second, if we consider an area spanned by knowledge on the one side, ranging 
from deep (low) to broad (high), and conditions on the other, ranging from controlling 
(low) to supportive (high), then the larger the area covered by these two aspects, the more 
innovative the initiative. Of the three firms, KLM covered the largest area through its 
constant supportive organizational conditions (high) and very broad knowledge (high). It 
had the most innovative initiatives of all the three firms. Van Ommeren, on the other hand, 
showed the least area covered because of its constant deep knowledge (low) and 
controlling conditions (low). It had the least innovative initiatives of all three. 
Third, there must be a convergence of these two aspects for effective 
implementation of ideas: broad to deep knowledge and supportive to controlling 
conditions. At KLM there was no convergence towards specialist knowledge and 
controlling conditions. In fact, the situation could be described as one of divergence. 
Broader knowledge was sought than was available. This lead to the setup of more 
supportive settings, which in turn enabled more broad knowledge. Overall, the process 
spiraled into broader knowledge and more supportive settings. Not surprisingly, initiatives 
failed to become implemented. Van Ommeren, on the other hand, showed the strongest 
convergence of all the three firms because it constantly had deep knowledge and 
controlling conditions.  It possessed the most effective implementation of initiatives.  
Fourth, the dampening effect, whether natural or managerial- must be of 
appropriate dosage. Co-evolutionary patterns are accompanied by damping effects that are 
either a natural offspring of the process or that management has imposed (McKelvey, 
2002). At KLM, notwithstanding the natural dampening, the lack of management 
dampening led to a lack of convergence to the narrow knowledge base and controlling 
conditions necessary for implementation. Yet at Van Ommeren, management dampened 
the co-evolutionary pattern to such an extent that convergence to specialist knowledge and 
controlling conditions already occurred in the idea generation stage. Only Ericsson seems 
to have dosaged the dampening effect at an appropriate level through the consensus model. 
One could possibly say that in their case the dampening could have been less in the initial 
stages to allow for broader knowledge and more supportive conditions in order to obtain 
more radical innovations.  
Overall, how have these views helped us understand how organizational 
conditions impact initiative trajectories? The organizational conditioning view points to the 
direct impact of organizational conditions on the initiative, with supportive conditions 
aiding idea generation and controlling ones facilitating implementation. The knowledge 
creating view only attributes some indirect impact to organizational conditions. Instead it 
attributes successful initiative trajectories to the knowledge base of initiatives, with broad 
knowledge facilitating idea generation and deep knowledge supporting idea integration. 
The co-evolutionary view clarifies that organizational conditions and the knowledge base 
are interdependent and that they can reinforce each other in a divergent or convergent 
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direction. By changing the organizational conditions and the organizational knowledge 
settings management can steer this direction. The challenge is to dosage this so-called 
dampening effect in such a way that idea generation converts to implementation in smooth 
and timely manner resulting in successful initiative trajectories. 
LIMITATIONS 
Of course these findings must be viewed in light of the theoretical and empirical 
limitations that come along with any research study. There are several theoretical 
limitations that need to be considered. First, there is the possibility of a top management 
selection bias. The initiatives were selected by asking top management of each of the three 
firms to suggest several initiatives. Top management could have been biased in their 
suggestions, for example, because they are fonder of initiatives that are top-down, ones in 
which they were involved themselves, or successful ones. This study has tried to offset this 
possible bias by also investigating initiatives that were serendipendipously stumbled upon 
during the investigation, a tactic that was also used by Birkinshaw (1997). 
Then there is the possibility of subsidiary, country, and industry effects. One of 
the three firms, namely Ericsson ETM, was a subsidiary of a Swedish multinational. Not 
only could a Swedish country effect thus have been present in this firm, but also the 
maneuverability of a subsidiary is very different from stand-alone firms. All three firms 
were located in a single country, the Netherlands, with one of them having its parent firm 
in Sweden. It might be that results would differ across different countries. One could also 
imagine an industry effect to have influenced the results. Evidently, the oil shipping 
industry is very different from that of the telecommunications industry. All these different 
effects impact the organizational conditions and thus ensure that the three firms had very 
differing sets of conditions. Whilst this is a good situation for analytical generalization, it 
of course hinders statistical generalization.  
The chosen firms do not necessarily represent best practice examples. Other firms 
might exist that have found even better ways for dealing with initiatives. Under norms of 
rationality (Thompson, 1967) firms will strive to perfect the balancing act between 
knowledge generation and integration. Even though in reality these firms do not represent 
such perfection, they do demonstrate the relation between organizational conditions, the 
knowledge base, and the initiative process.  
Another limitation is that the outcome of initiatives, i.e. whether they were 
successful, was determined by asking the initiative members whether they considered it to 
be successful. Other authors (Birkinshaw, 1997) have also suggested additional measures, 
such as the direct investment amount or the market performance. However, it was felt that 
the amount of investment did not reflect the success of an initiative, in particular because 
the initiatives were of very different nature and required very different sums of 
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investments. The market performance was considered to be influenced by so many factors 
that play a role after an initiative has been approved that it was regarded as very inaccurate. 
The measure chosen was thus the subjective opinion of the participants.  
Similarly, the innovative nature of an initiative, i.e. whether it was radical or 
incremental, was determined subjectively. However, it turned out that because the radical 
nature is a very relative concept, subjects tended to either underplay the radical nature of 
an initiative or to overestimate it. The research teams felt that the participants were not 
capable of weighing the innovative nature of the ideas. Either they were so deeply involved 
that it did not seem new to them, or they were so in love with their ‘baby’ that they could 
not imagine it being merely an incremental innovation. Thus, the three researchers were 
the ones who acted as a panel for judging the radical nature of the initiatives, because they 
were the only ones that were in the position to compare the three firms.  
One should realize that the organizational conditions of the three firms at the time 
of the investigation are most probably somewhat different from the conditions before and 
after the investigation. The three firms were all undergoing reorganizations. Although the 
effect of these changes is reflected in the organizational conditions of the three firms, it is 
very clear that they have probably changed since then. KLM Cargo, for example, was in a 
phase of reorganization where control systems were still lacking. They have been set up in 
the near future. However, this does not influence the results of this study, as what was 
being investigated was the impact of organizational conditions – whatever they were at the 
time - on initiatives. That these conditions could be different at later times is of less 
interest.  
IMPLICATIONS 
Theory 
This study has contributed to the innovation literature in various ways. One central theme 
in the innovation literature concerns the conflict between change and stability.  
 At the initiative level, studies have sought resolution of this conflict through 
temporal separation (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997). Abernathy and Utterback (1975), 
for example, proposed that the type of innovation depended on the stage of development, 
i.e. radical innovation (change) in the early stage and incremental innovation (stability) in 
the later stages. The initiatives in this study confirm their findings, as there are clear 
differences between the idea generation and implementation stages. The first deals with 
change; the latter with stability. The change-stability conflict is thus considered resolved in 
the initiative itself over time. 
At the organizational level, studies have sought resolution of this conflict through 
both temporal and spatial separation (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997), thus 
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acknowledging that change and stability require separate conditions, i.e. different 
organizations. Burns and Stalker (1961) proposed a mechanistic organization for dealing 
with stability and an organic one for dealing with change. Miles and Snow (1978) 
subdivided this categorization to four types: the defender, prospector, analyzer, or reactor 
type37. Volberda (1998, 2003) proposed the dual, network38, and oscillating forms. The 
dual and network form use spatial separation, in the sense that the dual form organizes 
change and stability in separate levels or units and the network organizes it in different 
firms in the network. The oscillating form uses temporal separation, by letting firms switch 
from an organic to mechanistic mode over time. This resembles Duncan’s (1976) 
ambidextrous organization that shifts its organizational conditions through various stages 
of innovation. All these forms at their core believe that it is impossible to balance change 
and stability in a single unit at the same moment in time. We find evidence for this with 
Van Ommeren and KLM Cargo, with the first being mechanistic and the second organic. 
Also within Ericsson, the New Telecom Operators unit was more organic, whereas the 
Logistics unit was more mechanistic. Overall, at the organizational level firms or units 
mostly take sides in the change-stability conflict, although they can shift sides over time. 
When considering initiatives, the change–stability conflict must be resolved at 
both the initiative and organizational level. Academics studying initiatives have tended to 
resolve the change-stability conflict by considering the initiative to represent change while 
the firm represents stability (i.e. Burgelman, 1983b). Spatial separation of the initiative 
from the firm, by means of skunkworks (Peters and Waterman, 1982), new business 
development departments (Fast, 1979), or internal corporate ventures (Burgelman, 1983a), 
is viewed as the way to resolve the conflict. This is partially supported by this study, which 
shows various initiatives that made use of such spatial separation, such as the Strategic 
Distribution Terminals initiative at Ericsson that grew in to a complete separate division. 
Other academics have disregarded the conflict and acted as though both the initiative and 
firms deal only with change (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). In this respect, Hargadon 
(1998a,b), for example, discusses a design firm, Ideo, which is all about change and whose 
creative processes are naturally also about change. Most firms, of course, do not have the 
luxury of dealing exclusively with exploration, but also need to manage exploitation. 
Overall, from the initiative viewpoint, the change-stability conflict is thus present in the 
initiative versus the firm. Is the only solution then that initiatives deal with change and 
firms with stability? 
Not surprisingly, there have been attempts to find a balanced form (Volberda, 
1996, 1998, 2003), alternatively labeled poised form (Kauffman, 1995) or dissipative 
structure (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), that resolves the exploration-exploitation paradox 
within a single unit at a single moment in time. In such a form the initiative would feel 
comfortable, as there would be room for both exploration and exploitation. This balanced 
                                                 
37 Miles and Snow (1978) actually talked about four kinds of strategies, but these can easily be related to four 
kinds of organizational forms. 
38 The network form is also known as the virtual corporation (Davidow and Malone, 1982). 
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form (Volberda, 1998, 2003) uses artificial stimuli to prevent conditions from becoming 
too controlling or supportive. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996), building on the work of 
Duncan (1976), suggest ambidextrous organizations that use small and autonomous units 
for innovation, while they take advantage of the aggregate size of the entire firm for 
achieving economies of scale and scope. However, when taking a closer look at these 
hybrid forms (Volberda and Lewin, 2003) many often do not represent a true balance as 
they use spatial (i.e. separate project units) or temporal separation as the basis for dealing 
with change and stability. For example, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) hypertext 
organization lets a business system and knowledge base (both representing stability) 
interact with project teams (change). The latter clearly represents a spatially separate 
structure form the business system. Moreover, it is questionable whether the examples 
provided, such as the often-quoted ABB, which carried out a reorganization into smaller 
units (i.e. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), are truly balanced 
forms. Moreover, in the case of ABB, in spite of its so-called hybrid structure, it is 
currently performing very badly. As such, finding a balanced form still forms a challenge 
to academia and is the reason for much speculation o new organizational forms (Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999). 
This study proposes a different take on the issue. It shows that it is very well 
possible, albeit not easy, to have within one firm or unit conditions that promote both 
change and stability, because supportive (change) and controlling (stability) conditions 
need not operate on the same phases of processes that occur within these firms or units. At 
Ericsson, for example, the supportive conditions, such as the availability of knowledge 
brokers, operated on the initial phase and controlling conditions, such as the use of 
milestones, operated on the implementation phase. The change-stability conflict can be 
resolved by realizing that organizations consist of various processes that are in different 
stages of development and that therefore have different organizational conditions operating 
on them. Hence, firms can deal with change, as was the case with KLM, or with stability, 
as was the case with Van Ommeren, or with both, as was the case at Ericsson, and 
simultaneously have supportive and controlling conditions that work on the change and 
stable phases of initiatives. The example of 3M as a balanced form, as discussed by 
Volberda (1998, 2003), comes very close to this, because it allows employees to devote 
thirty percentage of their time to autonomous explorative activities. In essence, this means 
that those explorative activities are under a separate set of conditions without having used 
temporal or spatial separation. There is thus no need to limit change to initiatives and 
stability to firms; each can deal with both.  
 
Another theme is that on the role of knowledge. One crucial aspect concerns the relation of 
knowledge creation processes to structure. Firms are often structured according to the 
division of specialist knowledge, and as a result organizational conditions tend to be in line 
with these divisions. However, knowledge creation processes tend to cut across 
organizational boundaries. Besides managing the division of specialist knowledge, 
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managers must therefore also manage the sharing of knowledge. In order to facilitate 
knowledge sharing, various structures have been proposed that allow cross-functional 
interaction, besides the interaction provided by the division of labor. Often this cross-
functional interaction occurs in the form of temporary teams. The resulting structures can 
take various forms such as the matrix form (Galbraith, 1973), the hypertext organization 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), the platform organization (Ciborra, 1996), or the hollow 
corporation (Davidow and Malone, 1992).  
 However, this study questions the adequacy of these structures for generating new 
knowledge. This study has shown that the knowledge sharing that sparked the generation 
of new ideas often occurred before teams were set up. Team structures were the result 
rather than the source of such knowledge sharing. Knowledge generation is thus more a 
result of cross-functional interaction than of some cross-functional structure. Although it is 
certainly true that cross-functional structures, such as teams, represent a form of 
interaction, by being structured they simultaneously limit the amount and kind of 
interactions. At Ericsson, for example, many ideas were formed by visits to other firms, 
lectures of guest speakers, a trip to headquarters, clients suggesting ideas etc. Firms should 
concentrate on providing a lot of interaction rather than structuring it per se in some form.  
Another crucial aspect lies in the relation of knowledge to strategy. This study 
shows that the knowledge base rather than corporate strategy formed the source for idea 
generation. In other words, people – in the lower echelons - conceived ideas because of 
what they were doing, rather than what they were instructed to do. This agrees with Lovas 
and Ghoshal (2000) who claim that Burgelman’s (1983) autonomous-induced distinction is 
irrelevant for the idea generation stage, because idea generators behave irrespective of 
corporate strategy. Evidently, it disagrees with the notion of strong strategic intent 
(Prahalad and Doz, 1987). However, in the selection phase strategy clearly directed the 
process. Strategy worked directly on the selection rather than the variation – the generation 
of ideas -. This is very much in line with Burgelman’s intraorganizational ecology view 
(1991) in which managers retroactively legitimize initiatives. Yet, is there no role for 
strategy in the initial phases at all? Are we to assume that managers can lay back for ideas 
to pop up and then in retrospect select? Looking closely, this study found that managers 
were already guiding the initiative before it was formally legitimized. This is very much 
what Lovas and Ghoshal termed guided evolution (2000). Managers must therefore both 
shape a facilitating context for knowledge sharing (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994) and 
strategically ‘guide’ the evolution of ideas (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000).  
 
The initiative process is of course a theme in the innovation literature that formed the focus 
of this study. Organizational levels have been considered to play an important role in the 
initiative process (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). Other studies have attributed more 
significance to individual tasks as a determinant for initiative roles (Hargadon, 1998a,b). 
This study found more support for the latter. Certain people and units performed certain 
roles - such as the product champion, broker, and organizational champion roles – not so 
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much because of their hierarchical level but because of the tasks they are involved in. For 
example, individuals within strategic and regular business development and R&D units 
stood out as product champions and brokers. Although the organizational champion role 
was linked to the upper levels, it was clear that certain individuals stood out more than 
others in this respect. People within the same hierarchical level did not perform identical 
roles. The roles people performed were instead more related to their tasks. Idea generators 
and brokers were, for example, particularly individuals who were involved in innovative 
activities. Thus, notwithstanding the role of levels, firms would do wise to ensure that 
certain people have task descriptions that increase the likelihood of performing necessary 
roles for innovative processes.  
Another interesting finding was also that whilst resources were tied to the 
hierarchy, knowledge typically cut across hierarchical boundaries, something that is very 
much in line with the network literature (Hedlund, 1994). In fact, one could even say that it 
knew no boundaries at all. In the Internet initiative at Ericsson, outsiders who possessed 
necessary knowledge were involved in aiding the initiative. Quite interestingly, there were 
even cases, such as the cable Dect initiative, where knowledge was shared without the 
expectation of any return favor. This questions trust as an explanation for such sharing 
(Granovetter, 1985), because if no return favors are expected then the concept of trust is 
irrelevant. Rather it seems as if the kind of sharing that is needed for gaining insight is 
different from that of developing knowledge, because in the latter case more formal 
arrangements are made between parties to facilitate the knowledge integration. 
If one mirrors the various governance structures of initiatives over their life span 
against transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1980) this 
study suggests that initiatives move through the following three governance structures: (1) 
markets for ideas, (2) clans for development, and (3) hierarchies for implementation. In the 
linking phase, people search for others with relevant knowledge and ideas. This search 
behavior resembles people shopping in a marketplace. Similarly, in the interpreting phase 
top management then selects certain initiatives for development. Not surprising, Hamel 
(1999) discusses this in terms of ‘bringing Silicon Valley inside large firms.’ In the 
integrating phase, where knowledge is integrated, the clan or team form (Ouchi, 1980) is 
used in order to actually develop the idea. Once developed, the idea is embedded in the 
knowledge hierarchy of the firm, this is the reason why it matches the hierarchy form. 
Overall then, initiatives enter internal idea markets of the firm, then develop their own clan 
structure, and finally embed within the hierarchy of the parent. 
Notwithstanding all the above implications, the main contribution of this study to 
the literature consists of the notion that organizational conditions and knowledge co-evolve 
during the initiative process. Previous studies that have focused only on the organizational 
conditions (i.e. Burgelman, 1983a) tend to view successful trajectories as those in which 
initiatives initially are provided with supportive conditions, for example through 
separation, before they are brought into the firm to be implemented under more controlling 
conditions. Previous studies on knowledge creation (i.e. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) tend 
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to view successful trajectories as those in which initial cross-functional interaction 
facilitates broad knowledge sharing that is then followed by detailing and embedding the 
idea within the specialist knowledge base of the firm. There are few studies that have tried 
to show a link between organizational conditions and the knowledge base. As discussed 
before, Kanzanjian and Rao (1999) form a notable exception, but their study did not treat 
initiatives and did not take a process approach. This study has shown that conditions and 
knowledge must co-evolve and that the role of management lies in providing the 
appropriate amount of damping to reach convergence.  
Managerial 
The most important managerial implication from this study is that managers must think 
more dynamically in terms of using a varying management style over time. The reason for 
this is that initiatives require different types of knowledge and conditions over their life 
span. Because various initiatives exist at the same time it is imperative that the 
management of knowledge and conditions is varied per initiative and over time. 
Management styles that remain steady and are indiscriminant will not serve those 
circumstances. Today’s managers must act more dynamically, being motivators and 
deciders or explorers and exploiters and vary this per specific activity. Given this need for 
a varying management style, there are further implications for managing the knowledge 
base and the organizational conditions, i.e. the organizational form, the administration, and 
the roles people perform.  
 
Managing the knowledge base 
Managers should balance a healthy co-existence of broad and deep knowledge. KLM had a 
broad knowledge base, resulting in many ideas, but lacked the deep knowledge to 
implement them. In contrast, Van Ommeren had a deep knowledge base, resulting in 
effective integration, but lacked the broad knowledge to create enough variety in ideas. 
Ericsson offered a better mixture of the two. The R&D and new venture units possessed 
lots of deep and specialist knowledge, yet the large amount of interfirm and cross-
functional interaction also provided for a lot of broad knowledge. Also, if we look at 
knowledge creators, managers should expect new ideas from everyone yet also invest in 
specific people. The study shows that certain people definitely stand out as generators of 
new ideas, as was evidenced at KLM and Ericsson. These inventor types are often the 
same people who perform a broker role for others. So it seems as if firms must ensure a 
mixture of innovators and employees who innovate, just as they must ensure a mixture of 
deep and broad knowledge with both types building on each other. 
 
Managing the conditions  
Managers should provide supportive conditions for broad knowledge sharing, and 
controlling conditions for deep knowledge sharing, and should set up systems that manage 
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these over time. In this way, managers can ensure that knowledge and conditions co-evolve 
and that they dosage a dampening effect that leads to convergence of the idea in a 
marketable innovation. KLM and Van Ommeren clearly fail to make this shift. Ericsson, 
with its milestone system, had a much better grip on the transition, which is reflected in its 
better throughput. 
The organizational form must be managed in such a way that the initiative can 
move from an informal network to a formal hierarchy. As such, the team form merely 
represents a phase in this transformation in which initiatives are undergoing increasingly 
tighter coupling and formalization as they evolve. Once the knowledge base of the 
initiative has been set up, no new linkages are needed and tight integration of complex 
specialist knowledge becomes necessary, requiring controlling conditions. For that 
situation the informal network form is not adequate. It implies that within team forms, 
commitments and tight coupling are to such an extent necessary that the team becomes 
realigned with the hierarchy. Rather than treating teams as ideal mechanisms for 
stimulating initiatives (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), managers should understand their 
temporary nature, and instead focus on the need for appropriate forms during all the 
phases. At Ericsson this is reflected in promoting an informal network through organized 
interchanges with others both within and outside the company, by allowing and having 
mechanisms in place for the quick set up of teams, and for allowing teams to become new 
units within the organization. 
The administrative system must also be managed with this dynamic aspect in 
mind. Management should understand that strategy may kill off initiatives and cause less 
variety in the strategic repertoire of a firm. At Van Ommeren the strong strategic intent 
clearly limited the scope of the initiatives, and thus the potential strategic variety that 
managers could have at their disposal. For this reason, many managers are promoting 
empowerment as a means to increase innovative behavior of employees or because it is 
just the politically correct thing to do (Argyris, 1998). However, if autonomy means a lack 
of strategy, it will smother initiatives because there is no foundation to hatch on. At KLM 
there was so little strategic direction that those with ideas could gain no control over other 
elements necessary for the implementation. This study shows that although autonomy, 
generally speaking, benefits idea generation and makes it easier to acquire resources, 
control systems are necessary for managing the tight coupling that is needed to develop 
and implement the idea. It underscores Argyris’s point that managers must “recognize that 
every company has both top-down controls and programs that empower people (Argyris, 
1998: 105).”  One way of managing this, as the Ericsson case shows, is by empowering 
people in the beginning, with limited strategic influence, yet taking control towards the end 
with strong strategic influence. This resulted in a reasonable variety of ideas, yet enough 
foundation to embed them in the firm. The crucial role for managers is thus to find an 
appropriate balance between the two and realize that for initiatives the balance changes 
over time.  
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As for the roles that people perform in the initiative process it is already known 
that these differ for the various phases an initiative evolves through (Burgelman, 1983a). 
This study found no new roles as such. Yet it did find that certain people stood out as the 
inventor types. This does not necessarily mean that firms should boost their innovative 
reservoir by hiring people that seem to possess entrepreneurial traits. Although it may 
indeed be the case that these inventor types possess such traits, i.e. they have 
entrepreneurial genes; it might just as well be that they have developed entrepreneurial 
skills over the course of time owing to the kinds of tasks they were involved in. This study 
did not investigate this distinction and cannot tell whether entrepreneurship is the result of 
genes or upbringing. What the study does suggest is that the reason these people performed 
broker roles is because they were recognized by their peers as always being ‘busy with 
new things.’  In other words, for firms to stimulate brokerage behavior they need to create 
centers of innovation, such as the business development or R&D units in the investigated 
cases, where employees know they can discuss questions about any ideas that they might 
have. These centers will function not just as innovation centers but also as brokers. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study points to various possibilities of future research. Firstly, future studies could try 
and relate intrafirm, interfirm, and industry levels. Previous studies have either considered 
the microlevel (Burgelman, 1983a; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993) or the macrolevel 
(Rosenberg, 1972; Schmalensee, 1985). This study has also taken an intrafirm level, yet it 
was found that particularly the knowledge creation process cuts across firm boundaries in 
this way relating various firms to each other. This cross-border activity clarifies that firms 
can renew through a blend of internal and external renewal. Future research could 
investigate how intrafirm activities relate to extra-firm evolution, which would, for 
example, be relevant for network organizations, clusters, joint ventures, and the setting of 
standards. 
 Future studies should try and quantify various findings that stem from qualitative 
research such as this one. Although quantitative studies on initiatives exist, they tend not to 
deal with similar questions as qualitative ones. Thus there is little contribution of studies of 
both types to each other. This study, for example, pointed out the importance of 
considering the knowledge creating process when analyzing the initiative phenomenon. 
Few quantitative studies exist that deal with a similar approach. One study that gets close 
was conducted in the chemical industry by Ahuja and Lampert (2001). They quantified the 
amount of knowledge bases in chemical patents by using the US-patent categorization as a 
basis for knowledge base categorization. This was then related to the patents market 
performance. Yet, the problem with patent data is that it does not necessarily cover all 
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types of innovative behavior in firms. Future research should thus try and quantify 
qualitative findings in order to allow for statistical generalization. 
Of particular interest is how firms, and more in particular managers, should 
balance support and control. Although there are various studies that have addressed the 
resolution of what seems like a paradox (Volberda and Baden-Fuller, 2003), they have 
done so with firms or units as the main unit. Future studies must acknowledge that the 
resolution of support versus control also occurs within initiatives, projects, or activities. 
New research should therefore consider the resolution of paradox at the initiative and unit 
levels. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has shown that management plays a strong role in the success rate of initiatives 
by manipulating the organizational conditions and knowledge settings. These conditions 
and knowledge need to co-evolve and must move from broad to specialist and from 
supportive to controlling conditions to reach convergence. Management’s influence is 
embodied in a dampening effect on the co-evolutionary pattern of two. Too little 
dampening, i.e. too little management control as was the case at KLM, leads to a situation 
where convergence is not reached. Too much dampening, as was the case at Van 
Ommeren, leads to a situation where too little divergence has been achieved. Of the three 
investigated firms, Ericsson seemed to be the one that best managed to find a middle 
ground. Yet, even Ericsson was not without its problems: it was a lengthy process and the 
ideas could perhaps have been more radical. Managers must therefore possess a dual 
management style, one that is both explorative and exploitative, based on a both a broad 
and deep knowledge base, and must differentiate these per initiative over time. 
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Appendix A: 
Semi-Structured Interview 
Choose those questions below that belong to the phases through which the project has moved. The 
phases are:  
1- sensing the idea 
2- idea generation 
3- development  
4- consolidation. 
Furthermore, ask the interviewee only those questions he is able to answer. 
 
Description of the Project 
 
 
Give a brief description of: 
 Reason for the start-up of the project 
 Technical and commercial statement of the problem 
 Aim of the project 
 
 
The Project Status 
 
 
 Describe the project during the course of time in terms of: 
1- the phases of the project (in his own words!) 
2- the staffing (who were involved and when) 
3- the kind of project management (how was the project managed) 
4- the structure of the project (how was the project set-up) 
  
What was your role in the project? 
- were the roles clearly defined or were they ambiguous? 
  
Could you tell some more about the form of organization of the project? 
- clearly defined or vague structure 
- did the culture within the project differ a lot from the organizational unit? 
- did the project require any new technologies other than the existing ones? 
  
How has the necessary mix of expertise been implemented during the consecutive phases of 
the project? 
 
 
Sensing the Idea 
 
 
 Who had/proposed the initial idea? 
  
Was this person an employee of the firm or an outsider? 
- If it was an outsider, describe his relation to the firm and why he suggested it. 
  Also describe how the idea got picked up by the firm. 
- If it was an employee, describe his position in the firm (top, middle, bottom -  
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       function) and find out how much autonomous behavior he had in his task? 
  
Why was the idea picked up (in case of an outsider) or how did the idea come about (in case 
of an employee)? 
- market-pull / technology push 
- follower / first mover (new in the Industry sector) 
- reactive / pro-active 
  
How did the idea relate to the at that time existing strategy? (induced - autonomous: how 
deviant was it?) 
  
Did the idea threaten any existing business at the time? 
  
Did the idea belong to the divisional charter (business area) or did it compete with the charter 
of another division? 
  
Was there anything that functioned as a benchmark for the idea? 
  
To what extent did the idea involve the creation of new competencies? 
  
Was there a pressure or need for new ideas? (Was the old business still earning enough 
revenue?) 
 
 
Initiating the Initiative 
 
 Who started the project in the organization and why? 
  
Was this the same person as the one who had the initial idea? 
If not, why is there a difference. 
 What position in the organization does the initiator have?  
- think of top-down/bottom-up, horizontal, mix? 
  
Was the initiative in line with his job description? 
  
What personal objectives did the initiator have to start the project? 
career, money personal, fulfillment? 
  
What company objectives did it relate to? 
  
How did it relate to the at that time existing strategy and was this taken into account when 
trying to set up the project? 
  
What selection criteria were present at the time of the initiative and how did the project fit in? 
  
What were the objectives of the project and have these been changed during the course of 
time? 
  
How was the project initiated? 
  
Was the project initiated in a planned manner or did it come about spontaneously? 
  
Was the culture favorable towards experimentation/initiatives or not? 
  
Was there any (official) freedom to be entrepreneurial? 
 
 
Role of the Management Levels 
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What management levels (top, middle) were involved and at what time in the project? 
- was this immediately from the start? 
  
At what moment do you think did or will the project obtain a formal status? Why then? 
  
What was the role of: 
- Ericsson Sweden 
- MT of Gilze-Rijen 
- Central staff 
- Other divisions and units? 
(steering, facilitating, supportive, delegating) 
  
What was the role of: 
 - MT of the division 
- Staff within the division 
- Competence managers within the division 
- Other BU managers within the division 
(steering, facilitating, supportive, delegating) 
 
 
Failure and Success Factors 
 
 
 Has the project been aborted prematurely or is there a strong chance that it will be aborted 
prematurely? If so, when and why? 
  
What where the biggest (organizational) obstructions and success factors for this project? 
- Failure and success factors 
  
When is the project considered successful? 
- What are the evaluation and selection criteria? 
 
 
Sponsors/Feeders 
 
 
 Describe the current sponsors of the renewal project? 
- Initiating sponsor: individual/group who has the power to initiate and legitimize the change 
for all affected targets. 
- Sustaining sponsor: individual/group who has the political, logistical, and economic 
proximity to the targets. 
- Change agent: individual/group who is responsible for implementing the change. 
  
When did these sponsors get involved and why? Describe their personality? If there was a 
cane of sponsor, why did this occur and what result did it have? 
  
Why did people side with the sponsor? (Also think of sponsors outside the division) 
  
Who do you think should become a sponsor in the future to guarantee success? 
 
 
Integration: Spinning-out / Spinning-in 
 
 
 Has there been a specific moment when the project became separated from the organization 
(special unit or team)? 
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To what extent was the project incorporated in the existing organization and how has this 
changed during the course of the project? 
- Internalized (what form)? 
- Externalized (how)? 
- Hybrid organization form (network, alliance, joint-venture etc.) 
  
What problems have occurred during the process of (de-)integration in the existing 
organization? 
  
Who are the parties interested in the success of this project? 
 
 
Hindsight 
 
 
 If you could do the project again would you do anything differently and why? 
  
Has the project had any influence on your career, in what way? 
 
Has the project had an impact on Ericsson, in what way? 
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Appendix B: 
Context measurement  
Background 
The three firms investigated, Van Ommeren, Ericsson Telecommunications, and KLM 
Cargo, all possess a different set of organizational conditions. Although much information 
on those organizational conditions could be deducted from the interviews held in order to 
depict the initiative trajectories in these firms, most information regarding their 
organizational conditions is based on a context measurement that had been set up and 
conducted previously through the Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center (Volberda, 1992, 
1996, 1998, 2003; Wielemaker, M.W., Elfring, T., and H.W. Volberda, 2000; Wielemaker, 
M.W., Elfring, T. and H.W. Volberda, 2001).  
Methodology 
The methodology used for carrying out the context measurement in these three firms has 
already been described in another publication (Wielemaker, M.W., Elfring, T., and H.W. 
Volberda, 2000). Basically, the context measurement was conducted using Volberda’s 
Flexibility Audit and Redesign method, which is available as an expert system called 
Farsys (Volberda and Rutges, 1999).  
He determines the nature of firms by using two dimensions. The first dimension 
consists of the repertoire of management capabilities, ranging from simple routines to 
dynamic capabilities. The range should consist of current capabilities (activated flexibility) 
and not yet activated capabilities (flexibility potential). The emergence of opportunities or 
threats requires management to have potential capabilities as a backup when renewal is 
necessary. The other dimension consists of the controllability, i.e. the responsiveness of the 
whole organization. It consists of the organizational conditions, i.e. the organization’s 
technology, structure, and culture (described in Volberda, 1998). 
Volberda’s framework leads to four ideal type organizational forms: (1) rigid, (2) 
planned, (3) flexible, and (4) chaotic. The rigid form has developed simple procedures and 
has a low degree of controllability. It has a routine technology, a mechanistic structure, and 
a conservative culture. The planned form also shows the variety of routines to be less 
limited. In addition, the controllability is much higher. It possesses more non-routine 
technology, a relatively organic structure, and a conservative culture. The flexible form 
possesses a large and rich flexibility mix dominated by strategic and structural 
APPENDICES 
184 
conduciveness to renewal, while in addition the controllability of the organizational 
conditions is high. It possesses a totally non-routine technology, and organic structure, and 
an innovative culture. The chaotic form possesses a very extensive flexibility mix 
dominated by strategic conduciveness to renewal, but is totally uncontrollable. In this 
organization the possibilities of variation are unlimited; there is no anchorage through the 
organizational conditions. 
Questionnaires (described in Volberda, 1998) that dealt with the environmental 
turbulence, flexibility, technology, structure, and culture were entered into Farsys. They 
were edited in advance in order to ensure that they fitted the firm situation. We carried out 
approximately 30 interviews per firm for the purpose of editing the questionnaires and 
gaining insight in the firm (see Wielemaker, M.W., Elfring, T., and H.W. Volberda, 2000). 
All interviews were taped and transcribed. We also analyzed documents for the same 
purpose, as well as to verify respondents’ answers. The edited questionnaires were then put 
out into the organization to be answered. There were five types of questionnaires relating 
to structure, culture, technology, environment, and flexibility. In total each firm filled in 
about 60 questionnaires. These were then processed by the Farsys expert system. 
Results 
After having processed the questionnaires the FARSYS expert system provided many 
profiles of the firms indicating their conduciveness to renewal (for the profiles see 
Wielemaker, M.W., Elfring, T., and H.W. Volberda, 2000). Using the profiles we can 
depict a taxonomy displayed for the three firms. 
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 KLM Cargo is located somewhat more to the chaotic because it is embedded in a 
turbulent environment that was complex and dynamic, yet somewhat predictable, because 
it has an organic structure (particularly formalization, standardization, participation, and 
grouping), and a rather innovative culture (particularly the scope, openness, and planning 
attitude), with some limitations in the technology.  
 Van Ommeren is located somewhat to the planned form because it is embedded in 
a more predictable, simple, and stable, environment, except with respect to the impact of 
laws. The structure is more mechanistic (particularly in formalization, standardization, and 
participation). The culture scored in between conservative and innovative (being 
conservative particularly in scope, openness, and planning attitude), although it had a very 
strong socialization. The employees had a strong sense of common identity, a participative 
leadership style, and a heuristic management attitude.  
 Ericsson Telecommunications is located in-between the other two, more 
towards the flexible form because it is embedded in a complex, dynamic but fairly 
predictable environment, somewhat less predictable than Van Ommeren although not as 
much as KLM Cargo. It also has a more innovative culture than Van Ommeren, but less so 
than KLM Cargo. Its structure showed to posses both organic and mechanistic elements. 
With a fairly routine technology, its technology lies in between the other two again.  
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Appendix C: 
Initiatives 
1/4 
Stages Form
Van Ommeren Link Interpr Integr Just had reorganization with one layer cut out. 
Hierarchical form.
Splitter 0 0 1 From project within existing unit to an informal project team across units
Eastman 0 0 2 From within an existing unit to a formal project team
Cooperation 0 0 1 From informal contacts at the top of the hierarchy to add hoc operational meetings
Tank Container 0 0 From within an existing operating company to  informal contacts at the top of the hierarchy
Latin America 0 0 Is carried out within an existing unit
Tallin 0 0 Project kept secret from the board within unit
0 0 1.3
Stages Form
Ericsson Link Interpr Integr Matrix form with teams for obtaining new operators. 
Restructured to customer axes.  
Strat. Distr. Term. 2 2 3 From a small formal team it grew into a new separate division
Unisource 0 2 2 From informal tieas between different subsidiaires it grew into a formal project team
EDI 0 2 2 From strong CEO-client ties it converted into a formal project team
Glass Box 2 2 2 A formal team already existed from a previous project
Cable Dect 0 1 2 From informal ties to a formal cooperation structure
Internet 0 1 From  informal gatherings to informal teams
Unax 0 1 From strong ties amongst developers in R&D to an informal team
SDH (2nd phase) 2 2 2 The formal team already existed from a previous project
Internet Billing 0 1 Informal contacts between R&D and marketeer. Development occurs as garage work within R&D.
Telfort (B) 2 2 Originally part of a Division, then as a formal separate project in a business development unit.
0.8 1.6 2.2
Form
KLM Loosely coupled form. Dual structure of Central factory 
is functional plus business units, with a business 
systems structure on top.
Cargo info. System 0 0 2 From within an existing unit to a formal project team
Tracking and Tracing 0 2 from strong ties to a formal project team
System Profit Man. 0 2 from strong ties to a formal project team
Product Portfolio 0 2 from strong ties to a formal project team
Jump start SCU 0 0 Remained as an initiative based on strong ties
NVOCC 0 0 From within an existing unit to an initiative based on strong ties
Express 0 2 2 From ties within the hierarchy to a formal project team
BU-Logistics 0 0 From within an existing unit to strong ties in the hierarchy
E-Status 0 0 Remained within a unit
0 0.8889 2
0.3 0.8 1.8
0 No team form
1 Informal team
2 Formal team
3 New unit/division based on initiative
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 2/4 
Stages Rel. to strategy Administration Non-level related roles Managerial roles
Van Ommeren Link Interpr Integr Link Interpr Centralized and formalized decision-making at the 
level of the board of directors. 
Weak control and support.
Who reason A restructuring has just taken place in which a 
management layer has been removed
Splitter 1 3 3 n n administration rests with board of directors, own procedures developed. middle/top-down
Eastman 1 3 3 n n administration rests with board of drectors, own procedures developed. middle/top-down
Cooperation 1 1 1 y y No procedures, except for answering to the board of directors top-down
Tank Container 1 1 y y administration rests with board of drectors middle/top-down
Latin America 1 1 y y administration rests with board of drectors middle/top-down
Tallin 2 2 n y Detached from firm bottom-up
1.2 1.8 2.3 50% 67%
Stages Strategy driven Administration Non-level related roles K
Ericsson Link Interpr Integr Link Interpr Consensus model of decision making, 
Formalized routines
Strong control and support. Stimulation of social 
network/community by exchanges with other HQ, 
universities etc.
Who reason Essentially a marketing organizationa that 
implements orders from HQ
Strat. Distr. Term. 3 3 4 y y Use of targets, instantly given marketing budget. Top-down
Unisource 2 4 4 y y introduction of project management techniques along the way Top-down
EDI 1 3 4 n y Strictly implemented in a planned top down-fashion Top-down
Glass Box 3 3 4 n n Approval of top management of corrective measures Bottom-up
Cable Dect 2 4 4 n n Constant shopping for resources, use of pilots and trials.
Business 
development Expertise Middle/top-down
Internet 0 1 n y No procedures. Resources needed.
Individuals 
bussy with 
Internet
Expertise & 
Interest Bottom-up
Unax 2 2 n y Lack of resources. Exists through slack. No formal procedures.
Business 
development
and R&D
Expertise
and 
Expertise
Bottom-up
SDH (2nd phase) 3 3 4 n y Was initially cart blanc in terms of resources. Acquiring a change in top strategy was problematic Bottom-up
Internet Billing 0 0 n y No formal procedures, rules etc.
Business 
development
and 
R&D
Expertise & 
Referal
and 
Expertise
Bottom-up
Telfort (B) 2 4 n n Loose structure, No formal procedures and processes. Business development Expertise Top-down
1.8 2.7 4.0 20% 70%
Stages Strategy driven Administration Non-level related roles K
KLM Link Interpr Integr Link Interpr Lack of control and support. Lacks adminstrative 
control systems. Middle layer is a bottlenack for 
vertical comunication.
Who reason Lower management levels has been empowered, 
but are uncomfortable with the change
Cargo info. System 3 3 3 y y Very planned and focussed on implementation. Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
Tracking and Tracing 3 3 y y Very planned through the use of time slots, go/no-go points, procedures, and routines.
Cargo 
development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
System Profit Man. 1 3 y y Limited administrative control Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
Product Portfolio 2 2 y y Procedures have not been documented. Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
Jump start SCU 2 2 y y No procedures. Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Bottom-up
NVOCC 2 2 y y No roles, procedures etc have been determined Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
Express 1 1 2 n y No procedures or routines set up. Top-down
BU-Logistics 0 0 y y Nothing specified yet. Cargo development
Strategy
expertise Top-down
E-Status 2 2 n n No clear and fixed roles. Only that convincing of BU manager is necessary. Bottom-up
1.8 2 2.5 78% 89%
1.6 2.2 2.9 48% 76%
0 no procedures, no control
1 no procedures, management control
2 no procedures, self-control
3 procedures, management control
4 procedures, self control
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3/4 
Knowledge bases Common language Innovativeness Accent Knowledge
Linking Interpreting Integrating
Van Ommeren Knowledge base limited to Tank Storage and Shipping
Splitter 1 1 0 0 0 1 No real increase in knowledge base
Eastman 2 1 0 0 0 1 Barely any increase of knowledge, More a strategic decision
Cooperation 2 0 2 1 0 1 linking of knowledge between two units. Increases along the way.
Tank Container 4 1 1 0 0 - Increase of knowledge 
Latin America 1 0 1 0 1 - Market research kind of knowledge
Tallin 2 0 1 0.5 0.5 - Little detailling necessary: more of a business concept
2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.0
Knowledge bases Common language Innovativeness Accent Knowledge
Linking Interpreting Integrating
Ericsson Very broad knowledge base. Both Marketing and 
Research and Development. Much knowledge also 
present in other subsidiairies.
Strat. Distr. Term. 2 0 2 0 0.5 1 New marketing knowledge generated.
Unisource 2 0 2 0 0.5 1 Increase of coordination knowledge 
EDI 2 1 1 0 0.5 1 Little new knowledge generated. Was more an implementation project.
Glass Box 1 0 1 1 0 0.5 New method of codeveloping with client 
Cable Dect 2 1 2 0 0 1 Detailling and testing of main idea
Internet 1 0 1 0 1 - Slow increase in knowledge. 
Unax 2 0 1 0 0 1 Mainly technological development
SDH (2nd phase) 2 0 1 0 0 0.5 Sales convincing strategists of wrong strategy
Internet Billing 2 1 1 0 0.5 -
Combination of marketing and specialist knowledge. 
Once sponsor has been found an increase in detailling 
specialist knowledge is expected.
Telfort (B) 5 1 3 0.5 0 - Integration of very different specialisms
2.1 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.7
Knowledge bases Common language Innovativeness Accent Knowledge
Linking Interpreting Integrating
KLM knowledge generation tied to new business 
development.
Cargo info. System 3 1 2 0 0 1
Explicitizing the knowledge present in Cargo in an IT 
system. Increased along the way. From concept to 
detailling.
Tracking and Tracing 3 1 2 0 1 Developed knowledge to be tested in pilot.
System Profit Man. 3 0 2 0 0 1 From basic idea to demo and implementation planLoose elements have been integrated
Product Portfolio 2 1 1 0 1 Limited increase in service knowledge
Jump start SCU 2 0 2 0 0 Knowledge only at the top
NVOCC 2 0 3 0 0 Considered very abstract, still at an early stage
Express 2 1 1 0 0 increase of Express knowledge base based on informal contacts
BU-Logistics 2 0 3 0 0.5 Still more an idea than a worked out plan
E-Status 2 0 1 0 0.5 Still in a conceptual phase
2.3 0.4 1.9 0.0 0.2 1.0
2.1 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.9
Common knowledge
1 Common knowledge
0 No common knowledge
Innovativeness
0 no knowledge created
1 limited knowledge created
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4/4 
problematic Resources Idea before Team Outcome
Van Ommeren Resources granted by the board
Splitter 0 Outside client is taking care of investment y success
Eastman 0 Outside partner provided resources y success
Cooperation 0 Resources available, more an issue of finding synergies. y ongoing
Tank Container 0 Basically an investment proposal y ongoing
Latin America 0 Basically an investment proposal y ongoing
Tallin 0 Basically an investment proposal y Terminated
0 100% 33.3%
Resources Idea before Team Outcome
Ericsson Resources granted by the MT on the basis 
of achieved consensus
Strat. Distr. Term. 1 Resources were on occasion put on hold for other priorities y success
Unisource 1 Previously committed resources were withdrawn for other priorities y success
EDI 0 Resources provided by the MT. Main issue was gaining legitimacy y mixed
Glass Box 0 Change in working method didn't require many resources y success
Cable Dect 1 Costly project which currently depends on client sponsorship y
Internet 0 Mainly conceptual y ongoing
Unax 1 In need of resources to pay for development hours. y ongoing
SDH (2nd phase) 0 Resources were no issue, changing the strategy was 0 mixed
Internet Billing 1 In need of resources to pay for development hours. y
Telfort (B) 1 Complex funding structure needed 0 ongoing
0.6 80% 40%
Idea before Team Outcome
KLM
Cargo info. System 0 MT provides resources for software development y mixed
Tracking and Tracing 0 Operations provides resources per time slot y ongoing
System Profit Man. 0 MT supplies resources to software development y ongoing
Product Portfolio 0 MT supplies the resources y ongoing
Jump start SCU 0 Mainly conceptual - ongoing
NVOCC 0 Mainly conceptual - ongoing
Express 0 Mianly conceptual y ongoing
BU-Logistics 0 Mianly conceptual - ongoing
E-Status 0 Mainly conceptual - ongoing
0 100% 0%
0.2 90%
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Appendix D: 
The Splitter Initiative 
 
Outcome - Successful: 
 Good 
revenues 
 Operating 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a 
 
Control
focus
Control
focus 
Client driven 
Client driven Long 
term
Board  
approval
Control
focus
Existing  
Operating unit
Existing  
Operating unit
Informal 
Project
Team is cross-
functional, and ad-hoc 
(not formal) 
‘89 
Long term contract with 
client with good ROI 
pushed ‘go’ decision 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Commercial director. 
(Initiator/Product
Dir. 
Bus.Dev./ 
Dir. Oper. 
Not strategic, but 
opportunity 
Hesitancy to create 
dependency on one client 
Line Man.   
(Implementers)
Board member (Executive champ) 
Knowledge Supply a client’s gas condense splitter with the necessary input 
No knowledge creation needed 
(instead outside client for 
investment)
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Operational/Chemical knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem because it 
was mainly an investment proposal. Once it 
got the ‘go-ahead’ it was the outside partner 
who agreed to take care of the investment.
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept
Integrative 
knowledge in 
various 
individuals 
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge in 
team
Integrative 
knowledge in  
various 
individuals 
- 
Integration
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Appendix E: 
The Eastman Initiative 
 
Outcome - Successful: 
 Operating 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretatio Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
 
Control
focus
Control
focus
Client driven 
Client driven Longstanding 
client/contract
Board approval
Control
focus
Existing  
Operating unit
Existing  
Operating unit
Formal Project
team
Team is cross-
functional 
 ‘? 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Not strategic, but 
opportunity 
Hesitancy to create 
dependency on one client Dir. Oper. com(Org. champ) 
Knowledge Creating a direct link between Van Ommeren’s terminals 
Partially sorting out environmental law issues. No real knowledge 
creation
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Operational/Chemical knowledge 
Environmental Law knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem because it 
was mainly an investment proposal. Once it 
got the ‘go-ahead’ it was the outside partner 
who agreed to take care of the investment. 
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Project 
team of 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
- 
Integration 
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Appendix F: 
The Cooperation Initiative 
 
Outcome - Mixed: 
 Operational 
synergies 
 Continues in 
evolutionary 
fashion 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretatio Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a 
Support
focus
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Directors  
want it
Control
focus
 ‘? 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board (initiator) 
Directors of Tank  
storage and inland shipping  
(Org. champs) 
Evolutionary process: 
continuous discussions 
on cooperation. 
If a feasible area is found 
implementation goes 
smoothly Line Man.   
(Implementers)
Within  
the board
Within existing 
hierarchy
Operational 
meeting
Very informal setting 
Ad hoc gatherings 
Knowledge 
Find out ways to create synergies 
between tank storage and inland shipping 
Incrementally discovering points of 
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Storage 
knowledge
Resources Resources are not a problem. The issue is 
finding points of synergy.  
Knowledge 
process
No common language (storage versus 
Desire to 
create
integration
Specialist 
Knowledge
Storage 
versus 
shipping
Meeting 
members are 
specialists 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in meeting 
members 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Storage 
versus 
shipping
Meeting performs  
integration 
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Appendix G: 
The Tank Container Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early tell: 
 Take over or 
partnership 
decision still 
pending 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a 
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
Existing 
Operat
Within  
hierarchy
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Control
focus
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board member 
  (Executive 
Dir. Operat. Company (Org. champ) 
Waiting for decision by 
board for take-over or 
partnership 
Line Manager 
(Product champ)
Knowledge 
Consist of setting up a business in 
Tank container shipping
Previous negative experience forms a hindrance for 
re-entry into the container business
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Liquids knowledge 
Logistics knowledge 
IT knowledge 
Environmental law knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. It is still 
conceptual, basically an investment 
proposal. 
Knowledge 
process
Concept well understood because of previous 
experience
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Integration of  
specialist knowledge  
problematic because of:
negative prior 
experiences 
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialists 
scattered 
in firm 
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Appendix H: 
The Latin America Initiative 
 
Outcome - Successful: 
 Board 
approval 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a 
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Control
focus
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Board (Initiator) 
Dir. Bus. Dev.  
(Org. champ) 
Market research to find 
best way forward. 
Board must choose 
strategy 
Bus. Dev. Manager (Prod champ) 
Existing Bus. 
Develop unit
Existing Bus. 
Develop unit
Knowledge Concerns a geographic expansion into Latin America 
Market research to check whether geographic 
expansion is worthwhile
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Marketing knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. 1 individual 
conducts the market research.  Still an 
investment proposal
Knowledge 
process
Only 1 individual conducting market study. 
Board is still to hear the report
Integrative 
knowledge 
in
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Integrative 
knowledge in 
1 individual
Specialists 
contacted 
Integration by  
1 individual
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Appendix I: 
The Tallin Initiative 
 
Outcome - Failure: 
 Terminated 
 Board pissed 
off 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Te
rm
in
at
ed
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
li
de
a
Control
focus
Opportunity driven
Opportunity  
driven
No with 
strategy
Control
focus
Existing 
Operat
Exist Operat. 
Company
Project secret from 
board 
 ? 
Top 
Middle 
Botto
m
Board (Terminator) 
Dir. Bus. Dev./    
       Dir. Operat comp.      
       (Weak Org.  
        champ) 
When board is informed 
they terminate the 
initiative
Line Managers (Initiator/Product champs) 
Knowledge Consists of investing in a terminal in Estonia 
Skunk work of few individuals  
who got everything ready for an investment 
project, then terminated when presented to the 
board. 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Logistics knowledge (problematic) 
Marketing knowledge 
Resources Resources were not a problem. It was 
basically an investment proposal
Knowledge 
process
Few individuals worked out the concept
Integrative 
knowledge 
in few 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
Same 
people are 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in few 
individuals
Same 
people are 
specialists 
terminated
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Appendix J: 
The EDI Initiative 
 
Outcome - Mixed: 
 Successful 
results; 
 Continuation; 
 No organization 
learning 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  
id
ea
 
Control
focus
Control
focus
Client requested idea 
CEO/MT (Initiators) /  
              Steering group (approver) 
Middle managers 
          (Product champ.) 
Front-liners 
(Implementers) 
Strong ties 
client – CEO/MT
Formal project
team
Formal project
team
Client pushed
idea
Fit with 
strategy
Hierarchical  
command
Smooth  
implementation
Support
focus
‘97‘96 
Knowledge             EDI link with client 
No knowledge creation needed,
it is more an implementation 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Logistics knowledge 
IT knowledge 
Resources Resources are not an issue as the MT is the 
driver behind the project. The isue is to gain 
legitimacy amongst lower levels. 
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept,  
but not everyone sees its relevance 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Integration
Project 
team of 
specialists
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Appendix K: 
The Unisource Initiative 
Outcome - Successful: 
 New account 
created 
 Continuation 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
id
ea
Control
focus
Control
focus
Strategy 
HQ/Div. manager (Initiator) / 
                 MT/Steering group (approver) 
Business manager 
 (Product champ.) 
Account manager
(Implementer)
Weak ties 
subsidiaries
Formal large  
project team
Formal small 
project team
Strategy (HQ)
driven
Career opport. 
New unit
Smooth  
implementation
Support
focus
Hierarchical  
command
‘97‘93 
R&D Manager (Discussant) 
Knowledge Becoming supplier for an international alliance 
Coordinating the project across the various national subsidiries 
was a learning experience that consisted of various alterations
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Marketing knowledge (getting to know the customer’s alliance) 
Cross-national Coordination knowledge (amongst Ericsson subsidiairies) 
Resources Resources were a problem because 
resources committed to the project were 
withdrawn for other things with a higher 
priority. 
Knowledge 
process 
Coordination amongst the national subsidiairies was 
uncommon and a new experience. 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Integration 
Large 
team of 
specialists 
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Appendix L: 
The Strategic Distribution Terminals Initiative 
 
Outcome – Successful: 
 New Mobile 
division 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  
id
ea
 
Control
focus
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
HQ/MT/New Mobile Div. 
Business Manager 
(Prod. champ.) 
Marketing 
representative
Formal small 
team
Formal larger
team
Separate 
Mobile
Strategy driven Career opport.
new unit
Smooth implementation 
Support
focus
Team intentionally 
grows into new unit 
Career opport.
new unit
‘97
Knowledge Set up of distribution network for mobile phones
Retail marketing knowledge had to be built up quickly, mainly by hiring on 
marketing people from outside. It also required a cultural change from the 
diustribution centre which had to move products through much faster than 
normally because it concerned  consumers. 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Retail marketing knowledge 
Operational/Chemical knowledge 
Resources Resources were at given times a problem. 
The MT suppied the reosurces but because 
of other priorities the resources were 
sometimes insufficient.
Knowledge 
process
The SDT people were specifically hired because they had a 
different mindset (marketing) than the existing Ericsson 
people who were used to dealing with firms rather than with 
end-users.
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Specialist 
Knowledge - 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in division
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Team of 
specialists
Integration 
Division 
with 
specialists
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Appendix M: 
The Glass Box Initiative 
 
Outcome – Successful: 
 Successful 
results; 
 No continuation;  
no learning 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a 
Control
focus
Client driven 
Team existed 
for previous
Existing
team
Client and 
Problem driven
Important 
Client
As soon as the MT 
recognized the need for 
corrective action 
implementation went 
smoothly 
Support 
focus
Bus. Man.  
(Prod. champ.) 
Marketing rep’s  (Initiators)
Initiative was a 
correction to an 
existing initiative 
Existing
team
MT command 
Control
focus
Development team  
(Implementors)
HQ/MT/ 
Steering Com. (approver) 
Div Manager (Sponsor) 
Knowledge Involve customer in development 
 
There was quite some trial and error as the 
concept was totally new for Ericsson. 
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
IT Project Management knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem because it 
was mainly a method of working that didn’t 
require many resources. 
Knowledge 
process
People were unfamiliar and unaccustomed to the new 
method of co-developing with the client 
- 
Specialist 
Knowledge
Client is 
specialist on 
method
Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Integrative 
knowledge 
developed by 
trial & error 
Integration 
Client 
codevelops 
with team 
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Appendix N: 
The Cable Dect Initiative 
 
Outcome – so far successful: 
 Continuation 
dependent on client 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
A
pp
ro
va
l 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 o
n 
cl
ie
nt
 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Client/Technology 
driven
Div. Man/MT/R&D Man (Executive champ) 
                            Steering Committee (appr.) 
                                      HQ (aware) 
Bus. Developer  
(Initiator/Product) 
Weak/Strong 
ties
Client/Techn. 
driven
ROI driven 
(If cust
Smooth implementation. 
Pilot depends on client 
Support
focus
 ? 
Strong ties in 
hierarchy 
Extra business
Control
focus
Within existing 
unit
Bus. Manager 
(Org. champ) 
Marketing representatives 
(implementers) 
Cooperation with other  
units and subsidiaries 
Knowledge Enable telephony over the cable through air-DECT technology 
Technological development 
requiring pilots to test if it works. 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
DECT-air knowledge 
Cable knowledge
Resources Resources are a problem because it is quite 
costly, yet not considered significant enough 
by HQ for funding. The resource search 
leads to time delays. Now a division pays, 
client for the pilots.
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in two 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in few 
individuals
Integration 
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Appendix O: 
The Internet Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Interest driven 
MT/Steering committee (Selector)
                                 HQ (aware) 
Interest driven Fit with  
scenarios
Difficulty seeing 
immediate ROI 
No clear sponsor yet 
Support
focus
Strat Bus Dev / Mark reps (Initiators/Prod
Inf. gathering 
interest. people
Informal 
teams
Bus. Dev. 
(Broker)
Knowledge Set up Internet business 
Incremental understanding of what the 
Internet could mean for Ericsson  
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Internet knowledge 
Other Ericsson Knowledge bases
Resources Resources are not a problem because it is 
mainly conceptual.  
Knowledge 
process 
Amongst those that share an interested in the Internet,
The rest of the organization was aloof 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialists 
are consulted
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Appendix P: 
The Unax Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Problem driven: long 
duration of translating 
software 
Problem  
driven 
Fit with 
strategy
Support
focus
HQ not cooperative; 
project seen as 
threatening to other 
subsidiary 
 
Mainly done within R&D 
R&D Developers (Initiators & Prod. 
MT/HQ aware of it 
Developers  
within R&D 
Informal 
team 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
An organizational unit has 
been conceptualized, but it 
has problems materializing 
R&D Manager (Org. champ)
Knowledge Enabling the use of Ericsson sofdtware on non-Ericsson hardware 
Idea downtuned to mini-platform,  technological 
development
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
UNIX knowledge 
Proprietary Platform knowledge 
Resources Obtaining resources is a hindrance. 
Currently sponsored by R&D, but in need of 
another sponsor. 
Knowledge 
process
Some rivalry between experts on both sides 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
- 
Integration 
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Appendix Q: 
The SDH Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Control
focus
Problem driven: 
customers wanted a 
different kind of product 
than was being offered. 
MT (Approver) / 
       HQ (disapproves)
Existing formal
Team &
Existing formal
team
Existing formal
team
Problem driven Fit with general 
strategy 
Demand for 
solution
Main problem was getting 
a readjustment of the 
strategy. 
Support
focus
Outcome – Successful: 
 Continues ‘92 
Bus. Man.  
(Org. champ) 
Marketing reps 
(Initiators) 
Team already existed. 
The issue was readjusting 
strategy 
Wrong entry strategy; new 
entry strategy necessary 
Knowledge Reposition portfolio at lower rather than higher SDH technology level 
Sales convincing strategists that strategy (Higher SDH) was wrong  
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Higher SDH knowledge present at Ericsson 
Lower SDH knowledge not present at Ericsson
Resources Resources were not the main issue. 
Changing the HQ strategy was.  
Knowledge 
process
Local Sales and HQ Strategists differed
Integrative 
knowledge 
in few 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
Sales 
confronted 
with 
problems 
Sales with 
outside 
partner
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Sales 
confronted 
with 
problems 
Integration
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Appendix R: 
The Internet Billing Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Technology driven
R&D manager 
(Org champ)
Mark. rep. (Initiator/product champion) 
Weak ties 
mark Rep and
Garage work 
within R&D
Technology  
driven
Fit with 
strategy
All done in spare time and 
by use of slack 
 
Not backed by the top 
Support
focus
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
 Depends on finding 
a client 
Driven by self motivation 
‘95 
MT (Aware of it)            
R&D dev. 
Bus. Dev.  
(Discussant)
Knowledge Enable charging specific Internet usage 
More a technological development project  
(Focusses on obtaining client sponsor) 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Billing knowledge 
IP knowledge
Resources Resources are the main problem because it 
is a technological development project for 
which the development time must be paid. 
Solution is sought by finding a client. 
Knowledge 
process
The people involved understand the concept 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in single 
individual
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
R&D 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in few 
individuals
 
Integration is a 
question of 
finding 
resources 
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Appendix S: 
The Telfort Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a 
Control
focus
Client/Opportunity 
Div Man (Org. champ) / MT approver
Bus dev.  
(Org. Champ)
Mark rep. (Initiator/product champion) 
Dedicated 
team
Split off team 
to become new 
unit
Client driven Dependent on 
outside partner
Major change to existing 
business.  
 
Cooperation with many  
outside parties 
Support
focus
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
 Depends on outside partners
If outside partner agrees, 
this will become a new unit 
‘? 
R&D Manager  
(Discussant)
Knowledge Smart card for financial transactions over the phone 
Much knowledge creation along the way 
Very radical project for Ericsson ETM 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Financial knowledge 
Marketing knowledge 
IT knowledge 
Telecom-Voice knowledge 
Project Management
Resources Figuring out how to gather all the resources 
and how the hole financial supportive 
structure will be set up is an enormous task. 
Never doen before at Ericsson. 
Knowledge 
process
People with very different competencies 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
- Specialists 
solve 
voice-data
Contacts  
with all sorts 
of other 
specialists 
Integration 
awaits go-
ahead 
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Appendix T: 
The Cargo Information System Initiative 
 
Outcome - Mixed: 
 Release remains 
problematic 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking
Knowledge 
Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Present Cargo’s offerings electronically:  
explicate organizational knowledge
Control
focus
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
Cargo Development (Initiator) 
Cargo Devel. 
(Product champ) 
Existing Cargo 
Develop unit
Existing Cargo 
Develop unit
Formal project
team
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Sales unit 
wants it
Conceptually well thought 
out, 
Difficulty to implement in 
chaotic organization 
Control
focus
Locating and explicating Cargo’s own knowledge 
very difficult
Sales Manager 
   (Implementer) 
Team is cross-
functional 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
li
de
a:
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Administrative knowledge (problematic) 
Sales knowledge 
IT knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. They are supplied 
by the MT and devoted to programming the 
software. 
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept 
Different opinions about who owns certain knowledge 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 1 
individual
Integration of  
specialist knowledge  
problematic because of: 
- administrative chaos 
- proprietary conflicts 
- interest conflicts 
Specialist 
Knowledge
- Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 1 
individual
- 
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Appendix U: 
The Tracking & Tracing Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Depends on whether 
it works 
 Continuing; 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
  
Tr
ac
ki
ng
 a
nd
 tr
ac
in
g 
of
 g
oo
ds
 
Control
focus
Imitating competitors 
(FedEx, UPS) 
Cargo Development 
Middle manager Operations 
                 (Product champ.) 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy
Formal project
team 
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Very planned. 
Chaotic context. 
Organization wants to 
move quicker than 
project team thinks 
possible 
Control
focus
Operations Manager 
 ? 
Knowledge Tracking and tracing of goods 
Administrative knowledge was too problematic 
thus a shift to tracking & tracing technology (learning experience) 
Still mainly an investigative rather than developmental project. 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Operational knowledge 
Tracking & Tracing Technology 
IT knowledge 
Resources Resources are supplied per ‘time box’ and 
increase over time. They are supplied by 
Operations and devoted to investigative 
pilots. The development of a definitive 
solution still requires approval.  
Knowledge 
process 
Everyone understands the concept 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- Tracking & tracing 
specialist to be 
brought on board
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Project 
team of 
specialis
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Appendix V: 
The System Profit Management Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
 Implementation by 
BUs essential 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  
id
ea
:  
Control
focus
Control
focus
Strategy driven 
Cargo Development (Broker) 
Sales M. (Prod. champ.) 
Sales M. 
(Implementer) 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy
Formal project
team
Formal project
team
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy 
Hierarchical  
command
BU’s don’t play role yet 
Is ahead of BUs position 
Control
focus
Sales M. 
(Initiator.) 
    V.P (Sponsor) 
‘95‘?
Use of SPM as 
control board 
Knowledge Create Management Decision Support System 
Explicating the strategic decision process in an IT 
system
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Strategic knowledge 
Organizational knowledge 
IT knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. They are supplied by 
the MT and devoted to programming the software
Knowledge 
process
Limited understanding of the concept
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge
- Business 
units are 
not 
involved
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
- 
Actual 
integration 
has not 
occurred yet
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Appendix W: 
The Product Development Initiative 
 
Outcome – So far good: 
 Successful 
results; 
 Continues; 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
  
Control
focus
Strategy/Client driven 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy
Formal project
team
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Difficult integration 
expected in chaotic 
organization 
Control
focus
Cargo Development (Broker) 
Sales M. (Prod. champ.) Sales M. 
(Initiator.) 
    SPM Staff Manager  
(Sponsor)
Use of SPM as 
control board 
Knowledge Develop method for dealing with client requests
Figuring out the guidelines for dealing with client 
requests is
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Sales knowledge 
Operational knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. They are 
supplied by Cargo’s MT
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept  
(considered a success factor)
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals Actual integration 
of specialist 
knowledge 
still necessary  
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- Project 
team of 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
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Appendix X: 
The Jump-start SCU Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
  
Control
focus
Unclear longer term 
(LT) strategy 
V.P., Cargo Development 
BU manager (Initiator/Product) 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Strategy driven Determining LT 
strategy
Basically a discussion with top: 
kept secret from rest of BU 
Control
focus
 Dec‘94 
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Knowledge Re(de)fining future position of Business 
One person is trying to put down a general 
framework for understanding the future portfolio of a
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Strategic knowledge 
Marketing knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem because it is 
basically a conceptual piece that is 
developed.  
Knowledge 
process
Only the top is involved and understands the concept. 
The middle management is kept unaware of it, in part 
because it is felt they don’t understand it yet.
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 1 
individual 
Specialist 
Knowledge
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 1 
individual
- 
APPENDICES 
212 
Appendix Y: 
The NVOCC (Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier) Initiative 
 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Botto
m
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
  
Control
focus
Strategy driven: larger 
capacity solution 
Cargo Dev. (Initiator) / V.P 
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Project not embedded 
within organization 
Still very vague 
Various owners 
Control
focus
Operations / Sales Manager (Prod.
 End‘86 
Existing Cargo 
Develop unit
Strong ties 
in hierarchy 
Knowledge Decouple Cargo space from flights to get larger capacity
Operationalizing a strategic concept that is barely understood 
other than by two individuals at the corporate level 
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Strategic knowledge 
Operational knowledge
Resources Resources are not a problem. This is a 
Cargo MT initiative and mainly conceptual.  
Knowledge 
process
Concept not well understood.
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. 
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. 
- 
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Appendix Z: 
The BU Logistics Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l i
de
a:
  
O
ffe
r f
ul
l L
og
is
tic
s 
in
 B
us
in
es
s 
Control
focus
Strategy driven: A BU Logistics 
had been envisioned in the 
structure.  This needs to be 
filled in.
Strategy driven Fit with 
strategy
Control
focus
Discussion from 
structure, not from 
needs/capabilities 
Project vague 
Middle Man. refuses 
product champion role 
Various sponsors
Various middle managers (Prod. Champ.)
Cargo Dev. (Initiator) / V.P Sponsor 
Existing Cargo 
Develop unit
Strong ties 
in hierarchy
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
An organizational unit has 
been conceptualized, but it 
has problems materializing 
Knowledge Offer full Logistics in Business Unit
The initiative is still very abstract leading to a call 
from lower levels to operationalize it more.
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Strategic knowledge 
Logistics knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem because they are 
supplied by the Cargo MT and because the idea 
is still very conceptual programming the 
software. 
Knowledge 
process
The concept is not well understood
Integrative 
knowledge in 
various 
individuals
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in various 
individuals
- 
APPENDICES 
214 
Appendix AA: 
The Express Initiative 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Ex
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t  
id
ea
:  
Control
focus
Control
focus
The customer demand for 
an Express product was 
high. 
V.P. (Initiator)
Manager Express 
          (Product champ.) 
Project team 
(Implementers) 
Weak/Strong 
ties
Formal project
team
Formal project
team
Client demand Fit with 
strategy
Operations 
sponsors it
Smooth implementation: 
just dependent on 
cooperation of Passenger 
division 
Control
focus
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
 Depends on Passenger 
cooperation 
Manager Express 
               (Broker.) 
? 
Cargo Dev. (Discussant)
Knowledge Provide an Express product 
On the basis of specifications of other units, two people 
are developing a plan for operationalizing the product
Integrative  
Knowledge 
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language 
Operational knowledge 
Courier knowledge 
Resources Resources are not a problem. They are 
supplied by the BU Mail and the idea is still 
mainly on paper.  
Knowledge 
process
Everyone understands the concept 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. Implementation depends on cooperation by the 
Passenger Division Specialist 
Knowledge 
- Links to 
specialists
Integrative 
knowledge 
in team
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. 
Links to 
specialists
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Appendix AB: 
The E-Status Initiative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initiative 
Linking Interpretation Integration
Phases 
Organizational conditions
Administration
& Incentives
People (Roles) 
Organizational Form
Im
pl
ic
it 
 
A
pp
ro
va
l 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Pr
od
uc
t i
de
a:
  
Client driven 
V.P. (Knows about it) 
BU managers (Weak sponsor) 
Sales rep. (Initiator/product champion) 
In Chemical  
unit of BU
In Chemical  
unit of BU
Client driven Dependent on 
outside partner
Remains at a low level  
whilst clearly fitting  
the strategy 
Middle management  
is bottle neck 
Outcome – Too early to tell: 
 Continues 
 Depends on negotiations 
with outside partner 
Totally dependent on self-
drive front-liners (newly 
hired) 
‘92 
Cargo Development 
(Discussant)            
Control
focus
Control
focus
Knowledge Obtain license that allows transport of dangerous 
Getting the top to make an agreement with outside 
partner is difficult. Cooperation with this outside 
specialist (dangerous goods) partner is essential for
Integrative  
Knowledge
Knowledge 
bases
Common 
language
Dangerous goods knowledge 
Operational knowledge
Resources Resources are not a problem. The idea is 
mainly conceptual. 
Knowledge 
process
Only front-line employees understand the 
concept
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. 
Specialist 
Knowledge 
- 
Integrative 
knowledge 
in 2 indiv. 
Same 2 
individuals 
are specialist 
Implementation 
depends on 
agreement with 
outside specialist 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
ACHTERGROND 
 
De exploratie en exploitatie van kansen is essentieel, zoniet cruciaal, voor het overleven 
van bedrijven. Omdat het competitief voordeel van bedrijven over tijd erodeert, moet deze 
continu vernieuwd worden. Initiatieven vormen een belangrijke bron voor deze benodigde 
vernieuwing.  
 Het onderzoeksveld van ondernemerschap, waarbinnen de studie naar initiatieven 
valt, is onder te verdelen in (1) studies naar onafhankelijke starters en (2) studies naar 
ondernemende activiteiten binnen bestaande bedrijven. Deze studie is van het tweede type, 
ook wel ‘intrapreneurship’ genoemd. Binnen dit onderzoeksveld gaat onze interesse uit 
naar het initiatief, dat we kunnen beschrijven als “een proces waarbij individuen in 
organisaties kansen om toekomstige goederen en diensten te creeren identificeren en 
nastreven zonder acht te slaan op de middelen die nu onder hun controle staan, 
resulterend in een goedkeuring van die kans.” Het kan leiden tot (1) de creatie van nieuwe 
bedrijfsactiviteiten binnen de bestaande organisatie, (2) de complete transformatie van de 
bestaande organisatie, (3) een verandering in de wijze van bedrijfsvoering in de industrie 
en (4) een afscheiding, leidend tot de start van een separaat bedrijf.  
 De vraag hoe bedrijven om moeten gaan met initiatieven is vooral van groot 
belang voor grote ondernemingen. Ze zijn vanwege hun grootte vaak traag en daarom 
hebben ze behoefte aan nieuw initiatief. Door hun schaalgrootte zijn ze, echter, wel zeer 
goed in staat om hun bestaande competenties te exploiteren. Steken ze dus energie in de 
exploratie van nieuwe initiatieven dan ondermijnt dat hun exploitatievaardigheid. Het 
moge duidelijk zijn dat dit veel minder een probleem vormt voor kleine ondernemingen. 
Vooral grote ondernemingen moeten dus de paradox van exploitatie versus exploratie 
oplossen.  Initiatieven belichamen dit dilemma van verandering versus stabiliteit. Hoe 
moeten grote bedrijven dan met initiatieven omgaan? 
 
DOELSTELLING EN ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN 
Helaas, ontbreekt het aan antwoorden als het erom gaat hoe grote bedrijven om moeten 
gaan met initiatieven, omdat de ondernemerschapsliteratuur conflicterende bevindingen 
beschrijft, er een gebrek aan definities is en er onduidelijkheden bestaan over de 
organisationele context die initiatieven faciliteert. Deze studie stelt dat een gedeelte van de 
verwarring over initiatieven veroorzaakt wordt door het bestaan van twee perspectieven die 
nauwelijks samengevoegd zijn: de conditionerings- en kenniscreatieperspectieven. 
 Het conditioneringsperspectief stelt dat het de organisationele condities zijn die 
de voortgang van initiatieven bepalen. Het grootste deel van de ‘intrapreneurship’ 
literatuur is gebaseerd op dit perspectief. Het wordt bekritiseerd omdat het alleen naar de 
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organisationele context van condities kijkt die de selectie van initiatieven sturen, terwijl het 
faalt in het verklaren van hun creatie. De kenniscreatieperspectief stelt dat het de 
recombinatie van kennis is die de ontwikkeling van initiatieven bepaalt. Een groot deel van 
de innovatieliteratuur is op dit perspectief gebaseerd. Het gaat ervan uit dat verbanden naar 
andere kennis worden gemaakt, dat ideeën opborrelen als gevolg van deze 
kennisuitwisseling en dat deze dan verder ontwikkeld worden door het integreren van 
specialistische kennis. Dit perspectief wordt eveneens bekritiseerd, maar in dit geval omdat 
het alleen naar de interne processen kijkt, terwijl het faalt om te onderkennen dat 
kenniscreatie plaatsvindt in een organisationele context die zich ook met kennisexploitatie 
moet bezighouden. 
Beide perspectieven benadrukken andere aspecten en representeren daarom 
eenzijdige gezichtspunten van het initiatieffenomeen. Deze studie stelt dat een synthese 
nodig is aangezien organisationele condities en kennisontwikkeling op elkaar van invloed 
zijn en zo de ontwikkeling van initiatieven in verschillende richtingen kunnen sturen. 
Alhoewel er wel studies bestaan die deze kloof proberen te overbruggen, schieten ze tekort 
omdat ze causaal of conceptueel van karakter zijn. Het is vanwege dit hiaat dat deze studie 
zich tot doel heeft gesteld inzicht te verschaffen in de invloed van ondernemingen op de 
ontwikkeling van initiatieven door de conditionerings- en kenniscreatieperspectieven 
samen te voegen. Daartoe zijn, in hoofdstuk 1, de volgende vier onderzoeksvragen 
geformuleerd: (1) hoe ontwikkelen initiatieven zich in ondernemingen, (2) wat is de 
invloed van de organisationele condities op de voortgang van initiatieven, (3) wat is de 
invloed van de kennisbasis op de voortgang van initiatieven en (4) wat is de toegevoegde 
waarde van het combineren van beide perspectieven? 
 
THEORIE 
Allereerst wordt, in hoofdstuk 2, het conditioneringsperspectief nader bekeken volgens 
welke organisationele condities het traject van initiatieven bepalen. Deze condities zijn 
onder te verdelen in (1) de organisatievorm, (2) de planning- en beheersystemen en (3) de 
management rollen. Deze condities kunnen controlerend danwel ondersteunend van aard 
zijn. Initiatieven doorlopen verschillende stadia die elk een toenemende mate van absorptie 
door de onderneming beschrijven: variatie, selectie en retentie. Het initiatief is in de eerste 
fase vooral exploratief, in de laatste fase is het vooral exploitatief. Dit gegeven vormt de 
basis voor de eerste twee proposities. Propositie 1a stelt dat bedrijven die controlerende, 
in plaats van ondersteundende, organisationele condities verschaffen in de retentiefase van 
initiatieven een betere implementatie laten zien van initiatieven. Propositie 1b stelt dat 
bedrijven die ondersteunende, in plaats van controlerende, organisationele condities 
verschaffen in de variatiefase van initiatieven een betere generatie laten zien van 
initiatieven. De organisationele condities moeten dus van ondersteunend naar controlerend 
veranderen voor een succesvolle voortgang van het initiatief. Dit vormt de basis voor 
propositie 1c die stelt dat bedrijven die ondersteundende organisational condities in de 
variatiefase van initiatieven verschaffen en controlerende in de retentiefase van 
initiatieven, een betere algemene generatie en implementatie laten zien van initiatieven. 
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Conflict met de onderneming is dus vooral in de eerste fase te verwachten aangezien het 
initiatief dan ondersteunende condities benodigt om zichzelf te kunnen ontwikkelen terwijl 
het bedrijf behoefte heeft aan controlerende condities voor de exploitatie van haar 
bedrijfsactiviteiten. De condities van ondernemingen zijn, vooral in die eerste fase, niet 
specifiek ingesteld op initiatieven en werken in veel gevallen beperkend. Om met dit 
probleem om te gaan kunnen bedrijven (1) de striktheid van hun condities verminderen, (2) 
een aparte set condities voor initiatieven opzetten of (3) toestaan dat invloedrijke 
tussenpersonen, zogenaamde ‘champions,’ initiatieven door de stringente condities heen 
loodsen als zich conflicten voordoen.  
Het kenniscreatieperspectief wordt vervolgens, in hoofdstuk 3, nader bekeken. 
Deze beschouwt een initiatief als een kennisdeeltje dat zichzelf uit de kennisbasis van een 
onderneming ontwikkelt tot een separate eenheid. Daarbij doorloopt het initiatief drie 
fasen, namelijk (1) het verbinden van bestaande met andere kennis, (2) het interpreteren 
van de nieuw onstane kennis, en (3) het integreren van die kennis. Gedurende dit proces 
verandert het initiatief van idee, tot concept, tot gedetailleerde aktie en ontwikkelt 
zodoende een eigen kennisbasis, naast die van het bedrijf. Om dit mogelijk te maken is er 
nodig (1) een transformatie van brede naar diepe (specialistische) kennis, (2) een 
transformatie van een losse naar vaste koppeling van de teamleden en (3) een formalisatie 
van de onderlinge verhoudingen. Het voorgaande vormt de basis voor de volgende 
proposities. Propositie 2a stelt dat initiatieven die op brede, in plaats van diepe, kennis 
kunnen bouwen in hun verbindingsfase een betere generatie laten zien. Propositie 2b stelt 
dat initiatieven die op diepe, in plaats van brede, kennis kunnen bouwen in hun 
integratiefase een betere implementatie laten zien. Propositie 2c stelt dat initiatieven die 
op brede kennis kunnen bouwen in hun verbindingsfase en op diepe kennis in hun 
integratiefase een betere algemene generatie en implementatie van initiatieven laten zien. 
Door de beschreven transformatie bouwt het initiatief gedurende zijn levensduur een eigen 
vorm, administratie en rollen op, naast die van de onderneming.  
 Een synthese van beide perspectieven wordt, in hoofdstuk 4, geboden door middel 
van een zogenaamd co-evolutionair raamwerk. Dit raamwerk verduidelijkt dat de typen 
condities en kennis bij elkaar moeten passen en met elkaar moeten co-evolueren over tijd. 
Dit vormt de basis voor propositie 3a die stelt dat coevolutie van condities en kennis 
tijdens de verbindings-, interpretatie- en integratiefasen nodig is voor een succesvolle 
levensloop van initiatieven. Dit betekent, ten eerste, dat brede kennis vergezeld moet 
worden met ondersteunende condities en dat diepe of specialistische kennis vergezeld moet 
worden met controlerende condities. Een brede kennisbasis met ondersteunende condities 
resulteert namelijk in meer innovatieve initiatieven. Dit vormt de basis voor propositie 3b 
die stelt dat hoe meer ondersteundend de organisationele condities en hoe breder de 
kennisbasis in de verbindings-, interpretatie- en integratiefasen des te meer innovatief het 
initiatief. De integratie van specialistische kennis, daarentegen, vereist een sterke 
koppeling tussen de leden alsmede een sterke mate van formalisatie om de complexe 
kennis uit te kunnen wisselen: controlerende condities dus. Voor een effectieve 
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implementatie van initiatieven moet er dus een diepe kennisbasis met controlerende 
condities aanwezig zijn. Dit vormt de basis voor propositie 3c die stelt dat hoe meer 
controlerend de organisationele condities en hoe dieper de kennisbasis in de verbindings-, 
interpretatie- en integratiefasen des te beter de implementatie van het initiatief. De 
transformatie van kennis en condities tijdens het ontwikkelingsprocess van het initiatief 
staat bloot aan natuurlijke en door het management gestuurde dempingseffecten. Deze 
dempingseffecten moeten van een bepaald niveau zijn. Een gebrek aan demping kan tot 
overmatige chaos leiden en een te sterke demping leidt tot weinig innovatieve initiatieven. 
Condities en kennis grijpen dus op elkaar in, beïnvloeden elkaar en kunnen daarom als 
zodanig niet los van elkaar gezien worden.  
 
METHODE EN EMPIRIE 
De wisselwerking van condities en kenniscreatie is onderzocht bij 24 initiatieven in drie 
bedrijven, namelijk Ericsson Telecommunicatie, KLM Vracht en Van Ommeren. De drie 
bedrijven waren geselecteerd op basis van theoretische ‘sampling,’ in de zin dat elke van 
de drie bedrijven een duidelijk andere set aan organisationele condities had. Volgens het 
flexibiliteitsraamwerk van Volberda was Van Ommeren het meest planmatig, KLM Vracht 
het meest chaotisch, en Ericsson ETM ertussen in, zijnde flexibel. Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft 
deze selectie, volgens welke methodiek de initiatieven onderzocht zijn en bespreekt de 
validiteit van de verzamelde data  
De kenmerkende eigenschappen van de initiatieftrajecten voor elk van de drie 
bedrijven zijn eerst apart besproken in hoofdstukken 6,7 en 8. Bij Van Ommeren zijn zes 
initiatieven onderzocht. Hieruit bleek dat de meeste initiatieven investeringsvoorstellen 
betroffen, die in vergelijking met de andere onderzochte bedrijven niet erg innovatief 
waren, en waarvoor weinig kapitaal nodig was om ze te ontwikkelen. Het gecentraliseerde 
beslissingssysteem van het management en de raad van bestuur bepaalden de 
overlevingskansen van een initiatief. Autonoom gedrag buiten dit beslissingssysteem werd 
niet getolereerd en leidde tot het beeindigen van het initiatief. Echter, als initiatieven door 
het bestuur waren goedgekeurd werden ze goed geimplementeerd.  
Bij Ericsson zijn 10 initiatieven onderzocht. Initiatiefleden konden makkelijk in 
contact komen met andere dochterbedrijven, het hoofdkantoor of zelfs andere firma’s voor 
het verkijgen van kennis. Het opzetten van teams ging ook makkelijk bij Ericsson door de 
vele ervaring die men had met het opzetten van teams voor het acquireren van nieuw 
klanten. Er waren twee routes voor initiatieven: een ‘top-down’ en ‘bottom-up’. De laatste 
vond plaats via een process van consensus, dat weliswaar voor veel draagkracht zorgde, 
maar ook tot veel vertraging leidde en problematisch was voor de goedkeuring van 
radicalere initiatieven.  
Bij KLM Vracht zijn 9 initiatieven onderzocht. De initiatieven zijn vrij radicaal 
en ambitieus en zijn gebaseerd op een strategie die als verreikend wordt beschouwd in de 
luchtvracht industrie.. De meeste initiatieven komen van de top via de strategieeenheid, 
‘Cargo Development’. De ambiteuse strategie resulteert in een extreem brede kennisbasis, 
maar zonder de benodigde diepgang, resulterend in een chaotische situatie Bovendien 
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wordt het niet begrepen door de onderste laag en faalt het zodoende om initiatief te 
stimuleren. Vanwege de grote discrepantie tussen de visionaire strategie van de top en de 
recht-toe-recht-aan mentaliteit van de onderste laag heeft het middenniveau een moeilijke 
tijd om de top en onderste laag te verbinden De zwakke controlesystemen van KLM 
Vracht bemoeilijken de operationalisatie van de zeer conceptuele kennis en maakt 
implentatie een brug te ver voor de meeste initiatieven.  
De trajecten van de initiatieven van de drie bedrijven worden, in hoofdstuk 9, met 
elkaar vergeleken. Zo zien weinig innovatieve initiatieven het daglicht bij Van Ommeren, 
dat controlerende condities en een nauwe kennisbasis bezit, maar worden de initiatieven 
die er zijn goed geïmplementeerd. Er heerst een dusdanig sterk managementgestuurde 
dempingeffect dat er geen kans is voor de ontwikkeling van een bredere kennisbasis of 
meer ondersteunende condities. Bij KLM Vracht, dat ondersteunende condities en een 
brede maar ondiepe kennisbasis bezit, worden de meest innovatieve initiatieven 
gelanceerd, maar verloopt hun implementatie het meest moeizaam. Er ontbreekt een 
dempingeffect waardoor de brede kennisbasis en de ondersteunende condities alleen maar 
breder en meer ondersteunend worden in plaats van te convergeren naar de benodigde 
diepere kennisbasis en meer controlerende condities. Bij Ericsson zijn er zowel 
ondersteunende als controlerende condities en een brede en diepe kennisbasis aanwezig, 
die er voor zorgen dat de initiatieven meer innovatief zijn dan bij Van Ommeren maar 
minder dan bij KLM, en dat hun implementatie trager verloopt dan bij Van Ommeren maar 
beter dan bij KLM. Binnen de drie bedrijven zien we voorbeelden van initiatieven die een 
eigen set aan condities en kennisbasis proberen te creëren omdat dat van het bedrijf niet 
adequaat is. Deze initiatieven vertonen echter wel problemen as ze weer in het bedrijf 
geïntegreerd worden, omdat de kennisbasis en condities van het initiatief met dat van de 
onderneming op een lijn gebracht moeten worden. 
  
CONCLUSIES 
De bevindingen ondersteunen de proposities in sterke mate. De studie laat zien dat 
management een sterke invloed uit kan oefenen op de voortgang van initiatieven door het 
manipuleren van organisationele condities en de kennisbasis. Te weinig demping, zoals het 
geval was bij KLM Vracht, leidt tot een situatie waar geen convergentie van diepe kennis 
en controlerende condities wordt bereikt. Teveel demping, zoals het geval was bij Van 
Ommeren, leidt tot een situatie waarbij geen divergentie naar een breed genoeg kennisbasis 
en ondersteunende condities wordt bereikt. De tussensituatie, waarbij management een 
beperkte mate van demping uitoefent, zoals het geval was bij Ericsson Telecommunicatie 
zorgt voor een convergentie van een brede naar diepe kennisbasis en voor een 
transformatie van controlerende naar ondersteunende condities. Soortgelijke tussensituaties 
zijn eerder beschreven in de literatuur in de vorm van de ‘ambidextrous’ of gebalanceerde 
onderneming dat een mix aanhoudt tussen exploratie en exploitatie ofwel tussen 
verandering en stabiliteit. Dit gebeurt door binnen een onderneming bepaalde eenheden 
zich met exploratie en andere met exploitatie te laten bezighouden. Een andere 
tussensituatie is die van de duale of oscillerende onderneming die eenheden laat migreren 
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van een periode van exploratie naar één van exploitatie, en vice versa. Deze studie, echter, 
laat zien dat er binnen één eenheid op hetzelfde tijdstip verschillende condities kunnen 
bestaan die werkzaam zijn op verschillende fasen van het initiatief proces: ondersteunende 
op de eerste fase, en controlerende op de laatste fase. Managers dienen dus een duale 
managementstijl te bezitten, die zowel exploratief als exploitatief is, leundend zowel op 
een brede als diepe kennisbasis, en dienen deze over tijd per initiatief te differentieren.
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